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INTEGRATION HISTORY**

**REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE
L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE**

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION**

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The Fist of the Dwarf Formation, Organization and Representation of the Christian Trade Unions as a European Pressure Group (1945–1958)

*Patrick Pasture**

After the Second World War, the influence of the labour movement on socio-economic and political life increased all over Western Europe. The trade unions became important pressure groups. Little is known, however, about their European action, which at first sight seems to be much less significant than in the individual countries. This seems in particular to be the case for the Christian trade unions, although Christian Democracy played a vanguard role in the creation of the European community.

The following article contains an analysis of the way in which the Christian trade union movement attempted to act as a pressure group during the formation years of the European Community. The subject of this research is the organization of its action, mainly through the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), rather than the content of its arguments.¹

The Christian trade unions against a changed trade union backdrop

In labour circles, more than elsewhere, there was a desire for radical social change after the Second World War. This desire was partly translated, within the labour movement itself, into a marked struggle for unity and a break with pre-war ideological divisions. In Italy, Germany and Austria, this led to the formation of united trade unions which transcended the former philosophical differences. Behind the Iron Curtain, in countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, the Baltic states, Hungary and Romania, workers did not have the freedom to re-establish Christian trade unions in any case. In the Benelux countries, France and

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1. For a more general approach see P. PASTURE, "A la recherche du temps perdu? La CISC face à l'intégration européenne", in A. CIAMPANI (ed.), *L'altra via per l'Europa. Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell'integrazione europea (1947–1957)*, Milan 1995, p. 171–199.

This article is largely based upon the archives of the IFCTU/WCL, filed with the KADOC in Leuven (Belgium), of the ICFTU, the ERO (AERO) and the ERP-TUAC (ATUAC) at the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam and of the Belgian Christian Trade Union Confederation ACV/CSC at its headquarters in Brussels. We would like to thank these organisations for granting us access to their archives and their archives staff for their assistance. Unless otherwise stated, all references to documents of the IFCTU come from KADOC. We cannot give exact references to the archives of the ICFTU because they are being reorganized.

Switzerland on the other hand, where the pre-war trade union traditions had not been interrupted by fascism, war and occupation – or only for a short time and without so much disruption – attempts to achieve trade union unity failed from the start and “Richtungsgewerkschaften“, with their own philosophical principles, continued to exist. The Christian trade unions in these countries maintained mutual contacts via the IFCTU.

The IFCTU, which dates from 1920, was especially weak by the time the liberation took place.² It was particularly hard hit by the loss of the German and Italian Christian trade unions. Only in the Benelux countries and France, where the small CFTC (Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens) enjoyed great moral prestige as a result of its involvement in the resistance, did the Christian trade unions still really stand for something. Moreover, the central organization was seriously the worse for wear as a result of the occupation of its head office. Its pre-war accounts in the United States and Switzerland remained blocked for more than a year, so it could only get to its property with great difficulty. A disconcerting lack of financial clout made much action simply impossible. Its leadership was also found lacking. The president elected in 1937, Jules Zirnheld (France), had died in a German concentration camp and his successor, the Belgian Henri Pauwels, was accidentally killed in 1946. More important was that secretary-general Petrus Josephus Serrarens combined his function with membership of the Dutch Lower House, which took up a considerable amount of his time and attention. Only from 1947 there was really any kind of permanent organization, which still operated fairly haphazardly for a few more years to come. The IFCTU was therefore a loose association of a few Christian trade unions which as such offered few prospects. The organizational integration of the International Trade Federations into the international confederation was important and promising on paper, but no progress was made with a more efficient restructuring of professional action and, in practice, the International Trade Federations proved strikingly impotent for decades to come.

Nevertheless, the remaining Christian trade unions decided to retain the IFCTU as a form of cooperation and to expand it; with some hesitation, they remained on the sidelines, when the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was founded in 1945, and four years later they also decided not to join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), if that would mean that they would have to leave the IFCTU and give up the possibility of propagating Christian trade unionism. Perhaps the most important, deeper reason for this decision was that they would be jeopardizing their own *raison d'être* by entering into an association with socialists at international level, which they radically rejected in their own country; incidentally, trade union unity at national level was also a requirement for potential entry into the WFTU.

2. We are currently preparing a study on the history of the international action of Christian trade unions (to be published Oxford 1997). In the meantime see P. PASTURE, *Christian Trade Unionism in Europe since 1968. Tensions between Identity and Practice*, Aldershot etc. 1994 and G. BIANCHI, “La CMT/CISC: identité chrétienne et vocation syndicale (1945–1990)” in G. DEVIN (ed.), *Syndicalisme. Dimensions internationales*, La Garenne-Colombes 1990, p. 123–140 for a general overview.

Initial attempts at recognition in a European context

Within the framework of continuing international Christian trade union action, it was of primary importance to secure the international position of the IFCTU. Initially, this was possible through recognition by the new international institutions which were created in the post-war environment, but the IFCTU first had to increase its representativeness. With its limited resources totally ruling out worldwide active propaganda, the IFCTU concentrated primarily on Germany and Italy – even to the extent that it did not really support genuine, direct expansion possibilities in Ireland and Austria. However, the Christian democrat faction in the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) was able to join the IFCTU in 1949 as an ordinary member.

Until 1932/33, Germany had had a relatively strong Christian trade union which had represented up to 15% of German union members.³ After the War, a united trade union movement was formed. However, both Catholic and Protestant workers remained largely aloof from it; the few former militants and leaders of the earlier Christian trade unions that had survived fascism and war, committed themselves primarily to setting up the Christian democratic party CDU and often acquired important political posts. Mainly for political reasons, the CDU was never interested in a Christian trade union, certainly not if that meant a split of the united trade union DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund).⁴ In Italy, as in Austria, a more than substantial proportion of Catholics supported the united formula.⁵ Hope persisted in the IFCTU that the merger of Catholics and communists would not be viable for very long. The expectations of the IFCTU were not realised. In contrast to for example the American trade unions, it did not have the resources to exert real pressure. Moreover, it lacked insight into the new political and trade union relationships in Italy as well as in Austria and Germany. It was therefore completely taken by surprise, and severely hit, when the Italian Catholic trade unionists, led by Giulio Pastore – once they had broken away from the united trade union – formed a “free trade union“ rather than a Christian one, and then joined the ICFTU rather than the IFCTU.⁶ During the nineteen fifties, the IFCTU would seek to expand out-

3. M. SCHNEIDER, *Die christlichen Gewerkschaften 1894–1933, Politik und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* 10, Bonn 1982.

4. W. SCHROEDER, *Katholizismus und Einheitsgewerkschaft. Der Streit um den DGB und der Niedergang des Sozialkatholizismus in der Bundesrepublik bis 1960*, Bonn 1992.

5. For Austria see L. REICHHOLD, *Geschichte der christlichen Gewerkschaften Österreichs*, Vienna 1987. For Italy see F. ROMERO, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement*, London 1992 and G. BEDANI, *Politics and Ideology in the Italian Workers' Movement. Union Development and the Changing Role of the Catholic and Communist Subcultures in Postwar Italy*, Oxford/Providence 1995. Incidentally, in Italy there existed an association of Catholic trade unionists, the ACLI, aiming at spreading Catholic social doctrine among the labour movement and which in the eyes of the IFCTU had to keep alive the idea of a Catholic trade union movement.

6. This appears clearly from the discussions in the Confederal Board meetings of the IFCTU.

side Europe, without losing its European (primarily German) perspective, although ultimately without success.

Initially, the Christian trade union movement had to appeal to political “friends” in order to gain recognition. In this respect, it was able to count on the Netherlands and France in particular. Gaston Tessier, the president of the French Christian trade union CFTC and since 1947 also of the IFCTU, maintained good relations with the French Christian democratic party MRP (*Mouvement républicain populaire*) and especially with Georges Bidault, who was Foreign Minister from 1944 to 1948 and then again from 1953 to 1954. In the Dutch parliament, Serrarens was active in the field of foreign politics. In 1947, largely as a result of French and Dutch diplomatic pressure, the IFCTU was recognized as a consultative organization in United Nations category A, on an equal footing with the ICFTU and a number of other less important organizations.

The first real test for the IFCTU at European level came with the Marshall Plan. Right from the start, the Christian trade unions – as staunch anti-communists – supported the Marshall Plan.⁷ In order to avoid the WFTU being present at the first International Trade Union Conference in London on 8–9 March 1948, devoted to the participation of the trade unions in the European Recovery Programme (ERP), only national centres were invited, among whom also the Christian confederations. At this conference, it was decided to set up a Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to deal with the trade unions’ participation in the implementation of the ERP. The weakness of the Christian trade unions is reflected in the composition of the TUAC: of the 10 members, only one – Gaston Tessier – belonged to the Christian faction. However, Tessier did not hold his seat on behalf of the IFCTU, but on that of the CFTC.⁸ Also, the Frenchman was often replaced by an official of the CFTC. When midst 1948 in the TUAC an emergency committee was formed, there was initially no question of a representative of the Christian faction.⁹ Incidentally, the IFCTU was not involved in the implementation of the ERP in the various European countries: that was part of the competence of the national centres, which did not keep the IFCTU up-to-date with local situations and developments.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the Christian trade unions and, especially, the leadership of the IFCTU continued to support the ERP; it actually took steps to obtain recognition for the TUAC through the OEEC, which were not successful until December 1949.

The way in which the Christian trade unions made their voice heard at international level remained not chiefly via institutional means, but via the personal action of their leaders. Tessier, Serrarens, the president of the Belgian Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV/CSC) August Cool and others, played a considerable

7. Minutes of the 14th (meeting of the) IFCTU General Council, Strasbourg nov. 29–dec 1, 1947.

8. First International Trade Union Conference, London March 8–9, 1948 (ATUAC, 1).

9. ERP Report of the 2nd International Trade Union Conference ... London, July 29–30, 1948 (ATUAC, 1) and report of the 3rd TUAC, Paris, June 29, 1948 (ATUAC, 2) and the activity report of the third full conference of the trade union organizations participating in the ERP, Rome, April 18–20, 1950 (ATUAC, 1).

10. See for example the minutes of the 15th IFCTU General Council, Nancy, dec. 14–15, 1948. There are no indications that the situation improved later on.

part in the European Movement, which was formalized at the European congress in The Hague of May 1948.¹¹ Serrarens represented the Netherlands in the Study Committee for the European Union, which was set up by the countries of the Brussels Pact to study European integration, and which led directly to the formation of the Council of Europe. Serrarens, in his own words, was “not only the only Christian trade unionist, but also the only trade unionist ...“ on this committee.¹² The Dutchman was to become president of the Council’s committee for social affairs and, partly as a result of this, would give the IFCTU an authoritative voice in the European political forum.

The strategy of influencing European politics through personal contacts and representation in national delegations, for example to the Council of Europe, was officially ratified at the Confederal Board meeting of February 1949, at which the policy options of the IFCTU on European integration were discussed – one month after the international agreement on the Council of Europe and the first time that the question of Europe had been thoroughly debated by an administrative body of the IFCTU. At that important meeting, the IFCTU also decided, from the same viewpoint, to give its support to the initiative for the formation of a Movement for Christian Workers in Europe (MCWE). This movement would bring together both leaders of Christian trade unions and Christian trade unionists active elsewhere, such as in the German Christian democratic movement and the Italian ACLI, (Associazione Christiani Dei Lavoratori Italiani) or even non-confessional unions (such as the German DGB). In this way, the Christian trade union movement would be able to increase its representativeness considerably, especially in Germany and Italy. One may well wonder, however, whether joint action with people who sometimes were not sympathetic towards the formation of an independent Christian trade union in their own country (in particular in Germany), would have been so smooth. Originally, the IFCTU refused to acknowledge the movement as its own initiative, but eventually it was officially christened at the IFCTU congress in Lyon (31 May–2 June 1949) and even went on to enjoy some financial support from the IFCTU.¹³ Nonetheless, the MCWE would only exist at the mercy of its passionate secretary-general, Theo Grinevald. After his appointment to the ILO (International Labour Organization) as early as 1951, the movement was to dwindle away to nothing. From 1949 onwards the IFCTU would increasingly take the limelight in its own right.

The formation of the ICFTU in December 1949 represented a direct threat to the IFCTU. The pressure on the Christian trade unions to join this new anti-com-

11. Ph. CHENAUX, *Une Europe vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome*, Brussels 1990, p. 150.

12. Minutes of the 77th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Febr. 25, 1949.

13. At the inaugural conference of the ICFTU in London of November/December 1949, there was talk about a similar initiative with the creation of an international association of Catholic trade union leaders, active in Christian or in non-confessional unions. This association, to the image of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) which existed in the United States as well as in the UK, could replace the IFCTU if the Christian trade unions would affiliate to the new confederation. See *The Times*, Dec. 6, 1949 (press review in Archives IFCTU, 16).

munist international trade union federation was great. The Americans in particular would have liked to see the Christian unions in the ICFTU. However, the European socialist unions were not likely to promote this; initially, they had prevented the Christian unions, with the exception of the CFTC, from being invited to the inaugural conference. This move was only neutralized at the opening of the conference itself, after fierce protests from David Dubinsky of the AFL (American Federation of Labour) backed up by Pastore and the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations), and of course from the representatives of the only Christian trade union which had received an invitation, the CFTC. The inaugural conference of the ICFTU had left the way open for the Christian trade unions, which did however have to leave their international federation within two years.¹⁴ Irving Brown, the AFL representative for Europe and certainly no friend of the IFCTU, threatened all-out “war“ if the Christian trade unions did not accept the invitation.¹⁵

The extent to which the position of the IFCTU was in the balance became evident at a meeting of the TUAC in April 1950 in Rome, where the (highly anticlerical) Swiss confederation proposed transferring the functions of the TUAC to the ICFTU. This proposal provoked angry opposition from the Christian side.¹⁶ Eventually, it was decided to start talks with the leadership of the ICFTU and also to involve the IFCTU in these talks. In May 1950, the Confederal Board of the ICFTU accepted the transfer of the functions of the TUAC.¹⁷ That would then take place through its European Regional Organization (ERO). In practice, the Christian unions were more or less presented with a fait accompli.

Consequently, the Christian trade unions decided to leave the TUAC. The IFCTU set up its own Christian Trade Union Advisory Committee and asked the OEEC to recognize it, claiming that the transfer of the TUAC to the ERO cancelled its former recognition by the OEEC. The IFCTU was playing for high stakes: not only was recognition of its own Advisory Committee by the OEEC particularly unlikely, but, given experiences with the TUAC, it was not even inconceivable that the contribution of the trade unions to the ERP as such would again be at risk.¹⁸ As hoped, the action of the Christian trade unions led to new discussions with the ERO. Reports vary as to the outcome of these discussions: According to the IFCTU, the independence of the TUAC from the ICFTU was

14. ICFTU, *Official Report of the Free World Labour Conference and of the First Congress of the ICFTU*, London 1949. See also note 13.

15. A. Vanistendael in doc. 08-A of the 81th IFCTU Confederal Board, Utrecht, Dec. 23, 1949.

16. *Report on the 8th Session of the TUAC*, Rome, April 17–20, 1950 (ATUAC, 1). Although the agenda of this session was known, there was no representative of the Christian trade unions present on the first day, April 17, when the viewpoint of the Christian trade unions was presented by the general secretary of the TUAC, Walter Schevenels. See also 86th IFCTU Confederal Board, Paris, July 12–13, 1950.

17. Report of the ICFTU Executive Board May 25–27 and the minutes and activity report Jan. 1–Sept. 31, 1950 of the European Regional Conference of the ICFTU, November 1–4, 1950 (AERO, 1).

18. See in particular the report and preparing notes and documents of the 86th IFCTU Confederal Board Angers (F), December 19, 1950; of the 18th ICFTU General Council, Angers, December 20–21, 1950; the minutes of the 87th IFCTU Confederal Board Paris, Febr. 13, 1951 and the reports of the 9th and 10th TUAC, Nov. 3, 1950, Jan. 30, 1951 (ATUAC, 2).

saveguarded and the Christian representation guaranteed. For the ICFTU, however, the TUAC was as such retained, integrated as it was in the ERO, and therefore so was its recognition by the OEEC. The Christian unions as such were allocated one representative in the TUAC, as was also the case with the Americans. In practice, the ICFTU's interpretation was the one which was followed in all respects. The secretariat of the TUAC was to move from Paris to the headquarters of the ERO in Brussels, and Tessier, who from then on would represent "the CFTC and the other Christian trade unions"¹⁹, was appointed by the ERO and ratified by the Confederal Board of the ICFTU.²⁰ The Christian trade unions were not yet in a position to alter the humiliating position in which they found themselves.

Despite this, discussions behind the scenes had demonstrated that the IFCTU did have some political influence. It was to learn how to use this influence more effectively with the implementation of the Schuman Plan.

Towards a permanent position in the European institutions?

The IFCTU could fully endorse the basic principles of the Schuman Plan; they were after all heading along the lines in which the Christian trade unionists had already been thinking for some time. In particular, the Christian international federation attached great importance to the creation of a supranational authority which would not only promote economic expansion but would also have to have far-ranging social powers in order to deal with the social consequences of the integration of the relevant industries, especially during the transition period. However, in the long term too, a strong supranational organization was necessary to prevent protectionism and to make the pursuit of an efficient policy against syndicate and cartel formation possible. The Christian unions were however able to subscribe to the principles of a European community for coal and steel. They were certainly not over the moon about the fact that there was no place in Schuman's structure for the voice of the workers. The action of the Christian unions was therefore initially directed at ensuring representation for the workers, especially the Christian unionized workers, in the development and implementation of the Schuman Plan.²¹

In July 1950, a delegation from the IFCTU had a meeting on this subject with Robert Schuman himself. He said that the representation of the Christian workers in the institutions of the new community for coal and steel had to take place via the

19. Report of the 10th TUAC, Brussels, Jan. 30, 1951 (ATUAC, 2) and report of the 1st Office Committee of the ERO/ICFTU, Brussels, Jan. 31, 1951 (AERO, 7).

20. Minutes of the 87th IFCTU Confederal Board Paris, Febr. 13, 1951 and doc. 08-C and minutes of the 88th IFCTU Confederal Board, April 12, 1951. The particular interpretation of the agreement by the IFCTU is much clearer, however, in later documents, such as doc. 08-G for the 100th IFCTU Confederal Board, Geneva, June 3-4, 1953.

21. PASTURE, art. cit.

national delegations. However, in the plan there was also talk of advisory committees for employers, employees and consumers. The IFCTU demanded recognition of the international trade union movement as such.²² It believed that a joint body should be created which would form the link between the High Authority and the companies, not individual advisory committees. The appointment of a trade unionist to the High Authority was not enough: after all, this person would not be able to act as a representative of the trade unions.

On 15, 16 and 17 November 1950, the International Trade Federations held a conference entirely devoted to the Schuman Plan. Their opinion sounded considerably less positive than the initial reaction of the IFCTU. In particular, they demanded effective worker representation in the bodies and institutions of the Plan: the High Authority, the Consultative Committee, the Court of Justice and the Regional Groupings. The International Trade Federations and, in addition, the CFTC in particular, were also insisting on talks with the ICFTU in order to reach a joint arrangement, as well as with a view to distributing worker representation between the two sides.²³

In retrospect, these discussions between the two rival international trade union federations progressed relatively quickly. Even during their initial contacts at the beginning of December 1950, it was clear that a compromise put forward by the IFCTU representatives was possible. The basis of this compromise was that the ninth member of the High Authority – the one who would be co-opted by the national representatives – would have to be someone from the ICFTU, but that the IFCTU would “provide“ a judge in the Court of Justice. Even then, there was talk of Serrarens in this context, in addition to F.P. Fuykschot, secretary-general of the Protestant Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the Netherlands (CNV).²⁴ In April 1951, the two international federations reached an agreement on this matter, which also envisaged a distribution of worker representation in the Consultative Committee. The IFCTU would meticulously abide by this agreement, which was fairly beneficial for it, even when it subsequently appeared that Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi had agreed amongst themselves in April 1951 – without consulting the IFCTU! – to put forward Serrarens for the ninth seat in the High Authority. To make sure that someone from the Christian labour movement still got into the High Authority, in June 1952 Adenauer (!) suggested the Belgian Gaston Eyskens, who could possibly be designated as Belgium’s representative in the High

22. Not everyone agreed with this vision: for example, August Cool saw the IFCTU at the time chiefly as a contact body and a means of exerting pressure on national governments. See, also for an account of the meeting with Schuman, the minutes of the 86th IFCTU Confederal Board, Paris, July 12–13, 1950 and in general F.P. FUYKSCHOT, “Het Plan-Schuman en de arbeiders” [The Schuman-Plan and the workers], *Labor*, Aug. 1950, p. 55–56 (Dutch version).

23. Report and extensive documentation on this meeting of the International Trade Federations in Brussels, November 15–17, 1950 is to be found in the archives of the ACV/CSC (Archives of the presidency, August Cool, HV 7 [AC, HV 7], Meeting International Trade Federations File), at its headquarters in Brussels.

24. Minutes of the 86th IFCTU Confederal Board, Angers (F), December 19, 1950. It was clear, however, that a nomination of a trade unionist as a judge would be extremely difficult.

Authority.²⁵ However, Eyskens did not accept. Belgium eventually designated another Christian democrat, Albert Coppé. Although the ICFTU presented Coppé as a “friendly face“, it would never have a particularly warm relationship with him.²⁶ The “ninth seat“ was designed to Paul Finet, a Belgian socialist trade union leader.

The agreement between the IFCTU and the ICFTU stipulated that of the fifteen seats for the workers in the Consultative Committee, four would go to the Christian trade union movement.²⁷ The composition of the Consultative Committee was however part of the competence of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, many other “balances“ were at work in this composition, such as those between the relevant industries and between the countries, to which the international workers’ organizations had evidently not given enough consideration. In addition, the international association of executive staff was also demanding representation, which the IFCTU and the ICFTU fiercely opposed. The ultimate composition of the Committee therefore no longer corresponded to the intended agreement. The IFCTU had to climb down: it did indeed obtain four delegates and one observer – the IFCTU was a strong proponent of observers to make it easier to achieve “balance“²⁸ – but the total number of representatives of workers in the Consultative Committee was increased to seventeen from the planned fifteen. In other respects, the IFCTU had also tried to involve the labour movement, via the labour cooperatives, in the representation of the consumers, but it found no support for its view in the ICFTU at that time.²⁹ In terms of appointments to the bureaucracy of the ECSC (European Community of Steel and Coal) the Christian trade union movement felt completely left out in the cold. It believed that the Christian democratic politicians were putting

25. “According to the chancellor, it would be a lucky strike if Eyskens could accept this post and if his membership of the Christian labour movement could also be mentioned. Should this membership no longer exist, steps would have to be taken by Professor Eyskens to restore the situation so that the impression can be given to the outside world that the needs of Christian workers have to some extent been met. This is particularly important in the light of the possible change in the trade union situation in Germany and Italy“ (transl.). This was evident from a conversation between IFCTU deputy secretary-general, A. Vanistendael, and the German chancellor in June 1952, after rumours about opposition from Adenauer to the appointment of Serrarens as a judge in the Court of Justice. After clarification, Adenauer nevertheless supported Serrarens for the post of judge. Vanistendael to Cool, June 21, 1950 (AC, HV7, Schuman Plan File on prospective staff). Cool contacted Eyskens on this matter. The proposal was taken up by the Belgian government but Eyskens turned it down.

26. Doc. 09-A of the 95th IFCTU Confederal Board, Ghent (B), Sept. 26, 1952. However, Coppé was not popular in the ACV/CSC: as minister of Economic Affairs he was held responsible for the conservative economic policy under the Christian democratic government of Joseph Pholien. In January 1952 he had to exchange his post for the much less important ministry of Reconstruction. See P. PASTURE, *Kerk, politiek en sociale actie. De unieke positie van de christelijke arbeidersbeweging in België* (1944–1973), Leuven/Apeldoorn, 1991, p. 90.

27. Doc. 09-D of the 87th IFCTU Confederal Board, Paris, Febr. 13, 1951.

28. See for example Cool to P. Van Zeeland, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 4, 1952 (AC, HV 7, Meeting Monnet-IFCTU File).

29. See the correspondence in AC, HV 7, Correspondence IFCTU commission on the Schuman-plan file.

“Catholic considerations“ before the interests of Christian workers and giving ground to the socialists in terms of labour.³⁰

The IFCTU expressed itself publicly in favour of the ECSC. Still, it considered the workers inadequately represented. It therefore proposed setting up a special department in the High Authority to deal with relations with the trade unions.³¹ Initially, this met with a fair amount of resistance, particularly from Monnet himself. In addition, it was thinking about involving trade union experts in the activities of technical committees and about setting up joint consultative committees, representing workers, employers and consumers in the countries of the community. Thanks to joint pressure from both international trade union federations, at the end of 1953 a department was nonetheless set up to deal with relations with the trade unions. It became the setting for a new conflict concerning the appointment of representatives.³² However, the idea of national advisory committees never took off.

All things considered, the Schuman Plan did lead to considerable cooperation between the IFCTU and the ICFTU, although not without some difficulty. That does not alter the fact that relations between them were far from warm. In the Council of Europe, the two international federations largely worked alongside one another. Thanks to Serrarens and his successor as president of the Social Commission, the Belgian Christian-democrat Hendrik Heyman, the IFCTU managed to acquire considerable influence in this organization, much to the indignation of the ICFTU. At the end of 1951, both the ICFTU and the IFCTU suggested to the Council of Europe that it should involve the international trade union movement in its activities in a more structured manner.³³ At the time, the IFCTU’s preference was for a formula which would give the international trade union federations consultative status. Other proposals were also circulating, such as the European Movement’s proposal for setting up a Socio-Economic Council.³⁴

At the end of 1952, the initiatives of both international trade union federations led to an official question on the part of the Council of Europe about the possibilities of granting consultative status to the international trade union associations. Initially, the Council wanted a joint advisory committee to be formed between the two international federations, along the lines of the TUAC. The IFCTU was certainly in favour of this³⁵ – it may be assumed that it had suggested the idea itself – but the

30. This is all clear from the minutes of the IFCTU commission for the Schuman-plan in AC, HV 7, Reports IFCTU commission for the Schuman-plan file. The minutes of the meeting of this commission on December 17, 1952 in particular point at Coppé.

31. Report of a meeting of a IFCTU delegation and Jean Monnet Oct. 26, 1952 (AC, HV 7, Meeting Monnet-IFCTU File).

32. Doc. 08-B/II of the 102th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Jan. 7–8, 1954.

33. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, 1951, Fourth Ordinary Session, (second part), Documents, III, doc. 43, p. 721–737. Heyman had been Belgian Minister of Labour (1927–1932) and president of the ACV/CSC and of the Christian labour movement.

34. M. RUPPERT, *Le rôle des organisations syndicales dans les organisations de coopération européennes* (doc. 19/8), the report and resolutions of the 19th IFCTU General Council, Vienna, Nov. 21–23, 1951.

35. Doc. 08-F of the 97th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Dec. 1952; minutes of the 98th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Jan. 19–20, 1953.

ICFTU took the view that a joint committee implied too much recognition of the IFCTU. The latter certainly made a bad impression on the free trade unions at the time, partly as a result of an appeal to Franco to acknowledge trade union freedom – which gave the impression that the IFCTU would no longer isolate Franco if he would allow the development of Catholic trade unions. Furthermore, the attempts of the IFCTU to create Christian trade unions in various countries, including Germany, and thus to break through trade union unity, caused great irritation. In other respects, the ICFTU identified within Christian trade union circles a strand which wanted to wave goodbye to denominational trade unionism – by which it was referring to developments in France, which would indeed lead to the secularization of the CFTC in the long term.³⁶

After consultation with the ICFTU, the ERO rejected the Council of Europe's request for a common body and asked for individual recognition as a consultative organization. Eventually, both international federations were given individual status as category A consultative organizations in the Council of Europe, which made it possible for both of them to take part in the plenary sessions of the Common Assembly and in a number of committees – although the latter only progressed smoothly for the social affairs committee, at least for the IFCTU.³⁷

The situation in the TUAC in particular continued to fuel the anger of the Christian trade unions. Therefore, in 1951 negotiations were again necessary to gain their representation in the horizontal and vertical committees of the OEEC.³⁸ Provided talks on representation in the institutions of the Schuman Plan were going ahead, the IFCTU could not or dared not take a hard line against that situation. Also, the Christian trade unions were aware of the fact that the dispute between the two internationals caused much damage to the position of the labour movement in the OEEC.³⁹ But anyhow the trade unions did not really count for much in the OEEC. This was blatantly clear in the light of the discussions on the creation of the European Productivity Agency (EPA) at the end of 1952/beginning of 1953, in which the trade unions were not involved. Eventually, a consultative council was envisaged for the EPA, the members of which would be elected by the Council of the OEEC and, after much political pressure from the labour movement, a few trade union leaders were also able to be appointed in a personal capacity. The TUAC put forward two names for these appointments, Jack Tanner (TUC) and René Richard (Force Ouvrière).⁴⁰ Both were appointed – but so was August Cool, president of the Belgian ACV/CSC and vice-president of the IFCTU.

36. See the summarized minutes of the 7th Office Committee of the ERO, Paris, Jan. 14–15, 1953 and W. Schevenels, general secretary of the ERO, to the secretary general of the Council of Europe, March 19, 1953 (AERO, 7).

37. See previous note and the activity report in the report of the 23th Congress of the IFCTU, Vevey, June 25–28, 1958, p. 390–397.

38. Report of the 12th TUAC, Düsseldorf, Oct. 18, 1951 (ATUAC, 2).

39. See for example doc. 08-G of the 89th IFCTU Confederal Board, Lille (F), July 26, 1951.

40. W. Schevenels to G. Colonna, deputy secretary general of the OEEC, July 13, 1953 (ATUAC, 41). Schevenels had tried in vain to contact Tessier to find out the name of someone from the Christian side.

By the beginning of 1953, the TUAC was finding the inadequate and even dwindling influence of the trade unions in the OEEC intolerable. At a meeting of the TUAC on 12 February 1953, it threatened to break away. An on-the-spot meeting with deputy secretary-general Guido Colonna resulted in a temporary compromise, where a small delegation from the TUAC would regularly hold top-level talks with the OEEC leadership.⁴¹ This arrangement was the straw which broke the camel's back as far as the IFCTU was concerned, because it led to fears that nobody from the Christian side would be involved in that restricted delegation. In June 1953 – the major appointments in the ECSC having been made – the IFCTU asked its affiliates to withdraw from the TUAC. It then set up its own advisory committee for the second time, for which it again requested recognition from the OEEC.⁴² This step caused consternation among the ERO members of the TUAC. Even the secretary of the TUAC, Walter Schevenels, did not initially understand the reasons for this; he thought there had been a misunderstanding concerning the appointments to the consultative council of the EPA.⁴³

This time, there was no return of what had happened in 1950. The IFCTU's position was by now much stronger. It could count on support from the Christian democratic parties and from a number of governments where the Christian democrats were in the majority, particularly in Germany. Even the British and Scandinavian governments put pressure on the ERO to reach a satisfactory solution. In the long term, recognition of a Christian advisory committee was no longer inconceivable and the position of the trade unions in the OEEC was now at stake. In addition, experiences with the ECSC had taught the free trade unions that they could work with the IFCTU. After intense and difficult negotiations with the leadership of the TUAC and the OEEC, in autumn 1954 an agreement was reached, providing for the formation of a Joint Trade Union Advisory Committee (JTUAC), consisting of twelve delegates from the ERO and five from the IFCTU. Since that group seemed too large, a Small Joint Trade Union Advisory Committee was also set up, with four members from the free trade unions and two from the IFCTU. The Christian unions were guaranteed reasonable representation for all technical subcommittees and delegations of the JTUAC in the OEEC. In addition, both the ERO and the IFCTU retained their own internal advisory committee, their own secretariat and a liaison office in Paris. The IFCTU's proposal to appoint a secretary and a typist from the IFCTU at the TUAC's secretariat in Brussels was rejected by the ERO. The final result was not only much greater representation of the Christian trade unions, but also a greater contribution by the trade unions to the OEEC at all levels.⁴⁴

41. Report of the 13th TUAC, Paris, Febr. 12, 1953 and the note: "The present state and relations of ERO with the OEEC" (ATUAC, 2).

42. Doc. 08-G (provides a good summary of the problem of the IFCTU with the TUAC) and Minutes of the 100th IFCTU Confederal Board, Geneva, June 3–4 1953.

43. See in particular the summarized minutes of the 9th ERO Office Committee, Brussels, Nov. 9–10 Nov. 1953 (AERO, 7).

44. This question was treated at most meetings of the confederal board of the IFCTU and the ERO until September 1954; see in particular also the report of the meeting of the members of the ERO in the TUAC in Brussels, March 4, 1954 (ATUAC, 3).

The substantially improved position of the IFCTU in the European institutions, primarily in the ECSC, prompted it to make some organizational adjustments. A not unimportant effect of the jostle for seats in the ECSC was the replacement of secretary-general P.J. Serrarens, who was appointed judge in the Court of Justice, by the Belgian August Vanistendael. Where Serrarens often served in a capacity other than his function in the IFCTU – which was also the case with president Tessier and to a much greater extent – Vanistendael would devote himself entirely, with renewed enthusiasm and great energy, to the IFCTU. Vanistendael's main interest, however, did not lie with the old continent, but with the overseas areas: with the IFCTU, he would resolutely opt for expansion in the Third World, which would lead to renewed tension with the ICFTU. Another important event was the transfer of the head office of the IFCTU in 1952 from its peripheral location in Utrecht, the Netherlands, to Brussels.

In December 1951, a proposal was formulated to create a Council of Christian Trade Unions in Europe, which would as such be directly affiliated to the IFCTU.⁴⁵ However, the conditions for such an initiative were not ripe. The IFCTU confined itself to a coordination committee and a permanent liaison office in Luxembourg, staffed by one part-time collaborator. However, by mid-1953 the influence of the trade unions in the ECSC was considered entirely unsatisfactory and much weaker than that of the employers.⁴⁶ In addition, the IFCTU still had to deal with the absence of Christian trade unions in Germany. The only way to make up for this lack was to join forces to gain strength and thus transcend national contrasts. In order to achieve this, a proposal was made in the committee for the ECSC to combine the national trade unions for the metal industry, mining and white-collar workers in the countries of the ECSC into a federation and to coordinate them.⁴⁷ At the IFCTU council of October 1953, the Belgian ACV/CSC president August Cool opened the debate on this matter with his proposal to set up just such a supranational Christian trade union organization for the ECSC, which would also involve coordination between the national centres and the International Trade Federations. This organization had to be supported by its own well-equipped secretariat, with experts from the professional organizations.⁴⁸

However, when this plan was put into practice, it became evident that full integration was not feasible and activities progressed on the basis of a partial transfer of powers to a federation of Christian trade unions in the ECSC. In mid-1954, however, this formula also came up against fierce opposition from the CFTC, which believed it would be better to strengthen the powers of the existing committee for the ECSC; under pressure from France, the International Trade Federation of Mineworkers also

45. Doc. 09-C of the 91th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Dec. 16, 1951.

46. "Note sur activité et expériences du bureau de liaison CISC auprès de la CECA" [sic], s.l., s.d. (probably discussed at the meeting of the IFCTU commission on ECSC July 7, 1953 (AC, HV 7, Circulars and documentation of the IFCTU commission on ECSC file).

47. Note "Ontwerp betreffende de organisatie van de christelijke vakbeweging in de EKSG" [sic] (Draft concerning the organization of the Christian trade unions in the ECSC), July 7, 1953, *ibidem*.

48. A. COOL, *L'intégration économique et sociale de l'Europe*, document for the 21th General Council of the IFCTU, Brussels, Oct. 8–9, 1953 (see also his speech in the minutes of that meeting).

opposed renouncing its sovereignty in favour of a supranational federation. Relations with the IFCTU were posing problems too: was the new organization separate from the IFCTU or, on the contrary, did it have to be included in it? Eventually, the Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the ECSC (FCTU/ECSC) was only launched at the beginning of January 1955 as a loose federation of the relevant national professional unions (instead of International Trade Federations) and national centers, with the CFTC and the Christian trade unions of the Saar initially only attending meetings as observers.⁴⁹ The FCTU/ECSC was theoretically independent from the IFCTU but its secretary-general was represented in the Confederal Board of the federation, although he did not have voting rights. Incidentally, both shared the same Christian basic principles.⁵⁰ The IFCTU committee for the ECSC ceased to exist but was rapidly succeeded by a new committee for European questions, with subcommittees for (1) the OEEC, (2) the Council of Europe and other governmental European organizations, (3) the non-governmental European organizations and (4) Euro-African problems.⁵¹ Undoubtedly, these structural adjustments represented a reinforcement of the international Christian trade union movement at European level.

Recovery with a handicap?

After a few years, enthusiasm for European integration waned on a large scale. Nonetheless, the Christian trade unions did not throw in the towel. At its Confederal Board meeting in Algiers in March 1953, the IFCTU backed the proposal from the European Movement for a tripartite socio-economic council as a way of giving Europe more substance.⁵² This possibility was examined mainly in the Council of Europe – the IFCTU believed that the Council in particular should be the driving force behind European integration.⁵³ Within the context of these discussions, the Christian trade unions supported the idea of a European regional labour conference, to be organized jointly by the ILO and the Council of Europe.⁵⁴ In addition,

49. Official, published documents from the IFCTU quote 23 March 1954 as the date of birth of the federation. At that time, however, there was by no means any agreement on its structure. A solemn presentation even had to be cancelled at the last minute in September 1954. Reports IFCTU Confederal Board and IFCTU committee on ECSC (AC, HV 7, Reports IFCTU committee on ECSC File). Initially, the French name was “Cartel des syndicats chrétiens ...”. However, this name was changed at one of the first executive board meetings, in May 1955, to “Fédération des syndicats chrétiens”.

50. See the reports of the IFCTU committee on ECSC (AC, HV 7, IFCTU committee on ECSC File); the reports of the meetings of the FCTU/ECSC Board (AC, HV 13, FCTU/ECSC File); doc. 105-04-1.1 (referring to cc 145/54 and cc 146/54) and the minutes of the 105th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels Sept. 9, 1954; doc. 107-04-1.1 of the IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, March 9–11, 1955. R.C. BEEVER, *European Unity and the Trade Union Movements*, Leyde 1960, p. 112–114 provides a general description of the FCTU/ECSC.

51. Doc. 04-1.1 of the 108th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, May 18, 1955.

52. Doc. 08-C and minutes of the 99th IFCTU Confederal Board, Algiers, March 16–17, 1953.

53. See for example 21th IFCTU General Council, Brussels, Oct. 8–9, 1953.

54. Doc. 09-1.3 of the 108th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, May 18, 1955.

various leaders from Christian trade unions were included in the Monnet Committee. Although in general the trade unions felt left out of the discussions on European unification, the Monnet Committee formed an exception in that respect.⁵⁵

Eventually, however, the impetus for European recovery came from the European ministers' conference of June 1955 in Messina. Although the IFCTU was very sympathetic to the idea of an integrated Europe, it reacted with great reticence to the plan for economic recovery: after all, the trade unions were in no way involved in this initiative and the foreign ministers of the ECSC countries had not envisaged any contribution by the unions in the further implementation of the plan. Experiences with the ECSC had taught the Christian trade unions that it was of the utmost importance to be present at the beginning of the discussions, "because the question of the social and economic unification of Europe is not a matter simply for government officials, nor for a few major industrialists or banks, but for the entire European population and therefore European workers in particular."⁵⁶ That is why the IFCTU expressly wanted the Christian unions to be involved in the further implementation of the decisions; on 26 August 1955 it directed this question to the president of the conference, Paul-Henri Spaak, and again at the end of September to the various foreign ministers and the intergovernmental committee.⁵⁷ Firstly, the IFCTU attempted to have the social partners and, therefore, representatives of the Christian unions too, included in the national delegations to the intergovernmental committee. However, that was only successful for the Belgian delegation. In addition, it also asked to be recognized as a consultative organization, but in vain. The IFCTU sought support for its demands from the ICFTU, whose interests were largely similar. However, since the formation of a new Christian trade union movement in Germany in particular, relations between the two international federations had badly deteriorated and the ICFTU steered well clear.⁵⁸

Through the Monnet Committee, the IFCTU was aware of the discussions in the intergovernmental committee and therefore knew that these were developing along unfavourable lines. It tried to exert influence via all sorts of contacts, but without

55. See for example the moral report of the 22th IFCTU Congress, Antwerp, Dec. 12–14, 1955, ch. 3.

56. Quoted from a preparatory document for the 4th FCTU/ECSC Board Luxembourg, Sept. 2–3, 1955 (AC, HV 13, FCTU/ECSC File). See also PASTURE, art. cit. and BEEVER, o.c..

57. In August 1955, a small committee laid the foundations for a detailed viewpoint of the Christian trade union movement towards the decisions of the Messina conference. On 8 September the IFCTU's European committee approved a European manifesto for the IFCTU (*Manifeste Européen de la CISC*) with a general political viewpoint and a technical note ("Note concernant la Conférence de Messine et le programme de 'relance' européenne"). See doc. 09-3.2 of the 109th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Oct. 6–9, 1955. Both documents were subsequently ratified by the various administrative bodies. See also PASTURE, art. cit.

58. The documents and minutes of the IFCTU Confederal Board meetings, which include summary minutes of its commission for European questions (more extensive reports and documentation in AC, HV 14, several files with documents of the IFCTU commission for European questions) give a good overview of the policy of the IFCTU. See also summary reports of the 10th ERO-ICFTU Executive Committee, Brussels, May, 16–17 1957 and the minutes of the 16th ICFTU Executive Board, New York Dec. 12–16, 1955 (special attention given to the relations with the Christian trade unions).

much success. As an alternative, it tried to do something about the social dimension of Europe via the Council of Europe. This involved going back to the project for a European social charter and setting up a socio-economic council, which had been submitted to the Council of Europe for examination in 1953.⁵⁹ Ultimately, however, the Christian unions only seemed to have any influence in the social affairs committee and the plan for a social charter and a socio-economic committee continued its *Via Dolorosa*, despite all pressures. After discussion in the social affairs committee, it was referred to the economic committee which reached entirely different conclusions. The general affairs committee also had its say in the matter. In October 1956, a heavily diluted draft of the social charter – described as “unacceptable” by the ERO – was submitted to the Common Assembly. Contrary to the expectations of the IFCTU, the Assembly passed the question over to the Committee of Ministers. This in turn presented it to its social committee. The Christian trade unions had not the slightest influence on this committee, consisting only of civil servants. It is therefore little wonder that at the end of 1956 the IFCTU began a protest campaign.⁶⁰

Furthermore, it became clear that the position of the Christian trade unions in the ECSC also left much to be desired. In November 1955 a serious incident occurred in the Consultative Committee between the workers’ representatives on the one hand, which wanted the ECSC to fulfil a more active social role, and the employers, on the other hand, who claimed that the ECSC did not have the authority to interfere in matters of employment conditions and social provisions.⁶¹ This conflict was temporarily settled but it had clearly demonstrated the limited possibilities open to the ECSC and the High Authority – a situation which the governments consciously endeavoured to maintain. Moreover, the FCTU/ECSC had to cope with the recalibration of the CFTC metalworking trade federation, which first of all failed to meet its financial obligations and then went on to apply to the International Trade Secretariat for Metalworkers in 1957.⁶²

The above situation indicates the fundamental weakness of the Christian trade unions at a political level. In the Common Assembly of the ECSC, only four Christian democratic delegates out of 36 had links with the labour movement (reduced to only three after 1957). This observation, which some Dutch media made the most

59. “Le syndicalisme chrétien et les questions européennes“, resolution of the 23th IFCTU Congress, Antwerp, Dec. 12–14, 1955; minutes of the meeting of the IFCTU commission for European questions (IFCTU-CEQ), Jan. 16, 1956 (Doc. 09-1 of the 110th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, April 11–12, 1956) and the minutes of the other meetings of that commission (AC, HV 14, Documents IFCTU-CEQ 1955–1956 File).

60. J. KULAKOWSKI, “De Raad van Europa en de arbeiders“ [The Council of Europe and the workers], *Labor*, Dec. 1956, p. 249–251 and minutes of the IFCTU-CEQ documents quoted in the previous note; and the moral report of the 13 IFCTU Congress, Vevey, June, 24–25, 1958, p. 256 ff (Dutch version). The Social Charter was not approved before 1961. For the opinion of the ERO see the minutes of its Executive Committee meetings in AERO, 8 (in particular of its 6th meeting Brussels, Nov. 6, 1956) and of the ICFTU/ERO Committee on European social integration 1956 ff.

61. Comment on the agenda and press release of the 5th IFCTU/ECSC Board, Luxembourg, Nov. 18, 1955 (no minutes) (AC HV 13, Meetings IFCTU/ECSC 1955–1956 File).

62. Reports of the meetings of the IFCTU/ECSC in AC, HV 13, Files with meetings and documentation of the IFCTU/ECSC 1955–1958.

of in mid-1956, provided the initiative for contacts with the International Union of Christian Democrats (Nouvelles Equipes Internationales NEI), however without any fundamental changes in the situation. As indicated earlier, the IFCTU did not maintain good contacts with Albert Coppé, the president of the general affairs committee in the ECSC – ultimately relations with Finet were much better.⁶³

The IFCTU launched another last-ditch offensive to steer the draft treaties along a course more beneficial to the workers, concentrated mainly in the period between November 1956 and early 1957, when discussions on the draft EEC and Euratom treaties were in their closing and definitive stages. It insisted chiefly on greater powers for the European Commission, which had to be able to pursue a voluntarist economic and social policy and on the involvement of the social partners in European policy, via an economic and social council with the right of initiative and with advisory powers vis-à-vis both the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Sometimes it used strong language and even explicitly threatened to refuse to support European integration and the treaties.⁶⁴ On 1 February 1957 the IFCTU had a meeting with the president of the Intergovernmental Committee, Spaak. However, it was a sobering experience since in fact it was Spaak who gave the delegation a good roasting, criticizing “the absence of genuine European trade union action with a firm foundation in the national organizations”⁶⁵ – which did not immediately disarm the action of the IFCTU. Nevertheless, the battle seemed to be over; on 25 March the treaties were signed by the foreign ministers of the six countries in question.

Somewhat surprisingly in the light of the above, the opinion of the IFCTU on the Treaty of Rome ultimately sounded fairly balanced, certainly compared to that of the ERO, although the IFCTU also acknowledged that workers were inadequately represented in the new institutions, as compared to the ECSC.⁶⁶ There is no obvious explanation for this more moderate attitude. Although the IFCTU has always said that its positive attitude to European integration was not based on matters of principle but was pragmatically motivated⁶⁷, it seems to us that the very fact

63. Information, incl. press cuttings, in AC, HV 13, IFCTU/ECSC 1956 and Minutes and documentation 1957 Files.

64. Minutes and press release of the special meeting of the IFCTU-CEQ Jan. 4, 1957 (doc. 09-1.2 of the 115th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, May, 15–16, 1957); A. COOL, “De arbeiders en de Europese gemeenschap” [The workers and the European community], *Labor*, Dec. 1956, p. 243–245. The reports of the IFCTU Confederal Board and the Commission for European questions give a good account of the IFCTU’s policy and actions.

65. Minutes of the special meeting of the IFCTU-CEQ Jan 4, 1957 (doc. 09-1.2 of the 115th IFCTU Confederal Board, 115th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, May, 15–16, 1957).

66. Doc. 09-1.2 of the 115th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, May 15–16, 1957. See also BEEVER, o.c., 147–169. Later on, the IFCTU would even state that the Treaty on the EC was the first international treaty giving so much attention on social issues. See in particular J. ALDERS, *Le programme social des organismes européens*, report for the 26th IFCTU General Council, Strasbourg, Dec. 9–11, 1959.

67. “La position de CISC en faveur de l’intégration européenne n’a rien de dogmatique mais revêt un caractère purement empirique”. *Note concernant la Conférence de Messine et le programme de ‘relance’ européenne*, July 14, 1955, doc. 09-3.2 (ann.) of the 109th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Oct. 6–9, 1955.

of a common market was itself considered important. The evaluation of the ECSC also seems relevant: despite all the criticism about insufficient representation for the workers and the lack of social powers, the IFCTU still had to acknowledge that the ECSC had brought significant advantages for the workers and that the dreaded negative effects of its implementation had not materialized. In addition, despite the fact that the international trade union organizations did not contribute directly to ECSC policy via the High Authority, in 1957 the IFCTU still felt that the trade unions were being listened to and that they had acquired more influence than was strictly provided for under the Paris treaty. Last but not least, cooperation within the ECSC had considerably increased solidarity between workers in various countries – that was certainly the case for the labour representatives in the European institutions.⁶⁸

Looking towards the new institutions of the Common Market and Euratom, at the beginning of 1957 the IFCTU was searching for ways of safeguarding and strengthening the position of the Christian trade unions in Europe. An initial proposal was to resuscitate the Movement for Christian Workers in Europe (MCWE). Although the Confederal Board had initially supported this proposal, the idea was quietly dropped afterwards, mainly because the MCWE with the support of the German CDU could possibly have developed as an alternative to the IFCTU. Moreover, the IFCTU, in contrast to the situation in 1949, now had much better contacts in the European institutions and with the Christian democrats.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, in February 1957 the IFCTU decided to tighten its links with the NEI, which had developed cautiously since the 1955 IFCTU congress. In particular the FCTU/ECSC was dissatisfied with its limited influence in the Common Assembly.⁷⁰ However, the IFCTU had to tread gently because the NEI, which did not exactly represent the most socially-minded Christian democrats (barring exceptions), was extremely wary of “patronage” by the IFCTU. Nevertheless, several discussions and joint meetings followed between the IFCTU and the FCTU/ECSC on the one hand and the leadership of the NEI on the other hand, as well as with the Christian democratic fraction in the Parliamentary Assembly. The Catholic employer’s organization UNIAPAC was also involved in these talks. Ultimately, the closer contacts would lead primarily to joint pressure for appointments. There was also systematic consultation with the ICFTU on this matter. The most important result of the Christian trade union side was the appointment of Roger Reynaud to the

68. See in particular the evaluation of the ECSC by A.C. DE BRUIJN, secretary of the FCTU/ECSC, “Schijnwerpers op de Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal” [Spot-lights on the ECSC], *Labor*, Dec. 1956, p. 252–256; and some speeches in AC, HV 13, Minutes and documentation FCTU-ECSC 1958 File.

69. Doc. 11-1 and minutes of the 114th IFCTU Confederal Board, Heerlen (NL), Febr. 27–28, 1957; doc. 04-2.2 of the 116th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Sept. 26–27, 1957 and reports of the commission of European questions, Oct. 4, 1956 and July 1957, AC, HV 13, Documents IFCTU-CEQ 1955–1956 File.

70. Minutes and doc. 10-1 of the 114th IFCTU Confederal Board, Heerlen (NL), Febr. 27–28, 1957. See also the moral reports of the 13th IFCTU Congress, Antwerp, Dec. 12–14, 1955 and of the 14th Congress, Vevey, June 25–28, 1958.

leadership of the ECSC, replacing René Mayer. Important as it was, this appointment was only a success in relative terms, since the IFCTU had a good impression of Mayer and had put forward Reynaud or the Belgian Gaston Eyskens for the European Commission. The Christian trade union movement would not receive any posts in the commission, not even among the directors of the directorates-general. In the Economic and Social Committee the Christian trade unions obtained ten of the thirty-one seats for labour representatives, out of a total of one hundred and one.⁷¹ All things considered, this cooperation regarding the new communities did not entirely seem to have produced the desired result for the IFCTU.

As was the case with the creation of the ECSC, the formation of the EEC led to a restructuring of the international Christian trade union movement: at the end of the day, a strong trade union structure was the best guarantee of an efficient representation of interests. The most important defender of that new structure was again August Cool. He was a radical advocate of an independent, interdenominational and supranational European organization with the national centres forming one pillar and the national unions the other, along the lines of the national centres. This principle of organization was approved at the Confederal Board meeting of September 1957 and ratified by the General Council two months later.⁷² At a conference held in January 1958, the International Trade Federations also asked to be involved in the new organization; they proposed A.C. De Bruijn, secretary of the FCTU/ECSC, as a candidate for the post of secretary of the new organization.⁷³ However, the Dutch and French confederations were strongly opposed to the presence of the International Trade Federations in the European Organization. The

71. On these contacts see in particular Doc. 09-1.1 and Doc. 10-1 (with in annex a.o. “Note faisant suite à l’entretien du 4 avril entre MM Coste-Floret pour les NEI et Vanistendael et Kulakowski pour la CISC”) of the 115th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, May, 15–16, 1957; minutes of the meeting of the IFCTU-CEQ, in presence of August De Schryver, President of the NEI, July 4, 1957 (AC, HV 14, EO/IFCTU File and summarized in Doc. 04-2.2 of the 116th IFCTU Confederal Board, Sept. 26–27, 1957); Doc. 04-1.1 of the 117th IFCTU Confederal Board Brussels, Nov. 18, 1957 (conc. conference of Christian Democrats); Report on the encounter of the IFCTU, the FCTU/ECSC and the Christian Democrat members of the Common Assembly, Luxembourg, Febr. 6–7, 1958 in doc. 04-6.2 and doc. 09-1.1 of the 118th IFCTU Confederal Board, Geneva, Febr. 20–21, 1958; several documents in AC, HV 13, FCTU/ECSC 1956, 1957 and 1958 Files; Personal Archives A.E. De Schryver, 4.11, 5, 6.3, 6.5 and 7.2 (Leuven, KADOC), Archives confédérales CFDT (Paris), Série P, 1 P 12 and Archiv der Christlich-Demokratischen Politik (Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt-Augustin bei Bonn), IX-002. Also see CHENAUX, o.c., p. 273–275.

72. A. COOL, “De arbeiders en de Europese gemeenschappelijke markt” [the workers and the common market], *Labor*, Dec. 1956, p. 243–245; A. COOL, “La structure du mouvement syndical chrétien considérée en fonction de l’intégration progressive de l’Europe”, Doc. 116-04-1.1 and minutes of the 116th IFCTU Confederal Board, Sept. 26–27, 1957 and A. COOL, *La structure des organisations syndicales chrétiennes en Europe dans la perspective de la réalisation de la Communauté européenne*, and minutes of the 25 IFCTU General Council, Amsterdam, Nov. 20–22, 1957. According to R.C. BEEVER, o.c., p. 257, Cool, “in his advocacy of trade union integration, appears to have gone farther than any other trade union figure in Europe has done, in public”. The IFCTU had set up a special commission to study its European structures as early as July 1956.

73. Report of the meeting of the International Trade Federations and the IFCTU European commission, Luxembourg, Jan. 23, [1958] (AC, HV XIV, OE/IFCTU – European commission File).

degree of supranationalism of the new organization compared to the powers of the national centres, and the correct relationship with the IFCTU and the FCTU/ECSC, also were subject of discussion.⁷⁴

The European Organization of the IFCTU (EO/IFCTU) was officially inaugurated on 27 May 1958, well before all the problems had been solved.⁷⁵ Its leadership was in the hands of a committee consisting of twenty-four representatives of the national centres, although twelve of them were chosen among leaders of affiliated national trade unions. In addition, regular “conferences“ were envisaged and there was a restricted committee to deal with day-to-day management. The secretariat was assumed by the promising IFCTU secretariat employee, Jan Kulakowski, assisted by De Bruijn, while liaison offices were retained at the OEEC in Paris and the ECSC in Luxembourg. Unlike the FCTU/ECSC, the EO/IFCTU as such was part of the IFCTU, although it could pursue an independent policy. In Cool’s plan, the EFCT/ECSC had to merge with the EO, but these talks turned out to be particularly difficult – partly as a result of obstruction by De Bruijn – and dragged on until 1962. Only then did the professional action in the EO acquire its own position and until then the Federation continued to exist independently of the EO. In the meantime, the IFCTU committee for European questions had been transformed into a permanent committee with six representatives from the national centres, three representatives of the International Trade Federations and one delegate for the overseas areas.

Conclusion

In 1958, the IFCTU seemed fairly satisfied with its position in the European Community. It believed that it had considerably overtaken the two other federations: the WFTU would never have been able to rid itself of its purely negative and destructive standpoint and the ICFTU would not have been able to influence European politics as a result of its excessive internal disunity and its “sensitivity“ to the political fluctuations of the socialist parties. By its own admission, the FCTU/ECSC in particular had performed “pioneering work“ in trade union circles.⁷⁶

But we will leave this somewhat flattering self-evaluation to one side. Even if it is difficult to assess the mutual influence of the international trade union federations, it must nevertheless be noted that the ERO dates back to 1950 and the ICFTU-Committee of the 21 to 1952 – well before the creation of the FCTU/

74. See the discussions in the meetings of the IFCTU-CEQ 1957–1958 (AC, HV 14, *ibidem* and HV 13, Meetings and documentation FCTU/ECSC 1958 Files – summary minutes in preparatory documents for the IFCTU Confederal Board) and of the board meetings and documents of the FCTU/ECSC (AC, HV 13, Meetings and documentation FCTU/ECSC 1958 File).

75. Besides the minutes and documents of the FCTU/ECSC (see note 81) see in particular doc. 04-5.2 of the 119th IFCTU Confederal Board, The Hague, May 7–8, 1958 and doc. 09-2 of the 120th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Oct. 22–23, 1958.

76. Moral Report of the 13 IFCTU Congress, Vevey, June 25–28, 1958.

ECSC. The innovative nature of the latter is also a subject for discussion.⁷⁷ The position of the IFCTU was in other respects not yet entirely secure: posts in the EEC and Euratom were not yet finalized or the Christian trade unions again had to cope with an ICFTU offensive in the OEEC, since the former considered the Christian unions over-represented in the JTUAC and pushed for the creation of a socio-economic council for the whole of the European free trade zone – where the Christians stood for virtually nothing.⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the evolution of the IFCTU is remarkable, considering that its very survival was in no way guaranteed after the war. It was isolated within the international trade union movement, even battling with out-and-out hostility from the ICFTU, which was so much larger and claimed a monopoly on defending the freedom of the workers from communism; in this respect it could count on the support of the governments of the most powerful states, chiefly the United States. In Europe itself the IFCTU only had members in a few countries – not even in the heart of Western Europe – and nowhere did it represent the majority of trade unionists. It is almost a miracle that despite this it managed to carve out a niche for itself in Europe.

The IFCTU can largely attribute its relative success to the diplomatic and political talent of its leaders. In an initial phase, the IFCTU was only able to survive thanks to the diplomatic support of Paris and The Hague; later Belgium would also form an important political and diplomatic anchor, particularly during the period of the homogenous Christian democratic governments between 1950 and 1954. The leaders of the Christian trade unions committed themselves as prominent Catholic personalities in the European movement. In this way, they came to form part of the informal and semi-formal circuits of the Christian democratic political elite, which also counted the “Godfathers” of European integration – Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi – among its members. It was through these contacts that the leadership of the IFCTU succeeded in a first-degree diplomatic tour de force: obtaining practical support from the German Christian democrats for the position of the Christian trade union movement in the European institutions.

This support was far from a foregone conclusion; on the contrary, the German Christian democrats were seriously unhappy about the IFCTU’s attempts to encourage the formation of Christian trade unions. The fact that the IFCTU did succeed in practice in convincing the CDU and Adenauer especially that it should keep the “Catholic interests” of the IFCTU uppermost (which not all Christian democratic parties succeeded in doing incidentally) was perhaps only possible as a result of the DGB’s increasingly turning to the SPD during the nineteen fifties. Given the hesitant attitude of the German episcopacy to the principle of Christian trade unionism, it is unlikely that the IFCTU could count on much support from the church, although it should not be ruled out entirely: as a result of his regular trips to Germany, Vanistendael was able to build up a very close relationship with certain

77. According to J. WINDMULLER (*The International Trade Union Movement*, London/ Frankfurt/ Antwerp 1980, p. 128) the Committee of the 21 was much more autonomous and supranational than the FCTU/ECSC. Compare however BEEVER, o.c., p. 112–114 (and note 72).

78. Doc. 09-2 of the 120th IFCTU Confederal Board, Brussels, Oct. 22–23, 1958.

ecclesiastical circles, particularly with Cardinal Frings, archbishop of Cologne, who had a considerable influence on Adenauer.

However, no formal institutional links existed between the IFCTU and the Christian democracy, besides those via rather informal meetings such as the conferences of the presidents of the Catholic organizations or the meetings of the International Federation of Christian Labour Movements (Fédération Internationale des Mouvements Ouvriers Chrétiens). On their own, these meetings were of no importance whatsoever, but they did sometimes provide an opportunity for discussion in the corridors and they created a certain atmosphere of confidentiality. In a number of countries Christian democracy was strong and, at least in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France (where political Christian democracy as important political force did not last for very long), a close relationship existed between the union and the party.

However, we must add an important note at this point. Undoubtedly, the IFCTU was able to enjoy political support and recognition alongside the ICFTU, although even that was not all plain sailing. However, this political link was a good deal less efficient at achieving its objectives. All things considered, the contribution and influence of the trade unions in the European institutions remained extremely limited. Certainly the Christian trade unions did not have the necessary direct political influence in the places where European policy was formulated; particularly on the level of national ministries of foreign and economic affairs, they were largely out of the running. The course of the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Rome is more than significant in that context.

Despite the fact that the position of the IFCTU in the European institutions of 1957 was respectable, its future was nonetheless uncertain. Its major problem continued to be that its power in Europe was concentrated in a few countries. The Third World offered the IFCTU sufficiently worthy prospects, but in Europe itself these were absent. By contrast, the IFCTU would have to fight against internal dissent, which had already begun when the French Christian metalworkers' federation left the FCTU/ECSC. It was to be further marginalized by the expansion of Europe and all the ensuing consequences. But that is quite a different story.⁷⁹

Patrick Pasture

79. In PASTURE, *Christian Trade Unionism*, we analyse the further development of the Christian trade unions at European level, leading, among other things, to the transformation of the IFCTU into the World Confederation of Labour, the dissolution of its European Organization and the affiliation of the Christian trade unions with the European Trade Union Confederation in 1974.

Italy in International Economic Cooperation: The Franco-Italian Customs Union and the Fritalux-Finibel Negotiations

Francesca Fauri

Though unsuccessful as it was, the Franco-Italian attempt to form a customs union remains an interesting paragraph in Italy's postwar history. It enlightens Italy's political aims of being reaccepted after the war as an "equal partner" in the international setting. In economic terms, it shows the hope to earn an increase of Marshall Plan allocations, as promised by the Americans, and the belief that France could solve Italy's unemployment problems.

The first part of the essay will focus on the origins of the customs union, the role of the industrial sector in the ensuing negotiations and the effective feasibility of the union in economic terms. All economic evaluations concurred on the low degree of complementarity of the two economies. As we will see, the industrialists' solutions to check the resulting competition lay in the use of cartels. Yet, France rejected the treaty and, as analyzed in the second part of the work, no more luck had the following Fritalux-Finibel negotiations, which involved also the Benelux countries. Fruitless though they may seem, these efforts were not vain, they succeeded in reinserting Italy in international forums and provided a useful negotiating exercise on economic cooperation issues that will lay the foundations for future agreements.

The Origins of the Union

The first concrete step in the direction of a Franco-Italian entente was made by Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, who in the first days of march 1947 offered to help "reinsert Italy in the international political life through (...) a political treaty between the two countries: an Italo-French declaration of friendship." Bidault said he was willing to go as far as the Italian government wanted to, in his own words: "C'est une ouverture que je vous fais, la réponse est à vous."¹

Following intense diplomatic relations, the answer was disclosed to the international audience by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlo Sforza, at the CEEC (Committee on European Economic Cooperation) conference on July 15, 1947:

1. Archivio Storico Ministero degli Affari Esteri, (ASMAE), Ambasciata Francia b.373, Letter from Quaroni (Italian Ambassador in France) to Sforza (Minister of Foreign Affairs) March 4, 1947; Quaroni, who had come back to Paris only ten days before, was taken aback by Bidault's words.

“Why not form a customs union between two of the most illustrious peoples of the world, Italy and France? It would be to the eternal glory of Italy and France, if they should complete the first step on the road that sooner or later all Europe will follow.”²

Italy’s decision to propose the formation of a customs union was motivated, as suggested by Bidault, by a desire of political rehabilitation. An alliance with France could also support Italy in the solution of the open issues of its North-Eastern frontier and colonies ; Bidault himself had stated that “Italy didn’t deserve the form and substance of the Peace Treaty.”³ Furthermore, a customs union could help both countries to overcome their diminishing international importance and “make their voice heard a little bit more in the world.”⁴

A second set of motives for venturing in a customs union was given by the prospect of Marshall Plan aid funds that represented a powerful stimulus for trying to comply with American objectives of European unity. The Italian government instructions sent to the CEEC delegation in Paris and to the Italian Embassy in Paris are enlightening on this point. On August 20, Sforza on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the CIR, wrote a message to Paris exhorting the Italian delegation to fully support the idea of a customs union with France and to continue the negotiations in order to finalize and announce an agreement with France by the end of the Paris conference, “a possible customs union with France shall be pointed out as evidence of the will of the two countries to carry out in a positive way the spirit of the Marshall Plan.”⁵ In November the message was even more explicit, preference was to be given to an economic union (free movement of goods, labour and capital) over a customs union, “in-between forms would only risk to lower American contribution.”⁶

Last but not least, closer ties with France could facilitate the negotiations of immigration treaties to help solve Italy’s unemployment problems. The migration system between France and Italy was regulated by the fluctuations of demand. Specific bilateral agreements signed in 1946–1947 granted the possibility to France of letting in the necessary number of workers with a temporary contract. Italian emigration to France was thus completely organized and managed by the State.

2. See: *Relazioni Internazionali*, January 24, 1948, p. 57 and C. SFORZA, *Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi*, Roma 1952, p. 54.

3. See note 1

4. ASMAE, Francia, Affari Politici b. 13, Telespresso from DGAE Ufficio III, Sottosegretario di Stato, to the Italian Embassy in Paris, “Conferenza dei sedici e unioni doganali”.

5. ASMAE, Ambasciata Francia, b. 382; From Sforza, DGAE, to the Italian Delegation at the Paris Conference, 20 August 1947.

6. See note 4. See also: E.H. VAN DER BEUGEL, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, Amsterdam 1966, p. 172: “During the first Congressional debate on the European Recovery Program, Congress refused a four year’s authorization and insisted on a yearly decision for both authorization and appropriation. Therefore, (...) the activities of the ECA and OEEC were for a substantial part, geared to the necessity of presenting to Congress a program demonstrating that real progress had been made in Europe. The unification of Europe remained one of the constant themes of the Congressional deliberations.” Italy’s proposed customs union was going as far as it could in interpreting the US integrationist efforts.

After the increase in the number of Italian workers requested by France during the very first years of the reconstruction period, demand fell very low with few emigration prospects for Italy's unspecialized labour force.⁷ Yet, in the beginning the agreements were of some importance in finding a market of outlet for Italy's manpower, while in France they were considered a relevant contribution to the development of French production.⁸ Even the 'Rapport Final' of the Franco-Italian Mixed Commission, set up to evaluate the feasibility of a customs union, underlined the "general and absolute complementarity of the two economies especially in the field of capitals (on the part of France) and of labour (on the part of Italy) (...) good enough reason for the Union."⁹ Yet, the Commission had warned that completely free movement of workers would not serve the interest of either country, what was needed, according to it, was training of Italian workers for employment in France and improvement of regulations concerning the movement of labour and conditions of work.¹⁰ The Italian government, on its part, pressed the question of emigration throughout the duration of the negotiations, clinging to the concept of the free movement of labour and then shifting to the idea, when in France the customs union was losing any chance of success, of preferential employment of Italian labour force.¹¹ Indeed, a key motive for the refusal on the part of the French to proceed with the customs union was the distaste with which French labour unions and public opinion looked on the prospect of heavy immigration from Italy, there being no need on the French market for Italy's unspecialized labour force.

The Role of the Industrial Sector

The Mixed Commission, formally appointed by the two governments on September 13, 1947,¹² finished its work in the second half of December, producing a detailed

7. See: F. ROMERO, "L'integrazione dell'Italia in Europa negli anni '50: la questione dell'emigrazione" in *Passato e Presente*, maggio-dicembre 1989, pp. 79–86. On Italian emigration see also: U. ASCOLI, *Movimenti migratori in Italia*, Bologna 1989.
8. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 373, "Unione Doganale Franco-Italiana" 16/10/1947 – Paris Embassy Report on what the 'French technical press' was thinking of a customs union with Italy.
9. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, *Telespresso* 28 gennaio 1948, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to various embassies containing extracts of the 'Rapport Final'.
10. Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Archivio Giovan Battista Bertone, b. 4, Commission Mixte franco-italienne pour l'étude d'une union douanière entre la France et l'Italie, *Rapport Final*, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1948, and Volume II, *Annexes au Rapport Final*.
11. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi 1950, b. 463, f. Unione Italo-Francese dal 1 gennaio al 30 giugno, Letter from Quaroni to Sforza, 27 marzo 1950.
12. The Franco-Italian "Declaration" and "Protocol" stating the desire of the two countries to study the possibility of a customs union and to set up a mixed commission for this purpose, were signed in Paris on September 13, by Campilli (head of the Italian delegation at the CEEC Conference) and Bidault. For the text of the documents see: ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 373, Parigi, 20 settembre 1947, "Unione Doganale Italo-Francese".

report that was signed in Rome on December 22, 1947.¹³ The report compared the main features of the French and Italian economies and suggested conclusions on the main problems that would arise from formation of “a true economic union.”¹⁴

In evaluating the future prospects of the two industrial sectors, the Commission recommended the conclusion of industrial agreements to check competition resulting from the removal of tariffs and quotas.

“The principle that shall govern the creation of these agreements must be the search for a rationalization of industrial organizations and a specialization of production that will allow the regrouping of the productive energies of the two countries in the larger and more efficient scope of the customs union (...). The competitive situation will evolve gradually through a system of agreements toward the establishment of collaboration bringing with it the division of labour and a specialization of production. The resulting transformation of the structure of industries could lead to the organization of production on a complementary basis.”¹⁵

Such optimistic conclusion of the Mixed Commission lay, in Diebold’s words, “on the technique of evading the main problems by assuming that French and Italian businessmen and governments would be able to agree on satisfactory measures for limiting competition and rationalizing production.”¹⁶ In practical terms, the implicit suggestion to the industrial world was to revive the use of cartels. According to Quaroni, French industrialists believed in the use of cartels in order to defend themselves against Italian competition and dramatically stated that if “Italy wants to be anti-cartels (...) there is no chance France will agree on a customs union.”¹⁷

In the end, the Final Report of the Mixed Commission positively concluded its analysis on each subject, finding in no field “fundamental obstacles or even serious difficulties to the formation of such a union” and more than that, it suggested that “the customs union between France and Italy (...) would even make it possible to find solutions to economic problems facing the two countries that would otherwise be insoluble.”¹⁸

13. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 373, “Signature du rapport sur les travaux en vue d’une union douanière franco-italienne”, 22 decembre 1947, the signers were Drouin (Directeur des affaires économiques et financières) and Grazi (who held a corresponding position inside the Italian Foreign Office).

14. “In such a union, since two economic territories previously separated become a single economic area, two governments would have to establish by agreement a new kind of economic sovereignty”, Commission Mixte, “Rapport Final”, p. 7. On the Franco-Italian union and on the political relations between France and Italy in these years see also: P. GUILLEN, “Le projet d’union économique entre la France, l’Italie et le Benelux”, in R. POIDEVIN (ed.), *Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948–mai 1950)*, Bruxelles, Milano, Baden-Baden 1986, and by the same author, “Les vicissitudes des rapports franco-italiens de la rencontre de Cannes (décembre 1948) à celle de Santa Margherita (fév. 1951)”, in J.B. DUROSELLE, E. SERRA (ed.), *Italia e Francia (1946–1954)*, Milano 1988. For a keen analysis on the Franco-Italian customs union negotiations see: W. DIEBOLD, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, New York 1952, Ch. XIX, pp. 354–376.

15. Commission Mixte, “Rapport Final”, p. 59.

16. DIEBOLD, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, p. 358.

17. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 439, Letter from Quaroni to Sforza 15 maggio 1949.

On the basis of such favourable report, Bidault and Sforza met in Torino on March 20 1948 and signed a protocol where they declared “the formal will of the French and Italian Government to establish a Franco-Italian customs union (...) to be realized by steps and with suitable adjustments during the transition period in order not to damage the interests of the two economies”.¹⁹ A new mixed commission was to be set up with the task of determining “the terms of an agreement that will define the plan and program for the realization of the Customs Union.” In other words, it had to consider the way of putting it into practice. Unlike the earlier Commission, the new one included members of parliament and spokesmen of industrial, labour and agricultural organizations, as well as government officials.²⁰ The Commission’s Report, completed in January 1949, was drawn up on the basis of the different committees’ recommendations linked to the suggestions of interested groups in both countries.²¹

The industrial subcommittee of the Mixed Commission reported what were considered to be the problems, and the way they should be resolved, in the industrial sector of the two countries. First of all, what was needed was the regularization of industrial prices and therefore the harmonization of the administrative measures for products’ classification and relative taxation. In this context, the subcommittee highlighted the need to coordinate industrial subsidies.

Secondly, the two countries’ lack of energy and raw materials entailed the need to parcel out and ration certain industrial products. France and Italy’s deficiency in sources of energy and raw materials had prevented them to produce those industrial by-products, which are based on such raw materials and sources of energy, in sufficient quantity. “In the impossibility for both countries to stop producing those industrial products, it will be necessary to maintain government distribution over some industrial products”.

In the third place, the subcommittee suggested to coordinate France’s and Italy’s long-term programs: “Both countries foresee a noticeable increase in industrial equipment that calls for coordination of the different national objectives otherwise often incompatible”.

In the end, the industrial subcommittee made some suggestions on specific issues, among which it proposed the conclusion of industrial agreements for the harmonization of production.

“French and Italian economies are undoubtedly complementary as regards finished products and only slightly complementary as regards the trade of raw materials and semi-finished products (...) (*see the actual data in Table 2*). As a result the main problems raised by the Industrial Organizations of the two countries are problems of competition concerning prices, raw materials supplies, production capacity and markets of outlet. Therefore, it is necessary that the representatives of the two industries

18. Commission Mixte, “Rapport Final”, p. 155.

19. ACS, Archivio G.B. Bertone, b. 11, “Protocollo relativo alla costituzione di una unione doganale italo-francese”, Torino 20 marzo 1948.

20. DIEBOLD, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, p. 359.

21. ACS, Archivio G.B. Bertone, b. 4, *Compte rendu de la Commission Mixte franco-italienne d’union douanière*, Paris le 22 janvier 1949, p. 35 ff.

meet to analyze for each sector the possible consequences of the union (...) and reach agreements a) on industrial equipment, b) eventually, on common purchases of raw materials in third countries at the best price, c) on technical collaboration; d) on production specialization (...), e) on common prospection and sale to third markets“.²²

An interesting feature of this second stage of negotiations was, indeed, the increased involvement in the customs union project of representatives from Confindustria and from the Conseil national du patronat français. The Compte Rendu of the Mixed Commission, though acknowledging this fact, underlined the difficulties faced in trying to put together in discussions the same categories of producers from the two countries and the lack of time to carry out comprehensive studies on specific problems resulting from the customs union. As a result, the two industrial organizations' biggest concern was still the threat of being sacrificed to their competitors in the other country unless agreements could be reached on specialization among producers.

This point had come out quite clearly from various private and government's initiatives to check the producers' desire to go ahead with a franco-italian customs union. In Italy, the Chamber of Commerce in Milan submitted a questionnaire on the customs union with France to all different categories of Italian industrialists.²³ The answers framed a favourable picture toward the efforts to form a customs union, which according to most entrepreneurs was to be reached by stages, in the long term, and with the help of “accordi fra produttori“. The conclusions summarily reflect the suggestions that will be contained in the Compte Rendu: need to coordinate the level of prices and salaries, and the customs policy in regard to third countries; necessity of producers agreements for each industrial sector.²⁴

A key test to sound producers' feelings on the customs union was the meeting between French and Italian employers' organizations in Paris in February 1948. According to Ambassador Quaroni, the “satisfactory exchange of ideas they had on the customs union is particularly important for the French Authorities who are not willing to take a step forward unless certain that the Patronat is not against it“.²⁵ The final communiqué listed three conditions necessary for success: financial stability and a proper exchange rate ; a tariff on imports from third countries and an equalization of the social, fiscal and other burdens of industry in the two countries.²⁶ What the two countries should have aimed at was the constitution of “an economic union, reached by stages and developed essentially by means of

22. *Ibidem*, pp. 44–45.

23. ACS, Archivio G.B. Bertone, b. 4, “Camera di Commercio, Industria, Agricoltura Milano – L'Unione Economica Italo- Francese“.

24. The Italian machinery industry believed that the customs union would be beneficial, provided it led to the lowering of Italian steel costs by the shipment of semi-finished products from France for processing in Italy, and provided Italian machinery firms got freer access to the French market under agreements whereby French and Italian factories specialized in different products. (“Siderurgia e meccanica nel quadro dell'unione doganale italo-francese“, *Negotia*, 25 settembre 1947).

25. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi 1948, Letter from Quaroni to Campilli, 12 febbraio 1948.

26. Text of the communiqué in *Relazioni Internazionali*, 6 marzo 1948, p. 208.

incentives and adaptations deriving from the free development of free initiative (...):“

In early September 1948, it was the turn of a conference in Torino between the Italian and French Chambers of Commerce to assess the possibility of economic cooperation. The results of a Chamber of Commerce questionnaire on the Franco-Italian customs union among the industrialists in Torino had been extremely positive: the majority of producers considered the customs union “vantaggiosa“ either from an economic (89.8%) or from a political (84.8%) point of view.²⁷ At the end of the meeting the Chambers of Commerce unitedly stated that “the union must be brought about in a regime of liberty and not of planning, for the purpose of permitting as rapidly as possible the free circulation of people, goods and capital.“²⁸

This meeting in Torino along with other conferences, articles on various newspapers, inquiries and questionnaires, was promoted by the Italian government which, during the work of the second Mixed Commission on its report, sponsored also an increasing number of meetings between Italian and French producers.²⁹ At the same time, many producers’ conversations took place on the initiative of the industrialists themselves to prepare for the possibility of the union.³⁰

In Italy, for instance, the textile sector strongly opposed the union, fearing French competition, while the iron and steel industry was contrary to the treaty in the short term, turning eventually favourable in the long term under the protection of producers agreements.³¹ Yet, the talks between Italian and French steel industrialists had shown a French desire to sell semi-finished products on the Italian market while on the other hand withholding the supplies of raw materials the Italians considered vital for expansion and modernization of their industry.³²

While producing no practical results, these industrialists’ discussions began to arise fears in certain sectors of public opinion of a possible increase in cartel activity. The Italian authorities were well aware of the criticism accusing to found such a union on cartels if Grazzi, ‘Direttore Generale’ for economic affairs and head of the Italian delegation, felt the need to explain that the increasing number of meetings between Italian and French producers should not lead “to speak of trusts, but of free collaboration in the effort to meet potential competition (...)“.³³ Ambassador

27. ACS, Archivio G.B. Bertone, b. 4, Camera di Commercio Industria e Artigianato, “L’Industria torinese e l’unione doganale italo-francese.“

28. *Relazioni Internazionali*, 18 settembre 1948, p. 622.

29. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, Letter from Sforza to Quaroni 27 agosto 1948, listing all government’s initiatives to stimulate the interest of public opinion in the customs union project.

30. Wool, lace, other textiles, foundry work, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, automobiles, abrasives, paper and pulp, and glassware were among the fields covered in these discussions. See: DIEBOLD, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, p. 363.

31. ACS, Archivio Bertone, b. 4, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato, “L’unione economica Italo-Francese“.

32. R. RANIERI, “The Italian Steel Industry and the Schuman Plan negotiations“, in K. SCHWABE (ed.), *The Beginning of the Schuman Plan*, Baden-Baden, Milan, Paris, Brussels, 1986, p. 345.

33. U. GRAZZI, “Some Aspects of the Franco-Italian Customs Union in regard to the Gradual Manner of its Achievement“, *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Quarterly Review*, July 1948, pp. 365–368.

Quaroni, more straightforward in his reports to Sforza (and bitter for the first blows the project was receiving in France), wrote: “We all knew very well that the economic union was only feasible with the cartelization of big business on each side and therefore with no benefit for the consumer”.³⁴

The Feasibility of the Union in Economic Terms

As a matter of fact, industrial cartels under government aegis seemed a good solution to the low degree of complementarity of the two economies. Table 1 gives a significant picture of the composition of Franco-Italian foreign trade, highlighting the similarity of the economic structure of the two countries.³⁵

TABLE 1: Composition of Italian and French Foreign Trade (in % terms)

	1929		1937		1938	
	France	Italy	France	Italy	France	Italy
IMPORTS:						
Food	23,0	21,8	25,3	20,7	27,1	12,7
Materials for industry	59,4	58,4	59,3	65,5	58,2	68,8
Finished Products	17,6	19,8	15,4	13,8	14,7	18,5
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
EXPORTS:						
Food	12,0	24,1	14,0	29,6	14,3	32,1
Materials for industry	20,9	32,7	35,2	28,3	32,3	26,3
Finished Products	67,1	43,2	50,8	42,1	53,4	41,6
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: ASMAE Ambasciata Parigi, b.398.

Their definition as “mixed economies” meant economies based on a mixture of agriculture and industry, which in the case of industry happened to be heavily dependent on imports of raw materials in both countries. The figures reported in Table 2

34. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b.439, Letter from Quaroni to Sforza 20-7-1949.

35. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, Telespresso 16 dicembre 1948 containing copy of the Paris Embassy Franco-Italian long term programs comparative examination, pp. 13–16.

“don’t leave any doubts on the exiguousness of each other’s contribution (...) French participation to our imports of raw materials and foodstuffs is insignificant. A little more noteworthy are the imports of semifinished or finished products. France, on its part, is almost unimportant as a market of outlet for our finished and semifinished products.”³⁶

TABLE 2: Italian Share of French Foreign Trade in 1938 (millions of lire)

Products	Total Imp.	Imp. from Italy	% Ratio	Total Exp.	Exp. to Italy	% Ratio
Materials necessary to industry	26.864	2.053	0,8	9.842	2.648	2,7
Finished Products	6.707	1.228	1,8	16.354	1.654	1,0
Food	12.491	2.497	2,0	4.393	547	1,2
Total	41.062	5.778	1,3	30.589	4.849	1,6

French Share of Italian Foreign Trade in 1938 (millions of francs)

Products	Total Imp.	Imp. from France	% Ratio	Total Exp.	Exp. to France	% Ratio
Raw Materials	5.298	83	1,6	832	62	7,5
Semifinished Products	2.418	74	3,1	1.895	63	3,3
Finished Products	1.986	66	3,3	4.310	32	1,2
Food or live animals	1.422	24	1,7	3.342	144	4,3
Total	11.124	247	2,2	10.379	321	3,1

Source: ASMAE, Busta 398.

36. *Ibidem*, “Appendice statistica sugli scambi con la Francia“, p. 17.

As to the future development of the two economies, Table 3 offers a comparative analysis of the projected investments.

TABLE 3: Projected Investments

	FRANCE (millions of francs) in %		ITALY (millions of lire) in %	
AGRICULTURE	500	22	665	9,5
INDUSTRY	1205	52,2	920	40,2
coal	260		77	
electricity	370		394	16
gas (a)	35	34		
fuel	125		166	
iron and steel	105	4,5	250	6,3
engineering	150	6,7	260	6,4
chemicals	130	5,8	63	1,6
mines			36	1,1
COMMUNICATION	485	21	680	30
Land Transport	260	11	335	15
Merchant marine	210	9,5	240	11
TOURISM	70	3	8	0,3
TOTAL	2300	100	2273	100

(a) millions of dollars

Source: ASMAE, b.398.

Proportionally, France was going to spend more for industry (52% against Italy's 40%), while Italy considered bigger investments in agriculture (29% against 22%) and communications (30% against 21%).³⁷ Relevant differences entailed the energy sector where planned French investments reached 34% of the total, while in Italy they only amounted to 16%, and the chemical sector where France was going to invest 5.8% of its available resources and Italy only 1.6%. The long term objectives pursued in the development of the industrial apparatus differed in the priorities given to specific sectors, but in general they aimed at reinforcing the existing industrial structure.³⁸

37. *Ibidem*, "Produzione industriale", pp. 16-17.

38. *Ibidem*, for a comparative analysis of industrial production by sector see pp. 14-16.

It was believed that the two countries could integrate economically to a high degree only with the free movement of factors of production. Italy, having an excess number of agricultural workers in relation to the availability of capital goods and natural resources, could supply manpower to the scarcely populated land of Southern France or to the French industrial sector.³⁹ Similarly, it was hoped that “France could soon return to its traditional role of capital investor“ and help Italy fill the gap of \$2,000 in foreign capital funds (according to the estimates of the Saraceno Plan).⁴⁰

In a Conference in Rome on the Customs Union in September 1948, it was also suggested to adopt “an intermediate form between the free movement of capital and workers: the free movement of entire firms (especially construction – hydraulic firms)“.⁴¹

Besides the hope of being able to reduce unemployment by ‘exporting‘ its labour force to France, Italy’s economic studies on the customs union could but underline the non-complementarity of the two economies and the resulting direct competition many sectors would have to face with the acceptance of free trade. Yet, if the agricultural sector was tepid on the project,⁴² most industrialists remained favourable to the union, while the Italian government overvalued its political importance. As it emerges from various government documents on the customs union project, it seems that the possibility of resurgence of economic “obstacles“ was to be overcome by “decisions of a political nature“.⁴³ The Italian authorities believed that all kinds of economic complications could take a back seat if there was a political will. In February 1949, during an interministerial discussion in CIR, preceding the examination of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers, the critics coming from the Minister of Agriculture, Segni (worried about the limits imposed

39. Italy relied on the provisions of the Plan Monnet, according to which France needed to increase the number of workers and had therefore set an immigration target of 280,000 people a year, *Ibidem*, “Appendice statistica“ p. 17.

40. According to the four year Plan, Italy was going to need \$7,000 for reconstruction purposes of which \$2,000 were to be obtained from foreign sources, see: P. SARACENO, *Ricostruzione e Pianificazione*, Bari 1969.

41. ACS, Archivio Bertone, b. 11, “Schema di relazione intorno agli argomenti in materia di lavoro posti all’ordine del giorno della conferenza di Roma (8 settembre 1948) per l’Unione Doganale italo-francese.“

42. For the point of view of the agricultural sector on the union see G. LASCHI, *L’Italia e il processo di integrazione europea: il caso dell’agricoltura*, EUI PHD thesis, 1992, Ch.2 “L’unione doganale italo-francese.“

43. See: ASMAE, Francia Affari Politici b. 13, Telespresso 28-11-1947, from DGAE ufficio III, Sottosegretario di Stato, to Italian Embassy in Paris, “Conferenza dei sedici e unioni doganali“, in relation to the discussions on the customs union: ‘difficoltà‘ che possono essere determinanti, non possono essere superate che con decisioni di natura politica. Even on July 25, during an interministerial discussion on the economic directives to be sent to the Italian delegation in Paris, the proposal of a customs union with France was put aside acknowledging that the issue “e” essenzialmente di ordine politico“ in b. 383. See also the various reports of Ambassador Quaroni where he recurrently states the political importance of the customs union, for instance b. 439, letter from Quaroni to Sforza 17-1-1949, “Vedo soprattutto l’importanza politica dell’unione doganale (...) i rapporti con la Francia mi sembrano rappresentare in Europa il nostro unico punto di contatto con il mondo esterno“.

on vines growing) and of Labour, Fanfani, (who wanted to change article no.6 of the Treaty from freedom of employment to freedom of movement of labour), lost their grip in face of the remark that “the union is primarily a political rather than an economic act that, in order to be approved by Parliament, needs mutual sacrifices and reciprocal comprehension”.⁴⁴

The Vicissitudes of the Treaty and the French Proposal: “Le Plan Petsche”

The following month the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Sforza and Schuman met in Paris and signed the treaty (March 26) which, when ratified, would constitute a customs union between France and Italy. The union was to be brought into effect by stages. A year after the treaty came into force, the two countries would form a tariff union, while quotas and other restrictions on trade would be “progressively abolished” in order to form an economic union within six years from the coming into force of the treaty.⁴⁵ This program was soon to be changed in face of the upcoming OEEC (Organization of European Economic Cooperation) call on the removal of quotas by June 1949. The OEEC liberalization step could create difficulties to France and Italy that had planned to retain quotas while removing tariffs on trade between them within a year. Therefore, on July 29, 1949 the two governments signed a protocol in Paris delaying the formation of a tariff union.

However, in the meanwhile, the Customs Union treaty had failed to pass the examination of the Conseil Economique, an advisory body in which the principal labour, agricultural and industrial organizations were represented. The French government had decided to submit the treaty to the Economic Council for an opinion in May and had come out with a defeat. “Indecisive as they were, these votes in the Conseil Economique registered the opposition to the customs union of the principal farm and labour organizations and an uncertain attitude on the part of industrialists”.⁴⁶ In the words of Quaroni:

“With the contrary opinion of the Economic Council the customs union project has received a serious blow if not a death-blow (...) especially on the French side, the power and resistance of organized interests has been underestimated”.⁴⁷

As a result, the French Government started temporizing, afraid to submit the treaty to Parliament having realized its lack of strength “to impose its will to big business”.⁴⁸

The defeat of May 1949 inspired a change of strategy in the French projects of European integration which materialized in the elaboration of the Petsche Plan.

44. ACS, Archivio Sforza, f. 15, b. 4, DGAE Ufficio II, 11-2-1949, “Discussione al CIR sull’Unione Doganale.”

45. DIEBOLD, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, p. 365.

46. *Ibidem*, p. 366.

47. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 439, Letter from Quaroni to Sforza, 15-5-1949.

48. *Ibidem*.

The Plan, once endorsed by the member countries, could represent a solution both to the impasse in the Franco-Italian negotiations and to France's commercial problems with Belgium, that had made the French suspend all Belgian imports until April.⁴⁹

According to the Petsche Plan, the abolition of quantitative restrictions on the movement of capital, labour and goods was to be reached through a mechanism of floating exchange rates which was to reflect the disparities in the movement of trade and payments inside the group. In the end, the good functioning of the system depended upon the pursuing of similar monetary policies by the participating countries. In the beginning, the project negotiations involved only France, Italy and Belgium. Yet, when in August 1949 the three countries reached an agreement on the main aspects of the project, France realized it was necessary to inform the Dutch to proceed any further with the consent of the Benelux countries. The negotiations continued in September in Washington with the participation of the Dutch.

It must be said that the efforts of the French to involve in a project of economic cooperation Belgium, Luxembourg and under the insistence of the Belgians, the Dutch, dates back to the last years of the second world war with the creation of the "Conseil Tripartite".⁵⁰ The Council was to study the possibility of coordinating the policy of the four governments in the field of price fixing and control, social security, full employment, tax control, customs tariffs and quotas. Moreover, the question of organizing a common approach to German economic recovery was greatly debated inside the group. Yet, even though the economic discussions led the four countries to consider the possibility of forming a customs union, the political vacuum behind the Council, its lack of direction, and the evolving international circumstances which eliminated the French role of "porte parole" for the Benelux countries in the allied negotiations, gave the final blow to the "Conseil Tripartite" in 1948.

With the Council bound to fail, France made another effort in this direction already in 1947, when soon after the proposal made by Sforza to form a customs union, Alhand asked a reluctant Benelux delegation to form in the next five to seven years a customs union with France and Italy. The attitude of France aiming at involving Benelux in some form of economic union, such as the attempts made to draw it into the franco-italian customs union negotiations, may be explained by the economic advantage that France saw in establishing an area of protected trade which could replace and possibly hinder the German market. De Gaulle and Monnet were on the same side when it came to find solutions to keep German economic potential under French control. In the light of De Gaulle's objective of restoring French "grandeur" by exploiting German economic resources,⁵¹ a larger union headed by France could constitute a powerful European block able to control and

49. R.T. GRIFFITHS and F.M.B. LYNCH, "L'échec de la 'Petite Europe': les négociations Fritalux/Finibel, 1949–1950" in *Revue Historique*, CCLXXIV, 1985, no. 1, pp. 160–161.

50. R.T. GRIFFITHS and F.M.B. LYNCH, "L'échec de la 'Petite Europe': le Conseil tripartite 1944–1948", in *Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains*, 1988, no. 152, pp. 39–62.

51. A. LAPORTE, *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy 1944–1946*, Harvard 1986, p. 36.

contain German economic recovery.⁵² The same logic was contained in the Monnet Plan on French economic reconstruction, which, in its foreign objectives, aimed at a permanent control on German industrial output. But this could only be achieved if German coal and coke supplied French industry rather than German industry, in Alphand's words "the surest guarantee for the maintenance of peace will always consist in the limitation of the German steel potential".⁵³

The foreign objectives of the Plan didn't earn general approbation and were effectively ignored by the British and Americans who proposed to increase the level of industry in Germany and never thought feasible the idea of separating the Ruhr from Germany. Even the Italian instructions to the delegation in Paris in July 1947 were to "oppose the Monnet Plan since it entails an unnatural development of the French economy to the detriment of other countries".⁵⁴

The French had thus to look around for other fields of action to isolate and weaken Germany, which materialized in the efforts to involve the other members of the "Conseil Tripartite" in the negotiations on the franco-italian customs union. In September 1947 Alphand so repeatedly and insistently was requesting the Benelux governments to consider a three-party agreement that the Benelux delegation asked Campilli – head of the Italian delegation at the CEEC conference – to make the French understand that it was useless to insist any further and that eventually they would be interested in a four-party agreement including Germany.⁵⁵

Italy's diplomatic staff had worked out a credible picture of French policy aims in the end: "with Great Britain out of the way because of her imperial links, France wants to take the leadership in Europe not only through an alliance with Italy but with Benelux as well, with the aim to confront Germany in the best conditions".⁵⁶

As to Italy's reaction to the French proposal, the government could not refuse considering the possibility of including Benelux, having already declared itself favourable to multilateral agreements, though as Sforza underlined: "It should not be forgotten that the aim of Benelux is to conclude agreements for the lowering of tariffs for which we are less prepared and which would be less profitable for us".⁵⁷ Besides, if Benelux was to join, many voices raised for the inclusion of Germany

52. "French proposals to Benelux had the aim to create a Western European area subject to French supremacy as a safeguard against German revival" see A.S. MILWARD, "L'integrazione dell'Europa occidentale negli anni dell'ERP: l'esperienza del gruppo di studio Europeo per l'Unione Doganale" in E. AGA ROSSI (ed.), *Il Piano Marshall e l'Europa*, Roma, 1983, p. 111.

53. Quotation from: F.M.B. LYNCH, "Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in the French Reconstruction", in *The Economic History Review*, v. XXXVII, nos.1,2,3 & 4, 1984, p. 240. On the Monnet Plan see also: Ph. MIOCHE, "Aux origines du Plan Monnet, 1942–1947" in *Revue Historique*, 1981, and R.F. KUISEL, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France*, Cambridge 1981.

54. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 383, "Riunione ministri tecnici per Piano Marshall", 25 luglio 1947.

55. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, Letter from Campilli to Quaroni, 12 gennaio 1948.

56. See the various reports from the Paris Embassy which I have condensed in few lines, in particular: ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 373, Telegramma Quaroni 8 agosto 1947, b. 439, From Quaroni to Sforza 14 novembre 1949; b. 410, DAE, ufficio IV, "Appunto per S.E. il Ministro"; b. 463, From Quaroni to MAE, 3 gennaio 1950.

57. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi b. 383, Telegramma from Sforza to Quaroni 1 agosto 1947.

as well. Indeed, among the government instructions to the Italian delegation in Paris, there was the need to “contribute to decisions for the revival of Germany, to the end, also, of equal access to that market for our fruit and vegetables exports”.⁵⁸

In January 1948, a new French diplomatic offensive, armed with the favourable results of the first Mixed Commission report, tried again to convince Benelux and Italy to realize a joint customs union. As Italy was predicting and hoping, the Benelux Governments refused, replying that only in case of failure of the OEEC study group attempt to form a larger customs union, were they interested in examining the possibility to set up a regional one.⁵⁹

Italy again could not refuse Alphanand’s offer that, as he said to reassure the Italian Ambassador, was “not to be prejudicial to the franco-italian union”.⁶⁰ Yet, the possibility of the inclusion of Benelux in the negotiations was disliked, sometimes for different reasons, by almost everybody in the Italian Foreign Ministry. Campilli thought that, if the French idea was that of forming a larger customs union, then both Benelux and Germany should have joined, since Germany was “the determinant element of a large European customs union”.⁶¹ Sforza believed, that the inclusion of Benelux had to wait until “the Franco-Italian economic union had been accomplished” fearing a refusal on the part of Benelux as well as the possible insurgence of doubts in the American government on the real Franco-Italian intentions to carry on their economic union project.⁶² Grazzi, on the other hand, thought that the inclusion of Benelux could take place only through an extremely slow system of tariffs’ adjustments that was only to alter the concept of a Franco-Italian economic union.⁶³ Finally, Quaroni sharing with Campilli the idea of eventually including Germany as well, explicitly said:

“The Flanders ‘Anschluss’ has been a French obsession for centuries: we have today this absurd development according to which the French Foreign Ministry would be ready to let go the reality of the union with Italy only to run after the illusion of a union with Benelux (...) we have to give some time to the French to let this illusion go”.⁶⁴

The Fritalux-Finibel Negotiations

Even though no agreement was reached on the Petsche Plan (april–september 1949), the evolving international circumstances led the French to propose a revised version of it. In particular, an important factor was the ECA announcement at the

58. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 373, Telegramma from Sforza to Quaroni, 6 agosto 1947.

59. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 397, Telespresso 3 marzo 1948 transmitting the Note Verbal of the Government of Belgium of February 10 1948, on behalf of the Benelux Governments.

60. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, Telegramma from Quaroni to MAE, 8 gennaio 1948.

61. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, Lettera 12 gennaio 1948 from Campilli to Quaroni.

62. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi b. 412, Telegramma 12 gennaio 1948 from Sforza to Quaroni.

63. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, Telegramma 16 gennaio 1948, “Considerazioni Ministro Grazzi su inclusione Benelux”.

64. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 397, Lettera 12 febbraio 1948 from Quaroni to Campilli.

OEEC Executive Committee meeting of October 1949 of the creation of a \$150 million reserve fund available for supporting European integration schemes (besides, it was made clear that the allocation of Marshall Plan aid would depend on the degree of economic cooperation between the European countries).⁶⁵ Since the Petsche Plan had favourably impressed the Americans, the French presented its revised version which explicitly mentioned the need to make use of the ECA reserve fund. The future members were to commit themselves to:

- the free movement of capital, unless the verifying of specific conditions;
- remove quantitative restrictions beyond the percentage set by the OEEC ;
- accept a system of floating exchange rates, even though the degree of fluctuation was to be limited and the exchange rates chosen were to be maintained.⁶⁶

This proposal, integrated later on with other general ideas and open to all members of the OEEC, formed the basis of the so-called Fritalux negotiations. The Dutch insistence on the inclusion in the debate of the question of tariff reductions was fruitless. During the ensuing negotiations in Paris between November–December 1949, the Italian delegation headed by Grazzi sided with the French on the issues of an automatic system of exchange rates adjustment, of trade liberalization and on the question of tariffs, which Italy was not prepared to lower. Tariffs, as suggested by Grazzi, were the preserve of GATT and therefore were not to be discussed. As to the issue of trade liberalization, it was to be pursued on condition that it would not cause irreparable damage to existing industries and that it was coupled with measures to coordinate the economic, financial and social policy of the members of the group. In particular, as it came out during the subcommittees' debates, Italy was extremely doubtful even on the feasibility of the 50% liberalization target already set by the OEEC by December 1949, especially since it entailed a painful removal of quotas in the same proportion on each of the three major areas of commodity trade (food and fodder, raw materials and manufactures).⁶⁷

In January 1950, the negotiations were resumed under the name of "Finibel" but by February they had already come to a standstill. France proved irremovable on the question of tariffs and on the refusal to include West Germany, 'conditio sine qua non' for Dutch participation. The Italian delegation's instructions for this second

65. This development was linked to the necessity of finding concrete indications to demonstrate to the American Congress a more promising attitude of the European countries towards European cooperation and integration, in preparation for the third authorization and appropriation. Accordingly, the famous speech of the ECA Administrator Hoffman, made for the Ministerial Council of the OEEC on October 31, 1949, further legitimized limited customs union: "I have repeatedly referred to the creation of a single European market (...). But there are arrangements, some already in prospect, involving smaller groups of countries, which, I am convinced, will also turn out to be steps toward the same objective. I do not believe that any path toward integration should be left unexplored". Reported in E.H. VAN DER BEUGEL, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, p. 185.

66. For a detailed archival based reconstruction of the Fritalux-Finibel negotiations see: GRIFFITHS, LYNCH, "L'échec de la "Petite Europe: les négociations Fritalux/Finibel 1949–1950", pp. 165–166.

67. *Ibidem*, pp. 173–174.

round sent by Sforza on account of the Council of Ministers were on principle favourable to the union but warned Cattani (member of the delegation) on the importance 1) to make everyone recognize Italy's interest in the movement of labour; 2) and to accept the inclusion of Germany on condition that the German government would abolish numerous discriminatory measures and dumping and would negotiate a tariff agreement with Italy.⁶⁸ The question of how to present the issue of the movement of labour was greatly debated in government's meetings, preferring in the end not to tie the free movement of goods with the free movement of labour, while generally insisting in the debates on "une plus grande liberté du mouvement pour la main-d'oeuvre".⁶⁹ Italy was realizing that its unemployment problem was not to be resolved by exporting its excess manpower to Europe for the simple reason that there was no demand in Europe for it. The reports of Ambassador Quaroni on the issue removed all doubts: "As to the question of manpower emigration, it is my duty to report to Minister Sforza that abroad, our European colleagues, couldn't care less of this problem".⁷⁰ Quaroni also advised the Government not to isolate itself during the Finibel negotiations by insisting too much on Italy's emigration problems.

Throughout the Fritalux-Finibel negotiations, Italy tried to keep alive the much more favourite project of the union with France. In the words of Sforza: "After hindering the Treaty of Paris (...) false aims such as Fritalux or Finibel and other infernal abbreviations are being run after (...) Welcome to Finibel, but in the meanwhile let's start carrying out the original projects".⁷¹ As a matter of fact, after the mid-February draft agreement, Finibel had reached a deadlock on the question of the inclusion of Germany, and Franco-Italian negotiations on the customs union were resumed.⁷² On March 7 France and Italy signed a series of documents: on trade liberalization to enlarge quotas on a number of imports, on the preparation of a common customs tariff and on the constitution of a joint committee to study customs union problems. Furthermore, not having negotiated tariff reductions at Annecy in view of the customs union, they reached a tariff agreement for the reduction of duties on many items.⁷³ French and Italian officials pointed to the new agreements as a practical step on the way to the customs union. Yet, even though at the end of June a revised version of the treaty was signed in Rome, the treaty was never presented to Parliament in either country. Both Rome and Paris in Diebold's words "felt there were more important things to do than to challenge the opposition to customs union in their countries".⁷⁴

68. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 463, Telegramma 11 febbraio 1950 from Sforza to Cattani.

69. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 463, Relazione Ministro Pella in Allegato B, Comitato Interministeriale per la Ricostruzione 4-2-1950.

70. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 463, Letter from Quaroni to Sforza, 16 gennaio 1950, "Finibel – OEEC – Mano d'opera".

71. ACS, Archivio Sforza, b. 4, "L'unione italo-francese e l'unità europea", 1950.

72. For the Italian report on the draft agreement see: ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 463, from Cattani to MAE, 18 febbraio 1950, "Riesame del testo del rapporto degli esperti per il Finibel".

73. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 463, "Relazione sulle negoziazioni italo-francesi" Roma, 9 marzo 1950.

74. DIEBOLD, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, p. 369.

Conclusion

Italy turned to France for a customs union because France was the only European country in postwar Europe willing to support its international political rehabilitation and willing to help the government in the continuing skirmish over Trieste and its ex-colonies. Besides, during the very first years after the war, among the European countries, France was one of the main importers of Italian labour force. This fact, along with Italy's own perspectives on French shortage of labour, made the Italian government hope in the possibility France could reverse the decision to halt immigration. Indeed, during the first negotiations on the customs union France never played down completely Italy's requests on the free movement of labour, even though they had no chance of being fulfilled.

Moreover, a Franco-Italian customs union was going in the direction of the American idea of European unity and was thus capable of playing an important role in the allocation of Marshall Plan funds. Later, in January 1948, the Americans will say that the Franco-Italian favourable report on the customs union project had been the only positive result obtained within the Marshall program of European reorganization and hoped it could exert a favourable influence on the governmental discussion on Marshall Plan appropriations.⁷⁵

It would have been easy to predict that the obstacles to the union were to be economic. Problems lay in the similar economic structure and insignificant commercial relations of the two countries, and in the opposite line of economic policy chosen by the two governments after the war. While Italy embraced a strong deflationary policy, France chosen a policy of high levels of public expenditure with ensuing inflationary developments.

Yet, in Italy, the government had decided that the Treaty was politically important for the country and encountering no opposition on the part of the industrial sector – confiding in the use of cartels – was ready to go ahead. In France, the government was itself uncertain on the political-economic advantages of an agreement with Italy and did not hide its preference for a treaty including Benelux. This attitude probably reinforced the fears of the economic forces not willing to face increased competition from Italy nor an invasion of Italy's excess manpower.

As Quaroni was predicting, many French people thought that “if France is to make sacrifices in the economic field, it is better for it to make them in the direction of Germany,” which led to the conclusion that “after all, the French fear, hate but respect the Germans. They don't respect the Italians”.⁷⁶

In May 1949, France rejected the customs union treaty with Italy, but tried to breathe new life into Franco-Italian relations through the Petsche Plan and the following Fritalux-Finibel negotiations involving the Benelux countries as well. Also this effort was doomed to fail. Yet, as it has been observed,⁷⁷ the plan of economic cooperation which comes out from all the elements contained in the different prop-

75. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 398, From Quaroni to MAE, 21 gennaio 1948, “Opinioni di questa ambasciata di America sulla riunione dei 16 e sulla unione doganale italo-francese.”

76. ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi, b. 439, From Quaroni to Sforza, 27 luglio 1949, “Unione Doganale”.

ositions suggested by the countries involved in the Fritlaux-Finibel negotiations, is quite similar to the one agreed upon in the Rome Treaties. Nonetheless at that time, some of the propositions were mere statements of intent: Italy was determined not to accept any agreement on tariff reductions, and the French were stubbornly against the entrance of Germany unless a way could be found to neutralize German economic threat to France. Only a more limited, sectoral plan was to break down all opposition and soon after finally unite the six countries under a less ambitious but more successful project: the European Coal and Steel Community. In this light, the customs union experiment was itself successful in so far as it was able to strengthen Italy's ties with France, reintroduce the country in international debates on the possible economic shapes of European cooperation and put the Italian government in front of its responsibilities in the elaboration of a foreign economic policy that, as shown during the Fritalux-Finibel negotiations, was not going as far as its pro-European declarations were claiming.

Francesca Fauri

77. GRIFFITHS, LYNCH, "L'échec de la 'Petite Europe': les négociations Fritalux/Finibel 1949–1950", p. 189.

Eduquer les jeunes à l'union: La Campagne européenne de la jeunesse 1951–1958

Jean Marie Palayret

La Campagne européenne de la jeunesse (CEJ), développée par le Mouvement européen pour informer et sensibiliser les jeunes à l'alternative européenne entre 1951 et 1958 apparaît sans doute comme une initiative mineure par rapport aux événements politiques qui marquèrent, en Europe, la décennie 1950–1960. Ceci explique sans doute qu'elle ait été peu étudiée jusqu'à présent.

Elle mérite néanmoins une analyse plus en profondeur en fonction de ses objectifs, de ses méthodes, de son étendue dans l'espace et dans le temps, et même de ses résultats.

L'étude des archives du Mouvement européen et de la Campagne, déposées aux Archives historiques des Communautés européennes de Florence, permet aujourd'hui d'en éclairer la genèse et le fonctionnement plus particulièrement au cours de la période 1951–1958 marquée par l'action de ses deux secrétaires généraux successifs, Jean Charles Moreau et Philippe Deshormes.

Les dossiers qui ont retenu l'attention sont principalement les rapports d'activité et la correspondance du secrétariat général de la Campagne, les procès-verbaux des réunions de la Commission jeunesse et du Comité directeur du Mouvement européen. Ceux-ci présentent les arguments, les données budgétaires et mettent parfois en lumière les oppositions concernant l'élaboration de la stratégie d'action de la CEJ internationale. Mais seule la confrontation de ces documents d'archives avec les témoignages des acteurs recueillis au cours d'une table ronde, réunie à l'initiative conjointe de l'Institut universitaire européen de Florence et de la Commission (Direction Générale X) à Bruxelles en novembre 1993, a permis d'appréhender la complexité des choix qui ont présidé aux prises de décisions qui ont orienté entre 1951 et 1958 les grandes lignes de l'activité de la CEJ.

La genèse de la Campagne européenne de la jeunesse (1951–1953)

En 1951, le Mouvement européen développa pour la première fois une initiative orientée vers la jeunesse. Il s'agissait en premier lieu de proposer aux nouvelles générations de participer à la volonté de rapprochement et de coopération qui avait animé le congrès de la Haye, dont la résolution culturelle prévoyait la création d'un Institut européen de l'enfance et des questions de jeunesse.

L'initiative reflétait la réalité de l'affrontement Est-Ouest qui se concrétisait aussi dans le monde de la jeunesse organisée. La rivalité qui s'affirmait progres-

sivement entre la Fédération mondiale de la jeunesse démocratique (FMJD) sous obédience communiste et la “World Assembly of Youth” (WAY) soutenue par les puissances anglo-saxonnes correspondait à deux visions du monde antagonistes qui ne prenaient pas en compte le concept novateur et mobilisateur de la nécessaire création d’une Europe unie, conçue comme facteur de paix et d’équilibre. Cette réalité ne pouvait être méconnue par les responsables du Mouvement européen et en particulier par son président, Paul Henri Spaak. Elle devait aussi retenir l’attention des milieux qui, aux Etats-Unis, avaient jugé prioritaire l’aide aux initiatives qui concourraient à l’union de l’Europe occidentale, face au danger soviétique.

S’ensuivirent en 1949 deux types de consultation parallèles: l’“American Committee for a United Europe” (ACUE) engageait des conversations avec les responsables du ME, Paul Henri Spaak et Joseph Retinger, et assurait à ceux-ci qu’il soutiendrait des initiatives visant à sensibiliser les jeunes générations à l’idée européenne¹. Le ME prenait alors contact avec les associations de jeunesse les plus représentatives. Pluraliste par essence, il devait tenir compte du pluralisme correspondant des principales organisations de jeunesse. Ces consultations intéressèrent en premier lieu les responsables des mouvements internationaux de jeunesse: démocrates-chrétiens, libéraux, socialistes, ceux de la WAY et ceux des mouvements qui avaient vu le jour dans la mouvance du Congrès de la Haye et se caractérisaient par un engagement très militant en faveur de la Fédération européenne.²

A la fin de l’été 1951, le ME devait faire un pas décisif en précisant ses options principales et en choisissant le secrétaire général de l’organisme auquel il donnait le nom de “Campagne européenne de la jeunesse”.

C’est Jean-Charles Moreau, qui avait organisé en juillet-août 1951 en Allemagne, sur le site de la Lorelei des “rencontres européennes de la jeunesse”, qui en cinq décades successives avaient accueilli plusieurs dizaines de milliers de jeunes en majorité Allemands et Français³, qui se vit chargé par Paul Henri Spaak et Georges Rebattet de développer une campagne prévue à l’origine pour une durée de un an.

1. Archives historiques des Communautés européennes, dorénavant AHCE Dep.13 ME/1328. Correspondance échangée entre le secrétariat du ME et l’ACUE, notamment avec Warren Fuggitt (1951).
2. L’auteur se réfère essentiellement à la communication de J.-Ch. Moreau, premier secrétaire général de la CEJ, au colloque sur la CEJ, organisé par l’IUE de Florence et la Commission des CE (DG X) les 8 et 9 novembre 1993.
3. Organisée à l’initiative du service des rencontres internationales du Haut commissariat français en Allemagne et par le Bundesjugendring, la rencontre de la Lorelei (20 juillet – 6 septembre) eut un retentissement international: près de 35.000 jeunes (60% d’Allemands, 20% de Français, 10% de Britanniques) participèrent au camp à des titres divers. Divisée en 5 décades ayant chacune un thème central, elle devait être ponctuée par trois manifestations plus importantes: les cérémonies d’ouverture et de clôture, et deux journées plus politiques. Le discours que prononça André François Poncet, haut commissaire français en Allemagne, donna le ton politique. Son allocution fut à la fois un plaidoyer européen, un appel à la coopération franco-allemande et une mise en garde contre le communisme. Voir: C. DEFRENCE, *La politique culturelle de la France sur la rive gauche du Rhin. 1945–1955*, Strasbourg 1994, p.291–292.

Le principe d'une co-responsabilité du Mouvement européen et d'une représentation des Mouvements de jeunesse, dans une action commune était affirmé, L'objectif de cette action était d'intéresser la jeunesse à la construction de l'Europe. Une distinction était reconnue entre la préoccupation des mouvements de jeunesse éducatifs qui ne voulaient pas engager leurs membres dans des activités "politiques" et celle des mouvements (Jeunesse fédéraliste ou Jeunes démocrates-chrétiens par exemple) qui se ralliaient à la pensée initiale du Mouvement européen. Avec la garantie d'un soutien financier de l'ACUE, fixé à un peu moins d'un million de dollars, Georges Rebattet et Jean Charles Moreau mirent sur pied en quelques mois une organisation complexe. Dans chaque pays participant à la Campagne (correspondant aux Quinze pays du Conseil de l'Europe) était créé un secrétariat national, émanation du secrétariat général international, coopérant avec un Comité national représentatif des mouvements de jeunesse du pays concerné et apportant à ceux-ci informations, conseil et aide technique⁴. Les mouvements fournissaient des cadres et militants pour la CEJ et organisaient des manifestations européennes pour leurs membres. Par l'attribution des fonds le ME était quant à lui en condition d'influer indirectement sur l'activité des mouvements de jeunesse⁵.

Il était nécessaire de définir rapidement les activités qui constitueraient la Campagne. Quelques responsables du Mouvement européen avaient songé initialement à une manifestation de masse, susceptible d'apporter une réplique aux "Festivals mondiaux de la jeunesse" organisés par les communistes, et au cours de laquelle "des dizaines de milliers de jeunes gens auraient marqué leur confiance en une Europe unie, libre et démocratique"⁶.

C'est peut-être une hypothèse de ce genre qui avait été initialement présentée aux amis américains du Mouvement européen. Mais les organisations de jeunesse étaient fortement opposées à un tel projet, lui préférant la programmation d'activités d'éducation et de formation européennes multiples, échelonnées dans le temps et dans l'espace, dont la conception et la réalisation leur incomberait pour une très large part⁷. Le secrétaire général Jean Moreau était convaincu de la nécessité de faire prévaloir ce point de vue. C'était aussi la tendance de Georges Rebattet et Paul Henri Spaak.

Le Mouvement européen avait donc réduit ses aspirations et accepté en 1951 l'idée d'une action éducative s'étendant aux quinze pays du Conseil de l'Europe et touchant les mouvements de jeunesse éducatifs au même titre que les mouvements de jeunesse politiques⁸.

4. AHCE Dep. 13.ME doc: GR/GLP/263. Buts et structures de la CEJ (secrétariat général).

5. M. LIPPENS, "La Campagne européenne de la jeunesse (CEJ) de 1951 à 1958", in M. DUMOULIN (ed.), *La Belgique et les débuts de la construction européenne*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1987, p.51-57.

6. AHCE: Dep ME/49. P.H. SPAAK, "Reflexions on what a second year of the European Youth Campaign should consist of", 1951 (non daté); *ibid*, "Rapport général pour les cinq premiers mois de la Campagne", ca. mars 1952.

7. *Ibid*.

8. AHCE Dep. ME/1477 Compte rendu d'une réunion tenue le 13/12/1951 à Paris entre P.H. Spaak, J. Retinger, A. Philip, J. Ch. Moreau, L. Radoux, W. Durkee et W. Fuggitt.

Les programmes furent orientés en conséquence: prévaudrait l'étude des problèmes économiques, sociaux, politiques et culturels posés aux pays européens et dont la solution commandait leur avenir. Il fallait faire comprendre aux jeunes que la création de l'Europe constituait, à tous égards, un progrès et une chance pour la paix. Ces programmes comportaient:

- un chapitre étude et propagande englobant tout ce qui concernait la diffusion des thèmes de la campagne: édition de bulletins d'information en quatre langues sur les problèmes de l'unité européenne destinés essentiellement aux cadres des organisations participant à la campagne, projection de films et expositions sur des thèmes européens, réalisation d'enquêtes et de sondages, etc...,
- un secteur échanges et manifestations: sessions d'études, congrès, rencontres internationales pour les animateurs des mouvements soit au plan national (patronnés par le comité national) soit au plan international (à l'initiative d'un ou plusieurs comités nationaux ou du secrétariat international)⁹.

L'orientation générale de cette première "campagne éducative" fut respectée pendant la majeure part de l'année 1952 parce que la conjoncture était porteuse (avec l'entrée en vigueur du Plan Schuman et la proposition Plevén de Communauté européenne de défense), et parce que l'équipe du secrétariat général et des secrétariats nationaux était animée d'un réel idéalisme.

D'autre part, l'aide de l'American Committee for a United Europe, même si elle s'inscrivait de fait dans un contexte de guerre froide, n'était pas à cette époque assortie de conditions contraignantes et respectait la liberté d'action des responsables. Ce fut bien le cas pour la campagne pour laquelle le comité américain s'en remit initialement aux options du Mouvement européen et plus précisément de Paul Henri Spaak. Le comité avait délégué pour le représenter à Paris, assurer le contact avec le Mouvement européen et observer les activités de la campagne, Warren Fuggitt. De l'avis de Jean Moreau:

"Dans ce contexte, le rôle de M. Fuggitt était d'observer les développements de l'entreprise. Il n'était pas un expert en matière d'organisations de jeunesse, souhaitait que les choses aillent vite et bien et prenait acte des opinions diverses et contrastées qui s'exprimaient, aussi bien dans le cadre de la campagne qu'au sein du Mouvement européen".¹⁰

On pouvait tirer, au milieu de 1952, un premier bilan de l'entreprise.

9. Le service échanges et manifestations du secrétariat international avait pour mission de sélectionner parmi les très nombreux projets présentés par les comités nationaux et les associations internationales, ceux qui présentaient le plus d'intérêt pour la diffusion des thèses en faveur de l'unité européenne. Il lui incombait d'autre part d'organiser directement certaines manifestations: c'est ainsi qu'il assumait au cours du printemps et de l'été 1952 l'organisation de plusieurs manifestations importantes telles que: Assemblée des jeunesses politiques européennes, le Conseil européen de la jeunesse, et une réunion qui devait regrouper fin août à Strasbourg plus de 2.000 jeunes. Cf. AHCE, Dep. ME/49 Jean Moreau, "Rapport général pour les cinq premiers mois de la campagne", été 1952.

10. La citation et les considérations qui précèdent sont tirées de la communication faite par Jean Charles Moreau à la conférence de Bruxelles sur la CEJ (8-9 novembre 1993).

A l'actif des réalisations de la campagne: la création de structures se traduisant par la fondation en moins de quatre mois de quinze comités nationaux groupant près de cinq cents mouvements de jeunesse totalisant environ quinze millions d'adhérents. Cette structure des comités était charpentée par la structure technique du secrétariat général de la campagne et de ses secrétariats nationaux dont bon nombre (avec Maurice Finkelstein en Allemagne, Ivo Murgia en Italie, Maurice Foley en Grande Bretagne) se révélaient à l'épreuve très efficaces.

Dans le domaine des publications: 1.750.000 brochures, plans de causeries, dépliants, bulletins furent diffusés par le secrétariat général, alors que la presse d'information des différents pays consacrait environ 3.000 articles aux activités de la campagne, Entre février et octobre 1952 étaient organisées 1.900 sessions d'études, congrès, conférences touchant soit les cadres des organisations, soit la masse de leurs adhérents¹¹.

Plus importante que les statistiques peut paraître la communauté des mouvements de jeunesse créée par la campagne ou l'influence que cette dernière a exercé plus sensiblement dans les pays où l'action du Mouvement européen s'était trouvée limitée par la force des choses à des cercles politiques restreints, par exemple en Grande-Bretagne, en Irlande¹², dans les pays scandinaves, la Turquie où la jeunesse a apporté un intérêt sans cesse croissant à la prise de conscience d'une solidarité qui la liait par dessus les frontières.

Au passif, l'existence de deux entités institutionnelles distinctes, le Conseil de l'Europe, regroupant quinze pays, et la Communauté des Six, générant inévitablement des attitudes et des options différentes de la part des jeunes ressortissants de divers pays concernés et des organisations participantes en face de la construction politique en cours. Comme l'exprimait Jean Moreau dans un rapport au bureau exécutif du Mouvement européen (BE/P/60) à l'automne 1952: "il y a ceux qui vont de l'avant, ceux qui suivent, ceux qui freinent"¹³.

Sans entrer dans une analyse détaillée, on peut constater, à titre d'exemple, le fait que les jeunes démocrates-chrétiens ou les jeunes fédéralistes existant essentiellement au sein des six Etats membres de la Communauté, étaient plus favorables à un engagement pour une communauté politique que les jeunes membres de l'Internationale socialiste. Les responsables de celle-ci étaient alors, en fait, des Scandinaves et des Autrichiens hostiles au projet communautaire.

Ceci engendra des tensions qui conduisirent, à terme, à une "séparation de corps" entre le Mouvement européen, en l'espèce son comité d'action qui sous la direction de Paul Henri Spaak entendait concentrer son action sur les Six "qui voulaient aller ensemble plus vite et plus loin" et les mouvements de jeunesse¹⁴.

11. AHCE Dep. ME/52. "Rapport présenté par J. Moreau, sec. gén. de la CEJ, au bureau exécutif international du Mouvement européen", 1952.

12. Cf. à ce propos l'exposé de M. HEDERMAN, "The Irish Committee of the European Youth Campaign", conférence sur la CEJ, Bruxelles 8 et 9 novembre 1993.

13. AHCE Dep. ME/52, cf. ci-dessus.

14. Exposé de Jean Charles Moreau à la conférence sur la CEJ, Bruxelles, 8 et 9 novembre 1993.

Le changement d'accent de la CEJ (1953)

La troisième année d'existence de la Campagne européenne de la jeunesse apparaît comme une période de doutes et de discussions. L'opinion des dirigeants du Mouvement européen et de la Campagne s'était, en 1952, partagée entre deux tendances:

- la première allait vers l'organisation d'un mouvement de jeunesse nouveau, directement rattaché au Mouvement européen pour constituer les troupes de choc de l'action européenne,
- la seconde allait vers la formule d'une association étroite entre le Mouvement européen et les mouvements de jeunesse, en vue d'une large diffusion de l'éducation européenne, d'abord aux cadres de la jeunesse organisée.

Bien que l'influence des tenants de la seconde tendance n'ait jamais cessé d'inspirer la ligne d'action de la campagne au cours des années suivantes, à la fin de 1952 et au début de 1953 une mise au point s'avéra nécessaire, qui amena une modification du statut, des structures et des programmes de la CEJ.

Cette évolution trouvait son origine dans deux facteurs:

- La remise en question des relations que le Mouvement européen entretenait avec les mouvements de jeunesse, organismes de nature et de vocation différentes: il était apparu que sous l'influence du Conseil européen de la jeunesse, la CEJ était entraînée à devenir l'organisme coordinateur des intérêts généraux des organisations de jeunesse à l'échelle européenne. Les dirigeants du Mouvement européen songeaient à un mode de coopération beaucoup plus souple avec les mouvements de jeunesse lorsque le protocole d'accord qui le liait à ces derniers perdrait ses effets en septembre 1953.
- D'autre part, le Mouvement européen qui avait vu et accepté cette entreprise dans la perspective d'une action éducative très large, s'étendant à l'origine aux quinze pays du Conseil de l'Europe, avait en cours d'année concentré de plus en plus son effort sur la bataille politique pour la ratification des traités de la Communauté européenne de défense et de la Communauté politique supranationale.

En septembre 1952, à l'occasion du Conseil européen de la jeunesse qui se tint à Florence, le Mouvement européen exprimait par la bouche de son représentant la volonté d'intensifier l'effort d'action politique engagée et cela essentiellement dans les six pays signataires de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA).

Ce changement d'accent était à mettre en rapport avec le fait qu'on essaya également de répondre aux remarques du comité américain pour une Europe unie, qui entendait concentrer l'effort financier sur l'action à entreprendre au sein des Six et insistait sur la nécessité d'une propagande à la base touchant la masse de la jeunesse non organisée.

La CEJ évolua ainsi vers une campagne nettement politique et se trouvait placée sous le contrôle direct du Mouvement européen en général et de son Comité d'action pour une Communauté supranationale en particulier.

De fait, dès décembre 1952 la séparation de corps entre les mouvements de jeunesse et le Mouvement européen apparaissait inéluctable. Le secrétariat général de la Campagne, autrefois soumis à un comité directeur mixte comprenant des représentants du Mouvement européen et du Conseil européen de la jeunesse, était rattaché au seul Mouvement européen. En son sein étaient créés deux secteurs distincts: un service “Campagne éducative“ d’une part contrôlant l’action dans les Quinze, un “Bureau politique“¹⁵, agissant sous l’autorité du Comité d’action pour une Communauté européenne supranationale, chargé d’organiser lui-même, ou en collaboration avec des mouvements nationaux ou organisations, les activités de caractère nettement politique au sein des six pays de la CECA.

Philippe Deshormes remplaçait à cette époque Jean-Charles Moreau à la tête du secrétariat international. Ses expériences antérieures à la tête du scoutisme puis de la Campagne en Belgique, sa compréhension à l’égard des divers génies nationaux et son ouverture d’esprit lui avaient permis de demeurer à l’écart des luttes d’influence qui avaient animé la CEJ au cours des derniers mois. Ses qualités le mettaient à même de mener la réforme nécessaire.

En mai 1953, le Bureau exécutif international du Mouvement européen confiait la charge de préparer le programme de la CEJ pour 1953/1954 à une Commission d’étude composée de Messieurs Philip, Drapier, Bichet, Focke, Fogarty, Moreau et Deshormes. Warren Fuggitt était associé aux travaux. La commission d’études basa le programme qu’elle définit (sur la base d’un avant-projet présenté par le nouveau secrétaire général Philippe Deshormes) sur les positions de principes suivantes:

- Le protocole signé entre le Mouvement européen et les mouvements de jeunesse qui venait à expiration en septembre 1953 ne serait pas reconduit. La coopération avec les organisations de jeunesse serait basée sur des contrats bilatéraux précis. L’action du secrétariat international ne se confinerait pas aux milieux de la jeunesse organisée. Cependant des secrétariats nationaux subsisteraient dans tous les pays où cela semblerait indiqué.
- Dans chaque pays, la coopération du Mouvement avec le Conseil national serait désormais fondée sur un programme précis comportant un “seuil politique“ qui conditionnerait l’attribution des fonds. Tout ce qui se trouverait en deçà de cette exigence politique, évaluée en dernier ressort par le Bureau exécutif du Mouvement européen, serait retranché. Le caractère unitaire de la campagne était cependant sauvegardé car le programme établissait que l’action dans les Six et dans les Quinze devrait constituer un ensemble homogène, action éducative et action politique devant être menées de pair.

15. Le “bureau politique“, constitué en décembre 1952 par un collège de quatre membres appartenant aux mouvements politiques européens de jeunesse, MM. Karilla, Rencki, Sibille et Degimbe, n’eut jamais réellement la possibilité, au cours de 1953, d’initier ou de contrôler les activités prises en main par les organes techniques (services des stages, de propagande et publications, journal) théoriquement placés sous son autorité.

Le programme d'action pour 1954–1955

Les fonds provenant des sources habituelles de financement étant assurés jusqu'à la fin de 1955, les caractéristiques du programme concret de la CEJ devaient amplifier l'action militante et assurer des relais. Au programme 1954–1955 devaient figurer: l'action de propagande en faveur de la CED en France et en Italie; la contribution aux efforts de rapprochement franco-allemand, l'information sur les problèmes de la Communauté politique européenne (CPE) et sur ses corollaires économiques, l'information sur les organismes existants (CECA).

Il s'agissait d'un effort visant à engager les jeunes de tous les pays dans le soutien actif des idées défendues par le Mouvement européen et les Institutions européennes, en instaurant une collaboration étroite avec tous les organismes promoteurs, sous différentes formes, de l'intégration européenne¹⁶.

Les activités principales tourneraient autour des préoccupations suivantes, sur le plan de l'action militante:

- collaboration avec le Comité d'action pour une Communauté supranationale pour la mise sur pied de la partie "jeunes" d'action politique à but immédiat dans les six pays de la CECA. On envisageait notamment une série de manifestations d'importance et de nature différentes comme les opérations de "pionnage" d'un pays: en 1954 l'ensemble de l'action en France est centrée sur la CED et la CPE; c'est le thème commun à toutes les conférences et réunions contradictoires tenues dans différents milieux (plus de trente en février-mars 1954), ou dans une région donnée (Comité français dans la Vienne en 1953), manifestations réalisées à l'occasion d'un événement significatif (en 1953, réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères à Baden-Baden, marquée par un défilé suivi d'une démarche de jeunes auprès des ministres, ou à l'occasion du congrès du Mouvement européen à la Haye);
- mise sur pied, avec le secteur "Production", de stages et de camps destinés à la prospection et à l'écolage politique et technique de futurs cadres qui seraient ensuite sollicités pour des actions précises et l'animation dans les divers pays de "groupes d'action" ainsi que de sessions d'études pour groupes spécialisés (étudiants, instituteurs, presse de la jeunesse). Il ne s'agissait plus seulement ici d'une action sur les jeunes, mais les jeunes devaient organiser eux-mêmes la propagande destinée à l'ensemble de l'opinion publique¹⁷.

La CEJ demeurait aussi une entreprise d'information et d'éducation européenne au niveau des Quinze. Trois années d'expérience avaient en effet mis les responsables de la Campagne devant une constatation d'évidence: la jeunesse se détournait de la chose politique comme le démontrait la forte proportion d'abstentions chez les jeunes lors des consultations électorales. C'est pourquoi l'effort à mener pour développer l'"esprit civique européen" devint le leitmotiv du programme d'action pour 1954–1955. Pour ce faire il fallait exposer les problèmes aux jeunes à

16. AHCE; CEJ Doc. "*Perspectives de la Campagne européenne pour 1954–1955*".

17. AHCE; CEJ, G. RENCKI, "*Note critique sur l'action politique du secrétariat international pour la jeunesse du Mouvement européen, mars 1953*".

l'échelle européenne et leur parler de ce qui les intéressait directement: en d'autres mots, il fallait les amener progressivement aux méandres de la politique internationale à travers le prisme simplificateur et stimulant des questions d'intérêt local ou particulier (les grands événements qui frappent l'opinion par exemple). Dans cette perspective la production et la diffusion de journaux revêtaient une grande importance: le ton devait en être "rajeuni", les "fiches du militant" existantes devaient être tenues régulièrement à jour, leur diffusion accélérée et accrue, en particulier par la constitution d'un réseau de correspondants susceptibles d'agir comme des relais.

Si l'on s'aventure à dresser un bilan des actions de la campagne pour 1953–1954, on constate qu'on peut lui attribuer quelques succès:

- Certes, suite aux décisions de Berlin, de larges secteurs de mouvements de jeunesse traditionnels abandonnent la campagne mais cette perte d'influence dans certains milieux éducatifs est compensée par une activité plus spécifiquement européenne dans les milieux politiques d'une part et dans les milieux professionnels d'autre part. C'est en effet au cours de l'exercice 1953–1954 que la Campagne établit des contacts, qui ne feront qu'aller croissant, avec les centrales syndicales Confédération internationale des syndicats chrétiens (CISC) et Confédération internationale des syndicats libres (CISL) et avec les coopératives et organisations de jeunesse agricole.¹⁸
- On peut mettre à son actif également le développement de ses journaux et de son réseau de diffusion: en 1955 les trois journaux "*Jeune Europe*", "*Jugend Europas*" et "*Giovane Europa*" tirent à plusieurs dizaines de milliers d'exemplaires. Les deux premiers ont entamé leur commercialisation et enregistrent des résultats encourageants au niveau des abonnements. La recherche de la publicité est régulièrement entreprise.

La réunion des "Etats généraux (ou convention) de la jeunesse européenne" (1955–1956)

L'actualité, dans la seconde moitié de 1954, déplace les problèmes. Le 30 août marque un arrêt brutal du développement logique et systématique des perspectives européennes. Les derniers mois de 1954 voient la confusion s'amplifier: le vote de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO), en rassurant l'opinion publique, rejette en fait dans l'ombre le problème de l'union de l'Europe. Au sein des mouvements européens, c'est le désarroi: le problème de la relance est posé.

Il se pose aussi, fin 1954, à la Campagne européenne de la jeunesse. Le programme de celle-ci est certes arrêté pour 1954–1955. Mais l'interrogation se fait pressante malgré le succès des entreprises de la CEJ. Celle-ci doit certes soutenir les efforts de relance, mais cette relance tend à se matérialiser en des termes peu

18. AHCE; CEJ/66, Note (J. Degimbe?), sur les activités de la Campagne européenne de la jeunesse (non datée).

attractifs pour la jeunesse: l'extension de la CECA à l'énergie et aux transports ou l'installation d'un "pool" des armements ne peuvent accrocher qu'un public restreint d'initiés. S'il ne s'agissait que de tenir sa partie dans cette relance, le rôle de la Campagne serait nécessairement de peu de portée.

Afin de contribuer à une relance de l'idée européenne, la CEJ prépare pour 1955-1956-1957 un programme recentré sur l'activité essentielle des années suivantes: la réunion d'"Etats généraux de la jeunesse". L'opération, dont le principe fut admis à la fin de 1955, fut initiée par J. Drapier, A. Philip et Ph. Deshormes et mise au point par ce dernier avec la collaboration de J. Eugène, J. Degimbe et G. Rencki. Elle devait originellement comporter trois phases:

- a) la réunion d'une conférence des représentants de toutes les organisations et institutions qui s'occupent à la fois de la jeunesse et de l'Europe; seront invités à cette conférence toutes les associations qui auront souscrit à une déclaration-programme préliminaire (Pâques 1956?);
- b) sur la base d'un plan de revendication établi par cette première conférence, un effort de décentralisation nationale et régionale ayant pour but de faire préparer des "cahiers de revendications" par des groupes nationaux et régionaux;
- c) une réunion d'Etats généraux de la jeunesse européenne accompagnée de manifestations culturelles de signification internationale (été 1957?).

Cette convocation exigeait une refonte complète des programmes de la CEJ. L'action devrait en effet répondre à deux objectifs: la nécessité de rallier la jeunesse européenne et l'effort d'approfondissement des problèmes qui se posait à cette jeunesse par les jeunes eux-mêmes. Mais il s'agissait aussi de répondre, avec des moyens limités, à l'entreprise de séduction et de détente que les communistes s'approprièrent à lancer par l'organisation d'un festival de la jeunesse à Moscou.

La réunion se présentait comme une action unitaire et non pas sous la forme de plusieurs actions nationales: les Etats généraux, conçus comme une initiative de ralliement pour ramasser l'action et la faire rebondir, tentaient à cet égard de pallier la dispersion des énergies qui avait suivi le 30 août 1954.

Dans ces conditions qu'advierait-il de la poursuite du programme des années précédentes, à savoir celui de l'action spécifiquement politique? La politique menée à l'égard des organisations européennes militantes devait s'en trouver modifiée. Jusqu'en 1955 elle s'était exprimée de la façon suivante: associer ces organisations au travail de la Campagne, soutenir leur existence matérielle, mesurer l'aide en fonction de la valeur des programmes présentés dans la ligne politique définie par le Mouvement européen. La prudence de cette politique avait été dépassée par les événements. Comme l'écrivait Philippe Deshormes: "Nous devons dorénavant avoir recours à ces organisations pour propager notre action commune, au maximum de leurs possibilités et de celles que nous pourrions leur apporter en renfort".

Un autre gros problème devait être résolu, qui relevait des principes: était-il sage de prévoir que la plus grande part de la participation à la conférence préparatoire aux Etats généraux fut réservée aux mouvements et organisations de jeu-

nesse?¹⁹ Ne risquait-on pas de retourner aux formules anciennes en renonçant à la présentation des milieux moins organisés touchés au cours des dernières activités? Ne prendrait-on pas, ce faisant, le risque de ne pas voir se dégager de ces organisations, caractérisées par l'inquiétude congénitale qu'elles nourrissent généralement à l'égard de l'action politique, la majorité enthousiaste souhaitée par les organisateurs, sans compter le désir des organisations de jeunesse de s'emparer du contrôle des phases successives de l'opération? Pour y parer, il fut décidé de procéder à un recrutement très large, une place sérieuse devant être réservée aux institutions telles la Haute Autorité de la CECA, l'OTAN ou l'OECE (Comité de patronage, conférenciers spécialisés, etc...).

Ces propositions un peu idéalistes furent de toute manière vite redimensionnées.

- Le programme de trois ans se heurta aux réticences de certains membres de la Commission jeunesse du Mouvement européen qui retarda l'adoption du budget additionnel nécessaire à sa préparation. La convention prit ainsi un an de retard.
- Des esprits chagrins craignaient que le but essentiel de l'opération proposée ne fut la recherche de moyens financiers qui auraient permis à la campagne de prolonger son existence. Il se serait agi d'élaborer un plan de trois ans que la CEJ "vendrait aux gouvernements". Il était souhaitable d'éviter une trop forte participation financière extraeuropéenne.²⁰
- Il s'avéra vite que les avantages accordés un peu démagogiquement aux organisations militantes de jeunesse depuis 1953, sur le plan de la représentation, avaient donné à celles-ci une importance disproportionnée par rapport à leur nombre et à leur efficacité.

L'alignement de la CEJ sur les institutions communautaires (1957–1958)

L'évolution favorable de la politique européenne qui s'était manifestée avec la signature et la ratification des Traités de Rome créant le Marché commun et la Communauté atomique européenne amena une nouvelle orientation de la CEJ.

La mise en place de ces institutions nouvelles conduisit la CEJ à concentrer son action en 1957 et 1958 sur tout ce qui s'y rapportait: le succès de la mise en application des deux traités devenait l'objectif numéro un de la Campagne.²¹ D'où la nécessité d'adapter le programme en conséquence: en 1957–1958, le travail de la

19. Dès 1954–1955, alors même que les activités allaient se précisant vis-à-vis des milieux politiques, le CEJ renouait contact avec quelques grandes internationales de jeunesse qui assuraient, outre le ralliement de mouvements de jeunesse traditionnels, une diffusion très grande de l'idée d'unification européenne: ce furent essentiellement la JOC internationale, les Faucons rouges, la Fédération mondiale des jeunesses catholiques.

20. AHCE; CEJ/1444, PV de la réunion sur les Etats généraux de la jeunesse européenne du 21 février 1955, intervention de J. Baudy et Ph. Deshormes notamment.

21. AHCE; CEJ/68, Ph. DESHORMES, Rap. 4, 1957.

CEJ s'infléchit dans le sens d'une information spécialisée milieu par milieu. Il allait porter spécialement sur les problèmes économiques en raison de la préparation puis de la mise en place des Traités de Rome. La CEJ devait être à même de jouer un rôle important pour aider à la mise en place des institutions communautaires. Cette action se développerait non seulement dans les six pays de la Communauté, mais également à l'extérieur, les pourparlers en vue de la constitution d'une éventuelle zone de libre-échange augmentant l'intérêt que pouvaient y porter des pays qui avaient toujours joué un rôle important dans la Campagne, tels que le Royaume-Uni et les pays scandinaves. Les moyens financiers allant en se réduisant, les méthodes employées ne pourraient guère être révolutionnaires: conférences, journées d'études, sessions d'information, réunions, publications restaient les moyens privilégiés d'action.

La nouveauté résidait dans le fait que le programme 1957-1958 se présentait comme une série de grandes subdivisions correspondant aux thèmes principaux de travail de la campagne: Europe et agriculture, Europe et milieux industriels, Europe et Outre-mer, Europe et énergie atomique, Europe et enseignement, avenir de l'Europe, politique générale européenne. A ces subdivisions correspondraient une série d'activités et de "groupes de travail". Ces derniers assumeraient la préparation et la tenue d'études, de colloques et de publications. Ils auraient une composition internationale.

La CEJ s'est alors tournée vers les jeunes de certains groupes: sociaux-politiques, syndicalistes, jeunes ruraux, jeunes économistes ou dirigeants d'organisations politiques de jeunesse, jeunes experts des problèmes de sous-développement, aux fins de constituer des groupes d'experts capables de guider la CEJ dans son action.²²

Comme il y a déjà été fait allusion, si la CEJ était devenue un organisme travaillant en milieux spécialisés c'était aussi parce que la campagne de propagande générale envisagée les années précédentes se retrouvait sans moyens suffisants. La CEJ n'avait plus la possibilité de maintenir un effort d'éducation dans tous les pays d'Europe, ses moyens de diffusion ayant considérablement diminué. L'argent constituait en effet la principale limite aux possibilités d'action internationale de la Campagne.

La création de la CEE et de l'EURATOM avait amené le Comité américain pour l'Europe unie à réduire ses efforts en faveur de la campagne. Les recettes se composaient essentiellement de cette subvention fixe, renouvelée chaque année qui, d'inchangée depuis plusieurs années avec un montant fixé à 425.000 dollars, avait été progressivement réduite à 300.000 dollars pour l'exercice 1957-1958, puis à 150.000 dollars pour 1958-1959.

Bien qu'un nombre croissant d'activités aient pu être financées par des fonds trouvés en Europe (stages pour mineurs et sidérurgistes financés par la Haute Autorité, séminaires de jeunes économistes dans le cadre de l'OECE, etc...), pour

22. AHCE: CEJ/68, Comité directeur, Avant-projet de programme général de la CEJ pour 1958-1959, 27 mai 1958.

l'exercice 1956–1957 leur montant n'atteignait pas 50% de la contribution de l'ACUE.

De plus, le Comité américain avait exprimé des vœux quant à l'affectation d'une bonne part de sa subvention. Ces vœux résultaient d'une tournée de consultation effectuée en Europe par Paul Hoffman, président en fonction du Comité américain. Ils stipulaient qu'une priorité absolue devrait être donnée aux activités de mise en oeuvre du Marché commun et d'EURATOM ainsi qu'aux activités se rapportant à la zone de libre-échange; point de vue qui était entièrement partagé par le Comité directeur de la CEJ.

Les dirigeants de la CEJ durent s'adapter en faisant porter les réductions dès 1957 sur certaines activités considérées comme moins essentielles et sur le secrétariat international (personnel et fonctionnement). Certains secrétariats nationaux ou correspondants périphériques durent être supprimés: Grèce, Turquie, Autriche, Suisse. On dut mettre un terme à la diffusion du journal allemand.

Après avoir vainement tenté de faire prendre la Campagne en charge par les institutions communautaires, sous la forme d'un "office d'information et d'éducation européenne"²³ doté d'un statut autonome, les responsables durent procéder à la liquidation de la Campagne européenne de la jeunesse proprement dite en 1959.

Conclusions

Au moment de sa dissolution le 30 septembre 1959, la Campagne avait à son actif de nombreuses publications, d'innombrables séminaires, sessions d'études, rencontres de jeunes ... Elle a aussi donné naissance à quelques autres actions durables telle que la journée européenne des écoles secondaires dans les différents pays d'Europe. Elle a constitué une école européenne pour de nombreuses personnes qui ont assumé par la suite de hautes responsabilités. Il y a dans les services de la Commission un certain nombre de directeurs généraux ou de directeurs qui ont fait leurs premières armes à la Campagne.

En dépit de ces résultats, l'impression subsiste d'une Campagne qui a souffert d'avoir sans cesse hésité entre les partisans de l'éducation et ceux de l'action.

La première école, en choisissant de coopérer avec les mouvements de la jeunesse organisée, quel que soit leur degré de ferveur ou de tiédeur européenne, a peut-être engendré une dispersion des efforts mais elle a eu le mérite d'économiser les forces et les moyens de la CEJ qui, faute de pouvoir forger une organisation par elle-même, s'est ainsi trouvé en mesure d'inspirer, d'aider, de financer et de coordonner les organisations militantes fonctionnant déjà sur le terrain.

La Campagne ne defut certes pas déterminée par des consignes de propagande. Il est néanmoins incontestable qu'une part notable de son activité et de son programme a dû coller aux événements: c'est ainsi qu'elle s'est engagée à fond en

23. AHCE; CEJ/68, Lettre de Paul Hoffman à Robert Schuman, 3 juillet 1958, et Rapport d'activités (Ph. Deshormes) du 27 mars 1958.

1953 dans la campagne en faveur de la CED et que les activités des secrétariats des Six ont été alors entièrement mobilisées à cet effet. Une prise de position claire sur les problèmes politiques a pu avoir le mérite de hâter la prise de conscience des jeunes générations sur les finalités de la Campagne qui demeuraient en définitive des objectifs à long terme transcendant la politique "politicienne": la Fédération de l'ensemble des pays d'Europe, la formation, dans cette perspective d'une génération européenne, à laquelle on fournirait ses cadres dont on forgerait la foi.

La Campagne a également souffert de n'avoir jamais pu se prévaloir d'un financement à long terme. La subvention du Comité américain, bien que renouvelée annuellement, était toujours sujette à révision, d'où l'impossibilité d'élaborer un programme d'une durée supérieure à trois ans. Cela a contribué à désorienter la stratégie de la Campagne soumise aux fluctuations de la politique américaine et européenne, alors même que le Mouvement européen hésitait sur les choix politiques à opérer.

Jean Marie Palayret

European Strategists and European Identity The quest for a European Nuclear Force 1954–1967

Beatrice Heuser

Il y a deux façons de radiographier l'âme de l'Europe, c'est de l'interroger sur sa culture et sur sa défense. (...) En l'occurrence, l'épreuve du réel qu'est le passage par la preuve militaire vaut pour mise à l'épreuve philosophique de l'idée d'Europe.

*Régis Debray*¹

Conflicts are possibly the most important contexts in which a feeling of group identity is engendered. War is thus of extreme importance for bonding experiences and for the formation of group identities, as is the experience of a common threat (or oppression etc.). Nevertheless, even within the circumstances of experiencing a common threat, there can be a tendency of the *saute qui peut*, of the wish to avoid being drawn into fights not of one's own making. Concrete physical circumstances, technical and geographic factors, can strengthen one tendency or the other.

A special set of interlocking technical, geographical and strategic circumstances was created by the advent of nuclear weapons and the almost simultaneous maturing of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies. In this paper it is argued that this politico-technical complex contained elements both furthering and undermining the growth of a feeling of European identity.

Yet it must be emphasized that such feelings of collective identity, where they do emerge, may stop short of becoming explicitly conscious, or of being turned into an explicit realisation that a new group identity, an "imagined community", has come into existence. Particularly among cultures in which such self-reflection is simply not part of the mental fabric, it would be unusual to say the least to dwell on the subject of defence and identity on the metaphysical plane, as does Régis Debray in the above quotation. Practical considerations, the imperatives of technological or strategic innovation, may lead to a *de facto* alignment with a group of other nations hitherto regarded as profoundly alien. It will not necessarily always and among all intellectual or political élites result in deep reflection, nor will it necessarily be recognized in public or private utterances that a new group identity has been formed. National particularities may stand in the way of this, and, I would argue, that is particularly the case for Britain.

If, then, such recognitions of a new group identity are not cast in the stone of public rhetoric and writing, whence they can penetrate into the consciousness of the public at large, they may also prove ephemeral.² Whether this is the case with

1. R. DEBRAY, *Tous azimuts*, Paris 1989, pp. 11–12.

2. The British pro-European government leaders of the early 1990s undoubtedly had their good reasons for not putting the Maastricht Treaty to their electorate for a referendum.

the collective identities formed under the influence of the common perception of a Soviet threat remains to be seen.

The Atlantic Community

The post-Second World War era cannot, of course, be understood without keeping in mind the friend-foe alignments of the war itself. The offer of a common citizenship made by Winston Churchill to the French during the war epitomized the feeling of “we-ness“ in the face of a common, deadly threat, that of Nazi Germany. An equally strong if not even stronger feeling of “we-ness“ was created between Britain and the United States, the power which once more entered a European war to save Europe from German barbarism. But even the Soviet Union was looked upon kindly by the public at large, once Stalin was forced to take sides with the Allies due to Hitler’s megalomania. On VE Day, as an eye-witness of this period, who at the time was a British civil servant dealing with psychological warfare in the Special Operations Executive (SOE), recorded later, the British public at large would have seen Russia as much as a great ally as America. For

“it had been the [British] government’s deliberate policy to suppress facts about differences and disputes between the British and their two great allies, America and Russia. The authorities thought, probably rightly, that if the public knew about them, morale would be shaken, relations between the British and the big allies would be damaged, and Hitler’s propagandists would be given rich material for their job (...).“³

Throughout Europe, the Cold War reaction against the Soviet Communist threat thus took some time to translate itself into popular “gut feelings“. This was true for Britain, but more particularly for France, where sizeable proportions of the population were and voted Communist.

In spite of some wobbles in the first post-war months, the one feeling of war-time bonding that survived was that between Britain, America and Canada. This feeling of a group identity was given a new lease of life by the perception of a Soviet threat, and the emerging Cold War.⁴ At first, it was not necessarily shared – or seen as vitally important – by any other European government.

Until approximately 1948, the time of the Czech coup and the First Berlin Crisis, the closeness of the British and American governments on the issue of the containment of the Communist military and political challenge was not paralleled by an equally close relationship with France. Until then, France’s interest in close cooperation with Britain hinged on the fear of a revival of the German threat. It was

3. E. BARKER, *The British between the Superpowers, 1945–50*, London 1983, pp. 1–2.

4. D. DIMBLEBY & D. REYNOLDS, *An Ocean Apart: the relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*, London 1988, pp. 168–177; see also D. REYNOLDS, “Rethinking Anglo-American relations“, *International Affairs*, vol. 65 no. 1 (Winter 1988–89), pp. 89–111, and D. CAMERON WATT, *Succeeding John Bull: America and Britain’s Place, 1900–1975*, Cambridge 1984.

the Berlin Blockade which catalyzed the majority opinion among the French public at large and French government circles in particular to take sides with the German victims of the Blockade against the Soviet Union.⁵

It is true that European defence integration in theory preceded Atlantic defence integration. The 1947 Dunkirk Treaty of mutual defence between Britain and France was indeed the first of the series of defensive treaties which was to unite the Western world against the perceived common threat, and the Brussels Treaty of March 1948 was perhaps a crucial precondition for the American treaty commitment to Europe in the following year. But the Treaty of Dunkirk and the Western Union formed by the Brussels Treaty were designed by the French to counter both renewed German and continuing Soviet expansionism.⁶ Also, the Brussels Treaty Organisation's (BTO) military planning was strangely impotent without the assured commitment of America's strategic air force with its nuclear weapons. Moreover, while the BTO's planning occurred within the legal framework of a mutual defence treaty, to all intents and purposes the *real* planning was being done in Washington, where Canadian and British missions had the privilege – not assured by any treaty rights – of being let in on the defence planning of the world's strongest economic power with the world's most advanced military technology.

The BTO was subsumed into the North Atlantic Treaty's organisation which was set up from late 1950 in reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War. Thus the infant European defence identity was subsumed into an Atlantic defence organisation. Plans to form an integrated West European (continental) pillar within NATO, namely the European Defence Community, founded in 1954 on the French National Assembly's veto, which we will discuss below. The potential for a European identity forming through the bonding effect of the common threat was thus lost, while the larger common identity, the Atlantic Alliance, was consolidated.

Yet there were increasing geostrategic reasons for such a European identity. The development by the Soviets first of nuclear weapons and then of the vehicles – bombers and aircraft – to deliver them against targets in the United States necessarily resulted in greater reluctance on the part of the Americans to commit themselves to an almost automatic release of nuclear weapons, as the Europeans hoped for, and as MC 48 or “Massive Retaliation“, the NATO strategy adopted in December 1954, seemed to suggest.⁷ Amazingly enough it was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,

5. C. BUFFET, *Mourir pour Berlin: La France et l'Allemagne, 1945–1949*, Paris 1991. See also E. BELLINGHAUSEN, “Le Blocus de Berlin à travers la presse française“, MS Mémoire de D.E.A., Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris 1990.

6. J.W. YOUNG, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–1949*, Leicester 1990, pp. 120–121, 134–154, 175–180.

7. Cf. discussion of MC 48, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years“, Foreign Relations of the United States henceforth FRUS 1952–1954 vol. V, p. 530 of November 1954, and French assumptions about MC 48, Mendès France, French Foreign Minister, on 30 November 1954: “Les plans militaires actuels de l'Alliance atlantique comportent notamment l'utilisation inconditionnelle et instantanée par les puissances occidentales des armes nucléaires et thermonucléaires en cas d'attaque soviétique“. (*Documents Diplomatiques Français* [henceforth DDF] 21 July–31 December 1954, Paris 1987, p. 399.)

who publicized the very concept of “Massive Retaliation“, who had drawn attention to this ever-increasing vulnerability of the United States (and Canada) in a session of the North Atlantic Council precisely a year before the adoption of MC 48.⁸ These doubts on the part of US leaders grew consistently, fuelled by the “bomber gap“ and the “missile gap“ myths, but also by the very real technological progress made by the USSR. In 1959 it led to Eisenhower’s Secretary of State Christian Herter’s answer to the question raised by Congress under which circumstances the United States would release nuclear weapons. His reply was: only if “we ourselves“ were “in danger of all-out devastation“.⁹ “We“ was commonly taken to mean the United States only, particularly in the interpretation of French strategists.¹⁰

In turn, this led to a European quest for reassurance, which in turn gave birth to a whole gamut of proposals for solutions. Among them was that for a NATO nuclear force in various guises, which, still subject to a US veto, would at least fall under the influence of NATO (and thus European *and* American) planning; one concept put forward became known as that of a Multilateral Nuclear Force or MLF. An alternative, which was eventually realized in the Nuclear Planning Group, was that of a joint process for the formulation of political guidelines for the release of nuclear weapons.

A European Nuclear Force?

A third option was that of creating a European nuclear force from the British and/or French arsenals, with financial support from the non-nuclear powers of Europe. The underlying argument for this is that geography – the width of the Atlantic – might shield America from the consequences of a large-scale war in Europe, but that modern conventional (let alone, nuclear) technology has made it impossible for any West European country to escape the common fate, should one of its neighbours be attacked by the Warsaw Pact (or any other putative major, hostile power). The size of the enemy, the reach of his aircraft, missiles and overwhelming ground forces, would have carried the war from the Elbe to the Rhine within few days only. France and Britain had to be defended in West Germany, and consequently (ran the geostrategic argument), these countries’ interests were the same as those of their European allies. A shared nuclear commitment among Europeans would therefore have more credibility than an American commitment.

The option of a European nuclear force was first contemplated in the wake of the rejection of the EDC,¹¹ but met with little enthusiasm. Pooling it with other

8. FRUS, 1952–1954 vol. V, Washington 1983, p. 477, 16 December 1953.

9. Quoted in M.M. HARRISON, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*, Baltimore 1981, p.76 and see note on p. 247 f.

10. Cf. Général P.-M. GALLOIS, *Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire*, Paris 1960, p. 200.

11. P. GUILLEN, “Die französische Generalität, die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik und die E.V.G., 1950–1954“, in: *Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft*, Boppard am Rhein 1985, pp.156–157.

Europeans was certainly the last thing the British would have wished to do with their embryonic nuclear force at the time.¹²

If Britain was unwilling to come in, one could still have envisaged the French deterrent as the core of such a European nuclear force,¹³ which would simultaneously have assured France a leading rôle in continental Europe. A US technical contribution was solicited, provided it was not tied to a veto-power.

The essential problems were thus, first, whether the British and French governments would be willing to co-ordinate their nuclear forces, e.g. by concerting their targeting and developing a joint arsenal;¹⁴ second, whether the French and the British (or the French alone) would allow their other European Allies a share in the planning, or even in the decision to use the weapons.

The 1954 idea of a European nuclear force was revived in 1957/58 with the Franco-German and later Franco-Italo-German talks on military co-operation.¹⁵ But these were ended when de Gaulle came to power in 1958. Nevertheless, the ideas continued to be talked about by strategists, and indeed, the West European Union's Parliamentary Assembly, led by the British Labour M.P. Fred Mulley, in December 1959 voted in favour of creating a European *force de frappe*.¹⁶ In the context of the talks about the MLF project, the idea of a European Nuclear Force was once again taken up in the early 1960s.

French Europeanists

In France there was in fact strong support for such an option even after de Gaulle's return to power. Indeed, in July and November 1962 the National Assembly and the Senate denied the government credits for the *force de frappe* on the grounds that they would not support a purely national nuclear programme.¹⁷

12. See the arguments put forward in government for an independent, national nuclear force in 1954: I. CLARK and N. WHEELER, *The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy*, Oxford 1989, p. 217; see also L. FREEDMAN, M. NAVIAS & N. WHEELER, "Independence in concert: The British Rationale for Possessing Strategic Nuclear Weapons", *Nuclear History Program Occasional Paper* no. 5 College Park, MD: Center for International Security Studies, Maryland 1989, pp. 10–17.
13. As suggested for example by R. ARON, as quoted in P. STÉLIN, "Initiation à la stratégie atomique", review of Raymond Aron's *Le Grand Débat*, *Le Figaro* (18 Nov. 1963).
14. A joint variable geometry aircraft was contemplated in the mid-60s.
15. M. VAÏSSE, "Autour des accords Chaban-Strauss, 1956–58"; Colette BARBIER, "Les négociations franco-germano-italiennes en vue de l'établissement d'une coopération militaire nucléaire au cours des années 1956–1958"; E. CONZE, "Un point de vue allemand"; Leopoldo NUTI, "Le rôle de l'Italie dans les négociations trilatérales, 1957–1985", all in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, vol. 104, no. 2 (1990), pp. 77–158.
16. R. ARON, "Force de frappe européenne?", *Figaro* (10 December 1959). The French government under de Gaulle was opposed to this scheme.
17. "Le Sénat repousse les crédits de la force de frappe", *Le Monde* (28 Nov. 1963): In their vote of 27 November 1963, the French Senate refused to grant the credits, by 169 against 64 voices. The MRP was supported by the Socialists and Communists, and by the Radicals.

Opposition to de Gaulle's ambitious nuclear plans came mainly from the Mouvement Républicain Populaire or MPR (a centre-right party later succeeded by the Christian Democrats), the Radicals, the Socialists and the Communists. The MPR's President Jean Lecanuet regarded Gaullist nationalism in defence matters as self-defeating:

“Le pouvoir qui nous guide a réveillé le nationalisme en agitant l'ambition d'une force de frappe strictement nationale, en posant les relations internationales en termes d'hégémonie, en prétendant bâtir l'Europe autour d'une prépondérance française. Dès lors, il oblige nos partenaires européens à choisir la vraie prépondérance, qui n'est pas celle de la France, mais celle des Etats-Unis. Par cette ambition et ces illusions, notre diplomatie contredit les possibilités européennes qu'elle voudrait créer. (...) Les progrès ne pourraient reprendre, (...) que si la France acceptait sans réticence d'abandonner la revendication permanente de la souveraineté et s'ouvrait aux perspectives d'une véritable union politique de l'Europe.”¹⁸

Lecanuet led the Senate to oppose the government's request for credits of November 1963, saying:

“La prétention de doter la France d'une panoplie atomique complète et concurrentielle d'armes nucléaires est inadaptée aux moyens économiques et financiers du pays. La construction de l'Europe fédérale, dans le cadre de l'alliance atlantique, que nous souhaitons, conduit à rechercher la création d'une force nucléaire européenne.”¹⁹

Maurice Faure, President of the Radical Party, was at the same time an inveterate Europeanist, holding the international presidency of the European Movement. Faure was equally critical of the Government's stance on defence. Showing himself a well-informed critic of prevailing government doctrine on defence, he argued that it was precisely the *French* (and not so much the American) deterrent, which was not credible: targeted exclusively at Soviet cities – with few weapons one cannot afford to squander any on targets of secondary importance – the French force, if used, would surely provoke an even more deadly anti-city retaliation. Surely, it could therefore not be used in case of a minor provocation: so how would France respond to a small-scale attack? Moreover, France's bombers stood only a very small chance of actually reaching the Russian cities in view of the Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Finally, France depended on NATO for her early-warning system.²⁰

The only thing which made sense in Faure's view would be multilateral nuclear disarmament, and the *force de frappe* could be France's bargaining chip to exert pressure on the other nuclear powers in this respect. Or else France should join forces with the other European powers to make a joint effort to create a truly substantial European nuclear arsenal, thenceforth acting in association with the US but

18. J. LECANUET, “Une politique de prétention nationale“, *Combat* (14 Oct. 1963).

19. “Très vives critiques au Sénat contre la force de frappe“, *Le Monde* (24 November 1963).

20. M. FAURE, “La force de frappe et nos possibilités“, *Le Monde* (20 July 1963).

independent from it with regard to the control of this nuclear arsenal.²¹ As he told an audience at the university of Lille in December 1963:

“Pour pouvoir dissuader un éventuel agresseur, il faut avoir à la fois une force technique suffisante et la fermeté politique. Pour longtemps encore, notre sécurité reposera sur la puissance nucléaire des Etats-Unis, mais quelle que soit l’amitié qui nous attache à cette nation, il serait souhaitable qu’une Europe politiquement unie prenne en charge sa propre sécurité. Au niveau européen, la défense nucléaire est possible et souhaitable. Au niveau national nous en sommes incapables.”²²

Yet even on the side of its supporters, it was noted that the essential problem of an integrated European nuclear force was who would control it. There was no way around the fact that a European political union was a prerequisite to any European nuclear force.

This point was made, for example, by the former chief of the French Air Staff, General Paul Stéhlin, born in Alsace. To him, the MLF was pointless in the form in which it was proposed, subject to a US veto. It would thus not serve to bring the European countries more closely together on questions of defence.²³ He thought the only solution would be for the US to help set up an integrated European nuclear force, without any US veto power attached; he thought that in enhancing deterrence, this would ultimately be in the American as well as in the European interest.²⁴

It is interesting to set Stéhlin’s thoughts on the MLF in the context of his wider understanding of strategy: he was an “Alliance” man, one might say, in that he saw the defence of the West as a common interest of all NATO Allies, and saw the development of any aspect of this defence as enhancing the security of all Allies, and of the entire defence apparatus.²⁵ Thus he opposed France’s withdrawal from the NATO military command structure, and favoured a defence based not only on nuclear deterrence, but also on strong conventional forces, to enhance deterrence on all levels,²⁶ which was in keeping with the US Administrations’ thinking in the 1960s.

Stéhlin may not have been alone among the French military to think in this way. But the self-denying ordinance forbidding active military officers to publish articles, and the general political climate of General de Gaulle’s years in government did not encourage military men to voice their opposition.

Plaidoyers for a European nuclear force were found, predictably enough, among the old Europeanists of the Club Jean Moulin. In December 1963 they produced a study called “La force de frappe et le citoyen”, in which they drew atten-

21. Ibid.

22. “M. Maurice Faure, notre défense nucléaire est impossible au niveau national”, *Le Monde* (3 December 1963).

23. P. STÉHLIN, “Vue d’avenir sur l’Alliance”, *NATO’s Fifteen Nations*, vol. 9 no. 4 (Aug.–Sept. 1964), p. 23.

24. STÉHLIN, “Vue d’avenir”, pp. 24–25.

25. STÉHLIN, “Initiation à la stratégie atomique”, *Le Figaro* (18 Nov. 1963).

26. Interview with General STÉHLIN in “Après la rupture, serons-nous plus en danger qu’aujourd’hui?”, *Paris Match* no. 888 (16 April 1966), pp. 56–59.

tion to the extreme divergence of interests in Europe. The French *force de frappe*, in their view, only made things worse: they described it as “un instrument ‘anti-intégrationniste’ efficace, mais elle n’accroît nullement la position et le rôle de la France”.²⁷ After a lengthy analysis of France’s rôle and defence spending, they concluded:

“Politiquement, la force de frappe française fait de la nation, prise au sens étroit, le terme ultime de l’évolution des sociétés. Elle enferme la France dans les limites des formules traditionnelles d’alliance. Elle se réfère à des concepts périmés d’hégémonie. Les effets négatifs de ces principes nous sont vite apparus: recul de la construction européenne, risque de fracture de l’O.T.A.N.”

Moreover, they felt that the *force de frappe* depended for its true credibility on the complement of the US nuclear power, so very much superior in quality and quantity: “En clair, sans l’appui américain, la force de frappe française ne peut être que l’instrument d’un chantage ou d’un suicide”.²⁸ The opting out of the MLF scheme by France would only result in strengthening the position of Germany, which they did not regard as desirable. Instead, the Club Jean Moulin saw a purely European nuclear force, including the French arsenal, as a possible solution to this problem.²⁹

The most prominent proponent of a European Nuclear Force was perhaps the former foreign minister and expert on international relations, Maurice Schumann. He put his concept forward at the fifth annual conference of the Institute of Strategic Studies in 1963. The Europeans’ fear and horror of any sort of war shines through clearly in his rejection of American concepts of slow escalation, even if this were to take only “four, eight or ten days”, for in that time would unfold

“first the Battle of Germany and then the Battle of France. As far as all those who live between the Elbe and the Rhine or between the Rhine and the Ocean (on either side of the Channel) are concerned, the problem is not to avoid an atomic or nuclear war but to prevent war itself, at all costs, even if it means using the atomic or nuclear threat.”³⁰

With this final point, he was in complete agreement with the de Gaulle government. French strategy was and remains one of war-prevention, giving little thought to war-fighting, as according to this logic anything that happens once deterrence has failed will mean unimaginable devastation either way.

In view of sizeable opposition to his nuclear programme, de Gaulle’s government was under considerable pressure to modify its nationalist stance. It came closest to advocating the formation of a European nuclear force around the (still non-existent) French nuclear arsenal during the debates in the Assemblée Nationale in mid-July 1962, that is, just after Robert McNamara had publicly criticized “relatively weak national nuclear forces operating independently” (i.e. by implication

27. Club Jean Moulin, “La force de frappe et le citoyen”, excerpts in: *Le Monde*, part I: “Signification politique de l’armement nucléaire” (19 December 1963).

28. Club Jean Moulin, “La force de frappe et le citoyen” part IV: “Force de frappe européenne ou force atlantique commune?”, *Le Monde* (24 December 1963).

29. *Ibid.*

30. M. SCHUMANN on “The Evolution of NATO”, *Adelphi Paper* No 5 (September 1965), p. 24.

those of Britain and France) as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent”.³¹

The subject evoked much speculation in the press throughout Western Europe,³² and was hotly debated in the *Assemblée Nationale*.³³ Here Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Defence Pierre Messmer and Minister for Atomic Energy Gaston Palewski all made statements to the effect that a European force was worthy of consideration, particularly once a European political union had been established.³⁴ Aye, there was the rub, and in its absence, any commitment to a multilateral nuclear force on that condition was cheap, but effective in confusing the German debate, as we shall see. In the context of the debate in the *Assemblée Nationale*, however, the government’s assurances that a European deterrent was a serious option were elicited by the Opposition’s refusals to approve of credits exclusively because of the Government’s previous insistence that theirs was to be a *national* deterrent.

Government statements favouring in principle the establishment of a European nuclear force were again made in the following year. De Gaulle’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville, expressed the same logic when telling a West German TV audience in June 1963:

“Rien ne s’opposera plus à ce qu’une très importante responsabilité soit confiée à une autorité politique européenne dans le domaine de la défense, c’est-à-dire avant tout dans le domaine nucléaire.”³⁵

In September 1963, Michel Habib-Deloncle, a junior minister, told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg:

“Le jour où l’Europe aura renforcé ses structures politiques, il conviendra alors de définir comment l’effort entrepris par la France pourra être utilisé par l’ensemble des nations européennes pour la défense commune (...). Dès maintenant, le seul fait que la France se soit engagée sur cette voie fait entrevoir la possibilité de réviser au profit de l’Europe l’équilibre des charges et des responsabilités au sein de l’Alliance atlantique. J’oserai ajouter que, si la Grande-Bretagne conçoit son avenir dans la communauté de l’Europe, elle peut trouver dans ce domaine l’occasion d’une contribution positive, compte tenu des choix nécessaires qu’une telle décision implique.”³⁶

The proposition that an integrated nuclear force was impossible without the prior creation of a supra-national European political union led by a single, integrated government was as sensible then as it is now, and a lesson learnt from the dismal failure of the EDC. Nevertheless, Couve de Murville and Habib-Deloncle

31. United States Information Service, Text of “McNamara address at Michigan University”, 16 June 1962, distributed 18 June 1962.

32. See below for the British and German responses.

33. “Vers la force européenne?”, *Le Monde* (18 July 1962).

34. *Ibid.*

35. Quoted in M. EYRAUD, “La controverse nucléaire au sein de l’Alliance Atlantique”, *Stratégie* no. 1 (Summer 1964), pp. 116–117.

36. Quoted in EYRAUD, “La controverse nucléaire”, p. 117.

can be accused of hypocrisy, as the upward-relegation of sovereignty to a supranational European government was always anathema to de Gaulle.

German Europeanists

The French government's basic tenet on strategy, namely that the nuclear threshold had to be kept low in order to deter war, with tactical nuclear weapons serving as escalatory links, was shared by the German Europeanists. They were led in the 1960s by the former Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and his former Defence Minister, Franz Josef Strauss. Strauss had been Minister of Atomic Energy in the 1950s. As such he had taken the lead, first, in negotiating bilaterally with France, and later, in the aforementioned tripartite negotiations with France and Italy, about possibilities of joint research into nuclear energy. The packet of negotiations also comprised joint aircraft procurement and laid the basis for collaboration on a nuclear weapons programme. Before this could come to fruition, however, de Gaulle had come to power and terminated the "FIG" project.³⁷

Strauss was not only the first real civilian strategist in West Germany to take an active interest in nuclear matters, but had made efforts early on to seek alternatives to the exclusive reliance by the Federal Republic on the US nuclear guarantee. He was deeply worried already in 1958 that the strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union might result in a Soviet attempt to launch a conventional *blitzkrieg* on Western Europe in the hope that the nuclear stalemate on the strategic level would prevent the US from taking action.³⁸

As Minister of Defence, Strauss fully accepted early Anglo-American thinking on the need for "graduated deterrence" or "flexible response", i.e. the need to have alternatives to the all-out strategic nuclear response which France espoused under de Gaulle. At the end of 1961 Strauss still advocated strengthening ties between the US and Western Europe within NATO even to the point of adding to NATO's existing military structure a deeply integrated political organ with sovereign decision-making rights. Only thus, by giving up a part of every member's sovereignty, could Western freedom really be protected, as he concluded in a remarkable speech made at Georgetown University.³⁹

When the US government under Kennedy and McNamara seemed to move towards a strategy advocating fighting a conventional war in Europe before contemplating any response to a nuclear level, Strauss no longer felt he could follow them. He warned that war in Europe must not be conventionalized, but that tactical nuclear weapons should be used very early on in case of war, to emphasize the

37. For a discussion of these negotiations, see the articles cited in footnote 15.

38. F.J. STRAUSS, "Der Preis des Friedens", *Neue Züricher Zeitung* (19 July 1958), quoted in T. ENDERS, *Franz Josef Strauß, Helmut Schmidt und die Doktrin der Abschreckung*, Koblenz 1984, p. 107.

39. F.J. STRAUSS, "Europe, America and NATO: A German View", *Survival*, vol. 4 no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1962), pp. 6-8, a most radical proposal on the transfer of sovereignty.

Western determination to escalate rather than to yield or engage in a prolonged conventional battle.⁴⁰ In this, Strauss felt himself increasingly close to the French government and increasingly at odds with the Americans, and advocated that the West German government should seek to explore any options of European cooperation.

Thus when the Multilateral Force was tabled in international negotiations from 1962 onwards, Strauss, now out of the Federal Government, was more reserved than his Cabinet colleagues and showed considerable concern about de Gaulle's blatant hostility to this scheme.⁴¹ Towards the end of 1964 Strauss seems to have persuaded the Federal Government to propose to the United States a modification of the planned scheme:⁴² he advocated the introduction of a clause through which the MLF could later be turned into a purely European structure.⁴³ Strauss cited the model of the aborted European Defence Community of the 1950s, which (as he pointed out) the United States had favoured so fervently. But with this idea he found little resonance in Bonn.⁴⁴

An alternative proposal had been floated among the rank and file of the Christian Democrats at their Conference on defence issues in October 1964. In truly Gaullist fashion, MP Heusinger proposed not a *directoire à trois* but a *directoire à cinq*, with the US, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy forming a military standing group within NATO.⁴⁵ While this took a leaf out of de Gaulle's book, it was hardly a proposal that would have pleased the General, and it does not seem to have been taken up in government circles.

The German Europeanist circle at various times included Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, Kurt Birrenbach, Heinrich Krone, Rainer Barzel and the President of the Bundestag, Eugen Gerstenmaier, all of them Conservative politicians.⁴⁶ Guttenberg, a very close associate of Strauss in the Christian Social Union CSU (the Bavarian version of the Federal CDU), like Strauss felt that the Franco-German relationship was extremely important to the stability of West European politics. Guttenberg was sceptical about the MLF's chances of being free from a US veto. On 21 January 1963 he told a West German radio-audience, "I think (...) that this Bahamas Conference [between Kennedy and Macmillan] in reality shows the intention of the Americans to tighten their atomic hegemony and to centre things on them even more."⁴⁷

Supporters of a purely European nuclear force around the French deterrent were rare outside the two Conservative parties. Erich Mende of the Free Democrats also

40. ENDERS, *Franz Josef Strauss, Helmut Schmidt*; pp. 136–7.

41. "Streit Erhard-Strauss über MLF", *Rhein-Zeitung* (5 Oct. 1964).

42. "Bonn eilt es nicht mit der MLF", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (7 Nov. 1964).

43. "Atomstreitmacht kompliziert die Bonner Außenpolitik", *Bonner Generalanzeiger* (14 Oct. 1964).

44. F. MÖRSCHBACH, "Schröder widerspricht Strauss – Neuaufgabe der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft abgelehnt", *Frankfurter Rundschau* (8 Dec. 1964).

45. K. BECKER, "Was steuert Bonn an Ideen bei?", *Die Welt* (12 Oct. 1964).

46. W. L. KOHL, *French Nuclear Diplomacy*, Princeton 1971, pp. 288 and 306n.

47. GUTTENBERG in: "Der Streit um die Verteidigungspolitik", *BPA* Abt. Nachrichten, Rundfunkaufnahme, Deutsche Gruppe West, DFS/21 January 1963/21:45 h, Series "Unter uns gesagt – Gespräch über Politik in Deutschland", p. 15.

showed interest in it,⁴⁸ but Social Democrats at the time were torn between old distrust of all things nuclear and full acceptance of US government thinking.⁴⁹ Fritz Erler of the SPD, it seems, would have favoured a purely European arrangement, but he was quite convinced that the French would be unwilling to commit themselves to it, and without them, such a scheme in his view would be pointless.⁵⁰

Europeanists in the United Kingdom

On the British side, McNamara's Michigan speech of June 1962 also sparked off an extremely vivid debate. Since 1960, the Labour Party's declaratory policy had been one of unilateral nuclear disarmament. When Labour won the general election of October 1964, however, they put this idea on ice (to defrost it again when they reverted to being the Opposition Party). When questioned about Britain's nuclear relationship with the United States six months before the famous Nassau meeting, Macmillan admitted to Parliament that Britain's bomber force was in fact closely coordinated with the American bomber force. It was immediately pointed out by Labour Opposition spokesmen that, taken together with Britain's dependence on the US for the acquisition of the *Skybolt* missile, Britain's deterrent was perhaps less than completely "independent" – "independence" had so long been given as the ultimate reason for the British nuclear programme.⁵¹

In the context of the debate this sparked off, the concept of a European nuclear force was put forward repeatedly. To put this in context, it must be remembered that Britain had applied for EEC membership in 1961. Also, there were worries throughout the English-speaking world that France's development of an independent (and in the French case, it was a completely independent) deterrent might whet the appetites of other powers and result in nuclear proliferation. In an opinion editorial article in the Conservative *Daily Telegraph* of 27 June 1962 it was thus argued that the only way to halt proliferation would be to share Anglo-American co-operation with France, and then to offer co-operation and consultation also to "other parts of the European continent".

"Ultimately, therefore, political control over the British and French elements in the western deterrent system will have to be extended to NATO Europe as a whole. Within the framework of the political integration which is anyway taking place in Europe this is by no means an unrealistic aim. The way can be seen towards a truly European deterrent force as part of the West's overall defence system."⁵²

48. KOHL, *French Nuclear Diplomacy*, p. 306n.

49. Led by Helmut Schmidt. For a summary of the development of Schmidt's thinking, see ENDERS, *Franz Josef Strauss, Helmut Schmidt*.

50. F. ERLER, in "Der Streit um die Verteidigungspolitik" (21 Jan. 1963).

51. H of C, Deb., vol. 661, cols. 954–960, Questions and Answers session of 26 June 1962.

52. "New Nuclear Strategy", *The Daily Telegraph* (27 June 1962).

In July 1962, Harold Watkinson resigned as British Minister of Defence and was succeeded by Peter Thorneycroft, who was seen as steering his government's defence policy towards European integration. Then as now, one of the main causes was the British choice not to shoulder defence costs on the same enormous scale as those of France, but to rely on co-operation with allies in the construction of missiles instead. Thorneycroft's main ambition seems to have been to balance the defence budget. He axed a project for the development of a British tactical nuclear missile (the *Blue Water*) on grounds of cost; he then seems to have sought an alternative to exclusive reliance on the United States, favouring a pooling of European resources in the defence industry. This was a logical step in view of Britain's wish to join the European Economic Community, and in August 1962 the British Aircraft Corporation and the French concern Nord Aviation concluded an agreement on a joint missile project.⁵³

At the time, there was already speculation as to whether the US would abandon their *Skybolt* missile programme, in which the British had invested considerable amounts of money after their own decision to cancel the development of the purely British *Blue Streak* air-launched missile. Without such an undetectable delivery vehicle, the V-bombers were in future unlikely to be able to penetrate the increasingly sophisticated Soviet radar and air-defence systems. Thorneycroft's interest in European nuclear co-operation thus seems to have been driven mainly by the wish to further collaboration on missile procurement.⁵⁴

In December 1962 the US Government confirmed the dreaded cancellation of *Skybolt*. In view of the British investment in it, the United States had to offer an alternative to make up for these losses. At their meeting at Nassau in the Bahamas, US President Kennedy offered the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, Polaris submarine technology, and the sale of Polaris missiles, to be fitted with British-built nuclear warheads. The condition: the United Kingdom should put these submarines and missiles at the disposal of the "NATO multilateral nuclear force".

"The Prime Minister made it clear that, except where Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these British forces will be used for the purposes of international defence of the western alliance in all circumstances."⁵⁵

Thus Britain retained the ultimate control of these forces, for, as was frequently commented, the use of nuclear weapons would hardly be an issue unless supreme national interests are at stake! Yet theoretically, the Macmillan Government found itself committed to the building of the MLF.

When de Gaulle vetoed the British entry to the EEC in his famous press conference on 14 January 1963, and simultaneously declined Kennedy's offer to France of Polaris submarine and missile technology, British Government hopes for further

53. H. PIERRE, "Le nouveau ministre de la défense serait favorable à une force de dissuasion européenne", *Le Monde* (15 Aug. 1962).

54. "'World Power' Defence urged for Europe – Mr. Thorneycroft speaks up for British Nuclear Weapons", *The Times* (5 Dec. 1962).

55. "Mr. Macmillan rejects Skybolt offer on grounds of cost", containing the Nassau declaration, *The Times* (22 Dec. 1962).

European integration were temporarily crushed. Nevertheless, the Europeanist voices continued to be heard. Like Franz Josef Strauss in his Washington talk of 1961, the *Observer* argued that full sovereignty had become an obsolete concept with the invention of nuclear weapons, contrary to what the French argued.⁵⁶ With the Nassau agreement, “interdependence” rather than “independence” had become the *leitmotif* of British nuclear policy.⁵⁷

The few advocates and the many critics in Britain of a Multilateral, Atlantic or European nuclear force, like their French colleagues, showed considerable awareness of the problem of who was to control such a force, the crucial problem of the entire scheme.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, sensitized by the French veto to what it was like to be left out in the cold, important voices within and outside government (including Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, backed by the Foreign Office) stated that Britain could not afford to ignore an MLF, should it be formed.⁵⁹ When Habib-Deloncle revived the project of a European nuclear force in Strasbourg, the British Government was split between the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence.⁶⁰ The former was opposed, while the latter, still headed by Thorneycroft, once again may have seen positive military-industrial possibilities. One year later, at any rate, the British firm Hawker Siddeley and the French space and missile firm Engins Matra were working on a combined project for their respective governments of an air-to-surface missile, called AS (for *Air-Sol*) 37.⁶¹ The project was worked out under the auspices of the Minister of Aviation, Julian Amery.⁶²

To confuse the situation further, Patrick Gordon Walker, a Labour Party spokesman, launched a *ballon d'essai* on a visit in Paris to see whether a future Labour government might not be able to buy off de Gaulle's veto to Britain's EEC-membership by offering France membership in a four-power directorate in NATO (France, Britain, the US – and West Germany).⁶³ Once Labour was in Government, a proposal on these lines may have been followed up on the British side, but in a form more palatable to de Gaulle, in that it left out Bonn: in December 1964 there were indications of French willingness to co-ordinate strategic nuclear targeting (of France's as yet not operational nuclear force!) with the USA and Britain.⁶⁴

56. “Sovereignty today”; “Sharing the control of nuclear weapons”, *The Observer* (17 February 1963).

57. See the Nassau Declaration, *The Times* (22 December 1962).

58. E.g. “Flying the Nuclear Flag”, *The Observer* (14 April 1963); “The Control of Nuclear Strategy”, *Adelphi Paper* no. 3 London, ISS, April 1963, a paper written by an Anglo-Franco-German study group drawn from the Institute for Strategic Studies (now International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS), the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère (now Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Ifri), and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP).

59. N. CARROLL, “Plan for NATO nuclear force splits Cabinet”, *The Sunday Times* (15 Sept. 1963).

60. “France's rival deterrent”, *The Guardian* (25 Sept. 1963).

61. “Daylight on the Missile Row: Cronin versus Amery”, *The Observer* (6 Sept. 1964).

62. In parentheses, the French and British governments in much the same context were in the late 1980s considering a joint programme of an air-to-surface missile, called ASLP, for *Air-Sol Longue Portée*, after France realized an air-launched short-range missile, the *Air-Sol Moyenne Portée*, on her own.

63. “Mr Gordon Walker's proposal for four-power directorate”, *The Times* (6 Nov. 1963).

64. A. MACPHERSON, “De Gaulle's H-force will share targets”, *Daily Mail Commonwealth* (18 Dec. 1964).

Meanwhile, apart from Peter Thorneycroft, a number of former Conservative Ministers and defence experts, including Duncan Sandys, Julian Amery, and even Edward Heath, favoured Franco-British co-operation, once they were in Opposition after the Labour victory of 1964.⁶⁵ The most consequent and outspoken proponent of a European nuclear force was perhaps Julian Critchley, a Conservative MP.⁶⁶

But 1965 saw the definite turning of the tide against an MLF, and against a European nuclear force. The Labour Government put forward a proposal for launching what they called an “Atlantic Nuclear Force“, to include British bombers and the Polaris submarines as well as the mixed manned fleet. “The only engagement which this nuclear force [the ANF] has ever been in was to sink the M.L.F. and that was apparently successful. That was its only battle honour“, as Peter Thorneycroft commented sarcastically from his Opposition bench in the House of Commons Debate on Defence.⁶⁷

Moreover, the paralysis of the Atlantic Alliance was overcome paradoxically by the withdrawal of France from most sessions of the Military Committee, renewing it as a forum of alliance activity. De Gaulle had become increasingly determined to assert French sovereignty with regard to any alliance. On 7 March 1966 he informed US President Johnson that France would withdraw all her forces from NATO’s integrated military command.⁶⁸ After France’s withdrawal, the revision of NATO’s doctrine could be completed, leading to the official adoption of the strategy of “flexible response“ by the fourteen powers remaining in the military integration – even if there was considerable disagreement as to what exactly this new strategy implied.⁶⁹ Instead of a multilateral nuclear force, a multilateral consultative group was formed (called the Nuclear Planning Group or NPG), charged with jointly working out guidelines for contingencies and targeting of nuclear weapons. This was a not altogether satisfactory, but nonetheless practicable solution to “NATO’s nuclear dilemmas“.⁷⁰

The greater the emphasis an individual placed on the transfer of sovereignty from national governments to the European Community, the more likely he or she was to extrapolate the need for a shift of sovereignty also in the realm of defence, “arguably *the* most important component of sovereignty“, in the words of former British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe.⁷¹ Thus logically, when Edward

65. KOHL, *French Nuclear Diplomacy*, p. 345 and see HofC, Debates, vol. 707, col. 1365 (3 March 1965).

66. See J. CRITCHLEY, MP, “Europe and the bomb – Beyond the nation-state“, *Crossbow* (Jan.–March 1963); ditto, “The Uneasy Alliance“, *Spectator* (8 March 1963); ditto, “The Value of Britain’s Deterrent“, *The Spectator* (21 February 1964).

67. H of C vol. 707 col. 1364 (3 March 1965).

68. De Gaulle’s letter to Johnson, 7 March 1966, in: *La politique de défense de la France – Textes et Documents*, Paris, FEDN, 1989, pp. 132–133.

69. J. STROMSETH, *The Origins of Flexible Response*, London 1988, pp. 175–194.

70. D. SCHWARZ, *NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas*, Washington, 1983, pp. 136–191.

71. Sir G. HOWE, “Sovereignty and interdependence: Britain’s place in the world“, *International Affairs*, vol. 66 no. 4 (October 1990), p. 687.

Heath as leader of the Conservative Opposition steered his party (and later his country) towards another attempt to join the European Community in the late 1960s, he wrote:

“there should eventually be defence arrangements on a European scale, including Germany, with an Anglo-French arrangement in the nuclear field. This European defence arrangement of course requires a political arrangement also, so that the European forces can work in a reconstructed North Atlantic alliance. This is the only way in which I can see a reconciliation between the desires of Europe, the general policies of France, and the need to have a European-American relationship which is effective and healthy“.⁷²

In 1969 he took a step further and proposed that non-nuclear countries of Europe could join with Britain and France

“in a Consultative Committee which would have exactly the same relationship to the joint Anglo-French deterrent as the so-called McNamara Committee [the later Nuclear Planning Group] has to the U.S. deterrent.“⁷³

This was at the time the predominant view in the British Conservative Party.⁷⁴

The Resilience of the Nation-State

But as we know, no European Nuclear Force has come into existence until this day. Although other reasons will be given, the chief reason was the reluctance among British and French political leaders to contemplate the surrender of sovereignty which such an integrated nuclear force would have entailed. British thinking on this matter has already been alluded to: from the beginning, quite apart from any technical and strategic considerations, successive British governments felt that they would lose their great-power rôle altogether if their own nuclear weapons did not secure them a place at the “top table“ and if they would lose their indirect input into US planning and thinking, again connected with their own possession of nuclear weapons.⁷⁵ But unlike France, Britain accorded its allies the same rights conceded by the USA, namely to have a say in the principles guiding the targeting and release of nuclear weapons, in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group set up within NATO in 1966/67. The basis for this was not just the relatively vague wording of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also the very concrete and comprehensive commitment to defend their treaty partners with “all the military and other aid and

72. E. HEATH in “Western and Eastern Europe: the Changing Relationship“, IISS Vienna conference, Oct. 1966, *Adelphi Paper* no. 33 (March 1967), pp. 34–35

73. E. HEATH in: *Foreign Affairs* (October 1969).

74. E.g. G. RIPPON, M.P., “The Reason behind the Opposition Viewpoint“, *Financial Times* (4 March 1970); the Bow Group (a Conservative discussion group) pamphlet of March 1970, quoted by Y. BOYER, “Franco-British nuclear co-operation: The legacy of history finally overcome?“, in: Y. BOYER, P. LELLOUCHE and J. ROPER, *Franco-British defence co-operation: A new entente cordiale?*, London 1989, p. 22.

75. FREEDMAN, NAVIAS & WHEELER, “Independence in concert“, pp. 10–17.

assistance in their power“, contained in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty (WEU Treaty), and, of course, the commitment of the Nassau Declaration. The confirmation that this means a British engagement to defend its allies with nuclear weapons if need be was spelled out by the British Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, in September 1992.⁷⁶

De Gaulle and some of his like-minded successors found it very difficult, however, to confirm the WEU commitment which France had equally undertaken in 1954. While France continued to rely, indirectly, on the American guarantee and on NATO, the idea prevailed in French government thinking that ultimately, any state could only rely on itself, that indeed nuclear weapons by their very nature could only credibly be used politically to protect the sovereign nation-state. The nuclear factor, as most crucial element in international security since the outbreak of the Cold War, made it imperative that France should acquire her independent nuclear force, and that France should withdraw from the integrated military structure to safeguard her independence and her security. The French governments of the later half of the IVth Republic and of de Gaulle's Vth Republic saw it as essential for French security that France on the one hand must not automatically become involved in a nuclear war between her allies and the USSR, but that France could on the other hand protect herself independently against nuclear threats. As one of Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France's counsellors, General Catroux, argued in 1954:

“On risque de voir les détenteurs de l'arme atomique conserver leur puissance atomique pour leurs intérêts par priorité. Il y aura les Etats qui ont la bombe atomique (qui ne l'utiliseront pas entre eux). Il y aura les Etats qui n'ont pas la bombe atomique et qui seront des champs de bataille. Il faut notre arme atomique, pour notre propre sécurité, pour nos négociations. Il faut, à nous mêmes, une possibilité propre de riposte atomique.“⁷⁷

This strategic argument would gain increasing support in France, and it was most vocally formulated by the French airforce officer Pierre-Marie Gallois. In his countless publications he never ceased to belabour the point, well taken by successive French governments, that it was no use expecting another power to risk nuclear destruction for the sake of its allies. No vested interest in an ally's security would be great enough to risk the destruction of one's own most valued possession, one's own cities, on behalf of that ally. Only if a sovereign nation-state in control of its own nuclear weapons were directly threatened or attacked would the use of nuclear weapons be both credible and logical. France therefore needed her independent nuclear arsenal, could not share control or planning with any allies, and

76. M. RIFKIND, “Elargir la dissuasion“, MS of intervention at a Symposium in Paris, 30 September 1992, made available by the British Ministry of Defence:“(...) we have regarded the commitment of forces as an important way of underlining the message that our deterrent is there for our non-nuclear Allies as well – that Britain would regard her own vital interests as at stake in any attack upon an Alliance member“.

77. Quoted in G.-H. SOUTOU, “La politique nucléaire de Pierre Mendès France“, *Relations internationales*, no. 59 (Autumn 1989), p. 321.

could much less still extend a nuclear guarantee to them – just as an American nuclear guarantee for Europe was seen as lacking in credibility by Gallois⁷⁸ and de Gaulle. The latter's famous adage, "*le nucléaire se partage mal*", came to prevail in French government thinking, making any surrender of French control over its nuclear arsenal to a multinational grouping unlikely for years to come.

Last, but not least, there was also a continuing resistance on the part of important elements of the French political élite to any scheme which would indirectly give Germany access to nuclear weapons.⁷⁹

Past, Present and Future

Until the end of the Cold War, on the higher level the Atlantic Alliance continued to be the main focus of British and German defence identity, while national self-sufficiency on the lower, the nation-state level, was the focus for France, and to a lesser extent also for Britain. The European defence identity, on the intermediate level, failed to materialize, eclipsed by the two other *foci* of identity.

Britain, extensively shorn of its other group identity (the Empire and Commonwealth) over the following decades, till this day continues to perceive her European identity in matters concerning defence as integral part of a larger Atlantic defence community. In a circular process, Britain's common interest with the United States was continually reaffirmed by the increasing cooperation on military nuclear matters between the two countries, once Britain had independently exploded her first nuclear charge in 1953 and had developed advanced nuclear technology. The British dependence on the US for Polaris missiles and submarine technology, and now for the successor generation of nuclear missiles and delivery technology, has reinforced this bond, making any exclusively European alternative prohibitively expensive.

For the Federal Republic of Germany, the defeat by the French National Assembly of the EDC project meant that NATO was the only feasible framework for defence cooperation. The subsequent growth of French opposition to defence integration, resulting in France's incremental withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command-structure between 1959 and 1966, meant that, forced to choose, Bonn had to plump for military co-operation with Washington rather than with Paris. Thus the Bonn government consciously brought the Franco-German "Elysée Treaty" of January 1963 into line with NATO requirements, much to de Gaulle's anger adding a preamble and changing the text so as to eliminate any incompatibilities.⁸⁰

78. See for example: GALLOIS, *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire*, pp. 190–210.

79. Cf. the views of the senior French diplomat Jean-Marc Boegner, cited in SOUTOU, "La politique nucléaire de Pierre Mendès France", p. 320.

80. Nuclear History Program collection of declassified German defence documents, Bonn [henceforth NHP Bonn], Doc. 128/42, Fü B III 110/63 of 22 January 1963.

The nuclear factor was of crucial importance in Bonn's reckoning. Even when the West Europeans had become acutely worried about the credibility of the American commitment to defend Western Europe with military force, and the German government was very eager to establish new structures (such as the Multinational Nuclear Force) to underpin the nuclear guarantee, it was very concerned not to question the relationship with the US, and "not to get into a situation, in which we have to choose between friendship with the United States and with France."⁸¹ In June 1962, when doubts about the American commitment had reached crisis point and de Gaulle made a bid to scupper the MLF proposal by hinting at a renewal of Franco-German nuclear co-operation,⁸² the German ministries of defence and foreign affairs secretly agreed that they would probably reject such a proposal, as it risked undermining the infinitely more precious American commitment. The German officials who discussed this possibility saw in the future French arsenal only "a third rate nuclear force, which would not really have any weight in relation to the nuclear potential of the great powers."⁸³ Only if the French *force de frappe* could be made serviceable to NATO did the Germans see a reason to welcome its development.⁸⁴

In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, we are once more witnessing the debates on a European Defence Entity, on a European army with the Franco-German nuclear brigade at its core. At the same time, the further decrease of the US commitment to the defence of Europe seems ever-more likely. Doubts will in future be greater than ever since World War II as to whether the United States would risk Chicago for the defence of Lyon or Berlin.

On the other side, if all goes well, we may be witnessing the complete transformation of the dreaded Soviet Union into a group of friendly but poor states in Europe's far east. Yet it is far from clear today whether a further wave of nuclear proliferation can be avoided, and whether a nuclear shield will not be needed in future to protect NATO members against nuclear blackmail, if not the use of nuclear weapons. Dangers may in future come from different directions than before; Rome and Madrid may become as exposed as Frankfurt or Hamburg used to be.

The Maastricht Treaty was seen by many as vehicle for further European integration on a political, security, and hence, defence level. In reality it is difficult to see how the hope for the "eventual framing of a common defence policy, which *might in time* lead to a common defence"⁸⁵, is supposed to be a step forward from the WEU Treaty of 1954 and the common defence as practised in NATO since the

81. NHP Bonn Doc. 154/39, Fü B III 3 of 17 May 1965.

82. See above.

83. NHP Bonn Doc. 97/8, Fü B III–Fü B III 8 of 15 June 1962, "Ergebnis der Besprechungen in Haus Giersberg, Müntereifel vom 1./2. Juni 1962".

84. NHP Bonn Doc. 97/14 of 23 August 1962, Fü B III 1 LO, "Verteidigungspolitische Grundsatzfragen; hier: Deutsche Stellungnahme zur französischen 'force de frappe'".

85. "Treaty on European Union", Maastricht, 1992, particularly Title V Article J.4.

early 1950s. Yet even this disappointing document, which would have been seen as reactionary in the extreme by a Jean Monnet, a Robert Schuman or a René Pleven, is rejected as too radical by approximately half the voters in France and Denmark.

This means that in many European countries, among them particularly Britain and France, public opinion continues to value national independence above any feeling of European identity. In a short story published by the cautiously pro-European British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, a Colonel Blimp-type Conservative backbencher with “a reputation for sound judgement“ earned copious applause with an attack on a fictional British military intervention without Americans or Canadians or Australians fighting alongside British soldiers – “just French and Germans and, he believed, a few Italians“. The gist of the criticism was that “The French and Germans were all very well, (...) but they were not our natural allies“.⁸⁶

However supportive the British and French governments and front-benchers may be of further economic and even political integration in Europe, the application of the touchstone of sovereignty, the exclusive control of nuclear weapons, shows how reluctant London and Paris are to surrender this ultimate symbol of national power. It continues to be unlikely for the foreseeable future that either will seriously consider sharing the control over their national nuclear forces with a European Political Union, let alone surrender the forces themselves. Now as in the early 1960s, a European Nuclear Force, albeit the ultimate symbol of European co-operation and perhaps once the most sensible solution to Western Europe’s nuclear dilemmas, seems out of reach notwithstanding the French proposals of 1995.

If looking at defence, as Régis Debray has argued, helps us “X-ray“ the soul of Europe, then we must come to the result that even at the end of the XXth century, this soul is a mere shadow, ever eclipsed by the continuing strength of national identity.

Beatrice Heuser

86. Douglas HURD, “Ten minutes to turn the devil“, *The Observer Review* (31 January 1993).

Washington – London – Paris An untenable Triangle (1960–1963)

Simona Toschi

On January 14, 1963, the international press gathered in the party room of the *Elysée* for the eighth press conference¹ held by General de Gaulle since his return to power. The five hundred journalists and three hundred guests who crowded the magnificent room had to wait for a quarter of an hour before the General addressed the burning issue of the United Kingdom's accession to the Common Market. Then, with a grave tone, de Gaulle approached the problem by underlining Britain's diversity:

“L'Angleterre est insulaire, maritime, liée par ses échanges, ses marchés, son ravitaillement, aux pays les plus divers et souvent les plus lointains. Elle exerce une activité essentiellement industrielle et commerciale et très peu agricole. (...) Bref, la nature, la structure, la conjoncture qui sont propres à l'Angleterre diffèrent de celles des autres continentaux.”

In the General's mind, the real issue was that the introduction of an extraneous entity into a well-harmonised Common Market would completely change its nature:

“Il faut convenir que l'entrée de la Grande Bretagne d'abord, et puis celle de ces Etats-là changera complètement l'ensemble des ajustements, des ententes, des compensations, des règles qui ont été établies déjà entre les Six, parce que tous ces Etats comme l'Angleterre ont de très importantes particularités. Alors c'est un autre Marché Commun dont on devrait envisager la construction (et qui) verrait se poser à (lui) tous les problèmes de ses relations économiques avec une foule d'autres Etats, et d'abord avec les Etats-Unis.”

And it was the very creation of a new relationship – predictably a relationship of dependence – with the United States that de Gaulle feared most: “Il est à prévoir que la cohésion de tous ses membres qui seraient très nombreux, très divers, n'y résisterait pas longtemps et qu'en définitive, il apparaîtrait une communauté atlantique colossale sous dépendance et direction américaines”.

Obviously, the door closed for the time being would not remain closed for ever, and the day would come in which a different Britain – a Britain much closer to the continent – might join the Common Market. Yet, de Gaulle could not hide his deep-seated scepticism:

1. To get the meaning of this term, it is worth quoting John Newhouse: “The term ‘press conference’ did little justice to the semi-annual pilgrimage of the Paris press corps, government ministers and assorted notables of the city to the *Elysée* Palace. It was, rather, a piece of theatre, a happening, an event of sometimes capital importance – a ritual with all the panoply and pomp of a royal ceremony, but few royal heads of state performed so brilliantly or to such effect as this plebiscitary monarch.” (J. NEWHOUSE, *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons*, London 1970, p. 237).

“(…) ce sera un grand honneur pour le Premier Ministre britannique, pour mon ami Harold Macmillan, et pour son gouvernement, d’avoir discerné cela d’aussi bonne heure, d’avoir eu assez de courage politique pour le proclamer, et d’avoir fait faire les premiers pas à leur pays dans la voie qui, un jour peut-être, le conduira à s’amarer au continent.”²

De Gaulle’s press conference dealt a fatal blow to the already vacillating Washington – London – Paris triangle, demonstrating its untenability. But, who had laid the foundations of such a triangle? For what reasons? And, even more important, were those foundations real or just illusory, as de Gaulle’s veto seemed to suggest ?

The Origins of the British Decision to join the Common Market³

At the beginning of January 1960, the Planning Section of the Foreign Office drew up a memorandum entitled ‘The Future of Anglo-American Relations’.⁴ The document started from the observation that during the previous two years Britain had succeeded in consolidating and extending its position as “first ally of the United States“ and that the co-ordination of policy between the two countries had never been so far-reaching. Yet, Britain’s privileged position could be jeopardised in the coming years, since, as the Foreign Office experts observed, “Anglo-American partnership is not a law of nature, and our present position is one which we could lose“. The memorandum , then, singled out several possible causes of friction, the most serious of which was the British detachment from the Europe of the Six:

“(…) the Americans are basically unsympathetic to our attitude towards European integration. This lack of sympathy is due to the great importance which they attach to the idea of a Europe made immensely more powerful by greater economic and political unity; we cannot expect them to take as full account as we must of our own Commonwealth and domestic difficulties. Their vision is moreover affected by their

2. J. LACOUTURE, *De Gaulle. Le Souverain*, Paris 1986, p. 336.

3. On the same topic see also W. KAISER, “To Join or not to Join: the ‘Appeasement’ Policy of Britain’s First EEC Application“, in B. BRIVATI & H. JONES (Eds.), *From Reconstruction to Integration. Britain and Europe since 1945*, Leicester-London-New York 1993.

4. Public Record Office (from now on: PRO), PREM 11/2986, Memorandum ‘*The Future of Anglo-American Relations*’, Planning Section, PUSD, Foreign Office, 5.1.60. . For a background on Anglo-American relations during the previous two decades see: C. BARTLETT, ‘*The Special Relationship*’. *A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, London-New York 1992; H. BRANDON, *Special Relationships*, London 1988; M. HATHAWAY, *Great Britain and the United States. Special Relations since World War II*, Boston 1990; W. R. LOUIS & H. BULL (eds.), *The Special Relationship. Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, Oxford 1986; I. S. MACDONALD (ed.), *Anglo-American Relations since the Second World War*, New York 1974; D. C. WATT, *Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain’s Place 1900–1975*, Cambridge 1984. A concise and insightful analysis of Anglo-American relations after 1945 is also provided by D. REYNOLDS “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War“, *International Affairs*, No. 62, Winter 1985/86.

own federal achievement; they think that what was right for the United States must be right for Europe. They blame us for standing aside.”

London feared that the changes in the balance of power taking place in Europe might lead West Germany or the Europe of the Six to take its place as Washington’s first ally, but found it very difficult to decide what actions must be undertaken to improve Anglo-American relations. Such uncertainty, stemming from the impossibility of foreseeing the future of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the development of the supra-national element within it, led the British experts to suggest a ‘wait and see’ policy:

“If we were led to make unsuccessful attempts to thwart the Six, or if, on the contrary, we decided to join them and found ourselves having to support them against the United States, our position vis-à-vis the Americans would be weakened. For the present, therefore, we would probably be wise to concentrate on working with the Americans in Europe through the medium of NATO, while seeking, through the Stockholm Group, to establish an accommodation with the EEC countries.”⁵

But prior to finding an accommodation with the Six, it was extremely important to try to persuade the EEC countries not to carry out their reciprocal tariff cuts (so that the implementation of the Rome Treaty would be frozen) the outcome of which would have been very damaging for the rest of Western Europe. This was what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan tried to do during his meeting with de Gaulle on 13 March, 1960, but with little success. All the British were able to obtain was the decision that the reductions would be by ten instead of twenty per cent, as originally planned.

After the collapse of the Paris Summit in May 1960, the widening gap between the Six and the Seven created increasing worries in Macmillan’s mind and fed his fear of British isolation. As he recalled in his diary:

“Shall we be caught between a hostile (or at least less and less friendly) America and a boastful, powerful ‘Empire de Charlemagne’ – now under French, but later bound to come under German control. Is this the real reason for ‘joining’ the Common Market (if we are acceptable) and for abandoning (a) the Seven (b) British agriculture (c) the Commonwealth? It’s a grim choice.”⁶

Hence, the British reappraisal was caused by two reasons, representing the two sides of the same coin: the desire to preserve a *Special Relationship* with Washington, on the one hand, and Britain’s fear of becoming an island also from a political point of view, on the other. The common denominator of these desires and fears was London’s search for a role after having lost an empire.⁷

5. PRO, PREM 11/2986, *ibidem*.

6. Harold Macmillan’s Diary (from now on: HMD), 9 July 1960, in H. MACMILLAN, *Pointing the Way*, London 1980, p.316.

7. On this topic, see: D. SANDERS, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: an Introduction to British Foreign Policy since 1945*, Basingstoke 1990.

If it was a “grim choice“, it seems that by July 1960 it had already been made,⁸ as some fundamental changes at the Foreign Office witnessed: at the end of July Edward Heath was appointed Lord Privy Seal with special responsibility for European affairs, while Duncan Sandys (one of the founders of the European movement) became Commonwealth Secretary.

The changes at home were soon followed by new tactics abroad. In August, Macmillan went to Bonn and, during his talks with Adenauer, repeatedly underlined the risks connected with a division of Western Europe *vis-à-vis* the strong Communist bloc. Adenauer immediately agreed with the Prime Minister’s worries and set up a committee of experts to analyse the problem. Macmillan’s tactics was to prove equally successful a few months later in Rome, where he could note in his diary: “The Italians are (like the Germans) genuinely anxious to do business on Sixes and Sevens. The French are (and the Italians say so openly) the real obstacle“.⁹

It was in order to sum up the actions already undertaken and to lay the basis for discussions with the neo-elected American President that Macmillan devoted the Christmas holidays to the draft of what he “jokingly“ called ‘The Grand Design‘. The declared purpose of such a document was “to call attention to the need to organise the great forces of the Free World – USA, Britain and Europe – economically, politically and militarily in a coherent effort to withstand the Communist tide all over the world“.¹⁰ The Prime Minister admitted that American repudiation of isolationism and Europe’s great recovery after World War II represented important victories for the West, “nevertheless“ – he warned – “there are great weaknesses“. What worried him most was the appalling contrast between the Communist monolithism and the Western fragmentation. Moreover, Britain no longer had the economic, nor the military power to take the leading role. On the contrary, London was confronted with countless problems: what used to be an asset (the Empire) had become a liability and what used to be a certainty (the privileged Anglo-American relationship) was no longer one. Hence, Macmillan’s conclusion was a call for unity; a unity which could not realistically be sought in the political or military spheres, but which could at least be approached in the economic field:

“It is no longer a question of Europe or the Commonwealth or America – we need a united free world. Of course we can’t get it – in the sense of a politically federal or unitary state. We cannot altogether get it in the sense of a military alliance which can really work as a single team. We could perhaps get nearer to it in a monetary and economic policy.“¹¹

8. According to Miriam Camps, the first rethinking of British policy towards Europe dated back to December 1958, when the free trade area negotiations had finally broken down. The fear of political instability on the continent (because of the Algerian war) seems to have been the original motive of the British reappraisal. Later on, economic considerations became equally important, as the EEC countries’ growth became a very depressing term of comparison for British stagnation. But the decisive stimulus came, as the above quoted documents suggest, from the other side of the ocean. (For an exhaustive analysis of British motives see: M. CAMPS, *Britain and the European Community 1955–1963*, London 1984, pp. 274–282).

9. HMD, 22 November 1960, in MACMILLAN, “Pointing the Way“, p.322.

10. MACMILLAN, “Pointing the Way“, p. 323.

To achieve this goal, Macmillan singled out two lines of action: on the one hand, Britain should press upon the new American Administration the need for the expansion of world trade, on the other, London must strive against a Western European division, by reaching an agreement with the French:

“(…) we must prevent the Six-Seven split in Europe from getting worse. This meant reaching an accommodation with de Gaulle. This was primarily a political and not an economic problem. We could woo the French more easily by backing their great power ambitions – that is by putting real life into Tripartitism – than by any other means. We might even be able to persuade the Americans to give the French some help in their nuclear plans.”¹²

Thus, by the end of 1960, Macmillan’s approach was definitively clarified: the key to Europe lay in the concession to the French of nuclear power status. All the British had to do was to be the brokers between Washington and Paris, obtaining for the latter the admission to the so-called *nuclear power club*. The underlying assumption was, evidently, the existence of room for manoeuvre between French nationalism and American jingoism. Hence, in Macmillan’s strategy, the alleged *Special Relationship* with Washington came to play a double role: whereas the preservation of such a privileged relation was the main aim of the British shift towards Europe, the special ties with Washington also became the key to open the European door. But, of course, everything depended on the Americans.¹³

“What we do must depend on the Americans“

At the end of January 1961, Macmillan, accompanied by his wife, went on a trip to Rambouillet, where he was the guest of the de Gaulles. The meeting with the French President was a rather delicate one, especially since it took place before any full consultation with the new American administration.¹⁴ The Prime Minister’s task was thus a very arduous one, because he had to convince the General of the need to associate Britain with the Common Market in some way and he also had to find out what France wanted in return¹⁵ without conceding anything, since the most important meeting was the one scheduled for the beginning of April in Washington

11. MACMILLAN, “Pointing the Way“, p. 324.

12. MACMILLAN, “Pointing the Way“, p. 325.

13. At the end of December Macmillan drafted a *memorandum* for the Ministers’ Meeting (to be held in January at Chequers) in which we restated the same problem in even clearer terms. See PRO, PREM 11/3325, Memorandum by the Prime Minister, Dec. 1960, top secret.

14. For the British worries on this matter, see: PRO, PREM 11/3325, Letter from the Foreign Minister Lord Home to Ambassador Sir Pierson Dixon (Paris), 24.1.61, secret.

15. “Our purpose“ – wrote Macmillan to his Foreign Secretary – “should be to discover if possible, and more precisely than we have yet put forward, what it is that President de Gaulle wants for France. And at the same time to discover how far he would be prepared to deal with the problem of the Six and the Seven in a constructive way“. (PRO, PREM 11/3322, Prime Minister’s Personal Minute Serial No. M.38/61, H. Macmillan to the Foreign Minister, 25.1.61, top secret.

Besides the relationship between Britain and the EEC, the other problem that Macmillan was planning to tackle was the future attainment of nuclear power status for France – which he viewed as one of the keys to open the European door. Macmillan was well aware that in both these fields it was necessary to devise a strategy which, without prejudicing the relationship with Washington, nor weakening NATO, induced the French to be “more helpful“. Nevertheless, if de Gaulle’s ambitions were basically twofold – tripartitism and independent nuclear power – London knew very well, that it could not satisfy those aspirations otherwise than by pleading concessions from its powerful overseas ally, as the Foreign Secretary remarked: “In both these matters we have little that we can offer by ourselves; what we do must depend on the Americans“.¹⁶

Meanwhile, within the new Democratic Administration, three different stands on the European issue coexisted. There is no doubt that President Kennedy had a deep interest in the Old Continent, but his attitude towards European integration was a rather sceptical one. As Kennedy’s Special Assistant Arthur Schlesinger recalls: “Both his collection of pre-1960 campaign addresses, *The Strategies of Peace*, and his 1960 campaign speeches were notable for the absence of particular theories beyond general affirmations of the desirability of ‘a stable, creative partnership of equals“.¹⁷

Despite the increasing influence exerted on the new President by George Ball, a friend of Monnet, and despite the Administration’s later support for European integration, it seems that Kennedy’s scepticism never really disappeared.¹⁸ It is conceivable that such scepticism was simultaneously the cause and the effect of a fundamental split in his administration: the split between the Europeanists, the Pragmatists and the Atlanticists.

If the Europeanists were soon called the ‘theologians’, George Ball was their ‘high priest‘.¹⁹ His career made him a real European citizen: Monnet’s advisor in 1945 for his Plan for Modernization and Reequiment, Ball had contributed to the creation of the Committee for European Economic Cooperation, while in 1947 he had closely followed, on Monnet’s behalf, the developments of the Euro-

16. PRO, PREM 11/3325, *ibidem*.

17. A. SCHLESINGER, *A Thousand Days*, Boston 1965, p. 781. A good example of Kennedy’s very general approach to European problems was his speech on foreign policy to the Senate on June 14, 1960. See: PRO, PREM 11/3168, Tel. No. 325 SAVING, Sir Harold Caccia (Washington) to Foreign Office, 16.6.1960. As for Kennedy’s approach to Western Europe stemming from his book *The Strategies of Peace*, see Ambassador Caccia’s review in PRO, FO 371/156436, Tel. No. 5, Sir Harold Caccia (Washington) to Lord Home, 6.1.61, confidential.

18. It is thus not very surprising that after a meeting with Secretary of Agriculture Freeman on November 20, 1963, President Kennedy wondered, if his Administration had not made a mistake in encouraging the creation of the Common Market and observed, that it probably was fortunate for the Americans that Britain had not gotten into it. See: John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library (from now on JFKL), Oral History Project, Charles S. Murphy, Under-Secretary for Agriculture, interviewed by John A. Barnes, 30.6.64.

19. See: D. DILEO, “*George Ball and the Europeanists at the State Department*“, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Kennedy and Europe’, 8–10 October 1992, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

pean Recovery Program. The Fifties saw him deeply involved in promoting and advising American private investments in Europe, still in intimate co-operation with Monnet. And it was Monnet's central idea that Ball embraced and underpinned during his whole career: that European integration was an inexorable process. The United States could either choose to ignore this process and be overwhelmed by it or accept to get involved in it and assume, once again, the leadership. The latter possibility coincided with the proposal put forward by Ball in a memorandum to the Secretary of State designated Dean Rusk on January 1, 1961:

“I am convinced, that unless we attempt some such grand design as I have outlined below we may be defeated in fulfilling those promises of growth which the American people have been given, and in conducting an effective foreign policy in the present age of change and uncertainty. (...) We shall be able to keep our promise of internal growth and our hopes for a prosperous and secure Free World only if we swiftly move to develop a new set of economic policies in common with our allies.”²⁰

Around George Ball, soon appointed Under-Secretary of State, a variegated group of Europeanists gradually took shape. His *entourage* included David Bruce, Robert Schaezel, Henry Owen, John Leddy and Ambassador Tuthill.

If Ball ensured the Europeanists' hegemony in the State Department, the Bureau of European Affairs was under the influence of the Europe-oriented vision as well, through Ball's senior assistant Robert Schaezel. Also a friend of Monnet's, Schaezel had spent one year in Europe in 1959 to study the European integration movement (as a Rockefeller Public Award recipient) and his loyalty to the cause was unquestionable. Moreover, Walt Rostow and Henry Owen ensured the Europeanists' control over the Policy Planning Council. Finally, the appointments of David Bruce as Ambassador to Great Britain and of John Tuthill as American representative first to the OECD and later to the European Communities, offered the Europeanists two key places to implement their programs on the other side of the Atlantic.

20. JFKL, General Correspondence, Box 12, Folder 48, George Ball to Dean Rusk, 1.1.61. Ball's elaboration of a *Grand Design* dated back to the summer 1960, when the Democratic nominee had asked Adlai Stevenson to draw up a report on foreign policy matters. Stevenson had then asked for help to Ball and Schaezel, who, in the end, came up with the so-called Task Force Report. The content of that report was extremely relevant because it enshrined all the most important initiatives assumed by Kennedy in his policy towards Europe. Besides calling for “a strong new lead from America” and a greater power to the executive in trade policy matters, the report also proposed a fifty percent across-the-board tariff reduction within five years. In the strategic field, Ball and Schaezel strongly recommended the creation of a NATO nuclear force, while warning against the development of independent national nuclear deterrents. Not surprisingly the report contained also a paper on what Ball called ‘A Partnership Between a United Europe and America within a Strong Atlantic Community’, whose main lines corresponded to Monnet's paper ‘Action Committee for a United States of Europe’. (On the Task Force Report and Kennedy's reactions to it see: Dileo, “George Ball”, p. 10–13 and Schlesinger, “A Thousand Days”, p. 180–181. On Ball's own view of the relationship between Europe and the United States see: G. BALL, *The Discipline of Power*, Boston 1968 and G. BALL, *The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York 1982).

While the Department of State was in the Europeanists' hands, the White House was the realm of the 'Pragmatists'. Besides Kennedy himself, described by Ball as 'the pragmatist *par excellence*' whose main concern was 'action and day-to-day result',²¹ the leading pragmatist in the White House staff was McGeorge Bundy. Actually, he was very interested in the rebirth and development of Western Europe, as witnessed by his work for implementing the Marshall Plan in 1948, but his approach was much more pragmatic and cool-blooded than the approach adopted by the 'theologians'. According to Robert Schaetzel, McGeorge Bundy was "not only amused by the enthusiasm displayed by some of his friends and colleagues for the idea of European integration, but also disturbed by the degree of their enthusiasm".²²

A third stream of thought in European matters was represented by the Atlantacists, led by the ex-Secretary of State Christian Herter. Appointed as Special Representative for Trade by Kennedy, Herter actively supported the British application to the Common Market, but his view of European integration differed from that of the 'theologians': whereas Ball considered the unification of Europe a prerequisite for Atlantic unity, Herter believed that European and Atlantic integrations should proceed together, "along parallel lines".²³

Despite the presence of at least three different 'schools of thought' within the Administration, it was the Europeanist approach that prevailed in the end. The reasons for the 'theologians' success are, according to David Dileo, essentially three.²⁴ First, Kennedy's 'agnostic' attitude towards European integration – that is the lack of any strong presidential stance on this matter – left the door open to the group which was more capable of combining ideals with reality, that is, more apt to transform the Atlantic Community vision into reality. Second, the Secretary of State's ignorance in European matters, led him to rely entirely on Ball's judgments and projects, thus strengthening the Europeanists' influence in American foreign policy. Finally, the 'theologians' had an exceptionally good personal reputation in terms of ability and creativity which never failed to arouse a widespread interest for their proposals.

Macmillan between Kennedy and de Gaulle

In spite of the British worries, the Rambouillet meeting had a relatively positive outcome: the two statesmen had six hours of private conversation and, in the end, "President de Gaulle accepted that there should be exploratory Anglo-

21. Ball, "The Past", p. 167.

22. Robert Schaetzel interviewed by Pascaline Winand in P. WINAND, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*, Basingstoke 1994.

23. C. HERTER, *Toward an Atlantic Community*, Published for the Council of Foreign Relations by Harper and Row, 1963, p. 25 quoted in Winand, "Presidents, Advisers", p.158.

24. See: Dileo, "George Ball", pp. 5–7.

French discussions at the official level during February to see if a plan could be agreed“ to bring together the Six and the Seven. Once back in London, Macmillan reported to Kennedy that he had found the French President “more relaxed“ than during their previous meeting and “more ready to discuss matters of general interest than he had been“.²⁵ This letter, together with the short, but precise account of the conversation at Rambouillet that Macmillan enclosed, appears as the first thread of the cobweb the Prime Minister attempted to spin between Paris, London and Washington. The second was to follow a few weeks later.

At the beginning of April, Macmillan and Kennedy met first at the Naval Base at Key West and then in Washington. There, the Prime Minister informed Kennedy of Britain’s decision to join the EEC. The President immediately expressed strong support for London’s initiative.²⁶ In the wake of the trip, the British Premier wrote to de Gaulle to give him an account of the impressions aroused by the new President and, above all, to tell him the extreme favour with which the new Administration considered a *rapprochement* between the Six and the Seven. According to Macmillan, in the European affairs the new Administration seemed “more anxious than their predecessors for an ending of the economic division between the Six and the Seven“ and seemed to believe that “the political advantages of greater cohesion in Europe would outweigh for them any possible economic disadvantages“. Moreover, the Prime Minister added that, in the course of various discussions, he had pointed out that the unity of the Atlantic Alliance required “a partnership in the nuclear field“²⁷ and the President had shown a certain interest in these remarks. By doing so, Macmillan felt that he had paved the way for the upcoming Paris meeting between Kennedy and de Gaulle. This correspondence expressed the Prime Minister’s strategy in much more explicit terms than ever before. Had he been able to convince Kennedy to give the atomic bomb to the French, de Gaulle would have opened the Common Market door to Britain. In this way, an inextricable intertwining of economic and military questions emerged, characterizing all the following negotiations, and causing their failure.

Macmillan devoted the months preceding Kennedy’s trip to Europe to convincing the Americans to concede atomic power *status* to France. On April 28, 1961, Macmillan sent Kennedy a very detailed explanation of his *Grand design*. If the major danger faced by the Western Europeans was an internal split, then it was necessary to single out a number of tools to guarantee and strengthen the unity of the ‘Free World’. Britain’s accession to the Common Market was the

25. PRO, PREM 11/3322, ‘Text of Letter from the Prime Minister to President Kennedy’, 1.2.1961.

26. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy’s reasoning was the following: “If Britain joined the Market, London could offset the eccentricities of policy in Paris and Bonn; moreover, Britain, with all its world obligations, could keep the EEC from becoming a high-tariff, inward-looking white men’s club. Above all, with British membership, the Market could become the base for a true political federation of Europe“. (A. Schlesinger, “A Thousand Days“, p. 845). On Kennedy’s reaction to the British initiative, see also: S. GEORGE, *An Awkward Partner*, Oxford 1990, p. 31).

27. PRO, PREM 11/3326, ‘Draft letter to President de Gaulle’, 13.4.61, top secret.

most relevant among those tools.²⁸ Yet, in the construction of a bridge over the Channel, the key role was played by the General, which is why Macmillan thought that London and Washington “should be ready to go a long way to meet de Gaulle in certain fields of interest to him”. Hence, it would have been necessary to negotiate with de Gaulle, but negotiations would have to be conducted in a very cautious way, so that the General did not get the impression that Britain and the United States “have ganged up together to bring pressure to bear on him”. What Macmillan wanted from the French was an assurance that they would “welcome” the United Kingdom in the Six and that they would understand the British need “to make some special arrangements” to protect British agriculture, the Commonwealth and the remaining EFTA countries. Moreover, the French should renounce building up their own independent nuclear capability, because it represented “a threat to Western Unity” and it jeopardized the prospects of reaching a test ban treaty.²⁹ What the Prime Minister suggested to offer de Gaulle in exchange was a revision of NATO (concerning both the military strategy and the structure of SHAPE), tripartite consultations at various levels and, above all, assistance in the development of a nuclear capability “as a contribution to a joint Western deterrent”.

A few days later, on May 4, McGeorge Bundy called Caccia to report Kennedy’s reactions to Macmillan’s letter: Kennedy agreed with all the British arguments and proposals, but strongly rejected the suggestion of providing assistance to France in the development of an atomic device. According to Bundy, the President was perfectly aware of the necessity of finding an agreement with France on the nuclear question, but he also thought that such an agreement was subject to at least three limiting factors: first, Kennedy “would have to carry Congress with him”, but recent events in France (that is the April ’61 *putsch* of the four generals) did not help French credibility; second, “French tests to date were very far from making France into a nuclear power”; finally, the President doubted whether the United States could “undertake to communicate nuclear “know how” to France and refuse it to all other allies”.³⁰ A dense correspondence on this matter between Macmillan and Kennedy ensued, but the British efforts were doomed to failure.³¹

28. Macmillan posed the question of the British entry in the EEC in the following terms: “Further political and economic division in Europe will weaken the cohesion of the Atlantic Community, which must be the core of the Western unity. We cannot hope to succeed in drawing the Western countries more closely together if in Europe there’s a continuing dichotomy between the Six and the Seven.” (PRO, PREM 11/3311, Letter, H. Macmillan to J. F. Kennedy, Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram Serial No. T.247/61, 28.4.61, top secret and personal.

29. Obviously, the French might have objected that what they were doing was no more than the British did when they decided to develop first an atomic and later a thermo-nuclear weapon. Macmillan’s answer is worth quoting: “(...) the situation today is different. The West now has sufficient nuclear power to destroy the world, and ‘enough is enough’ (...)” (PRO, PREM 11/3311, *ibidem*).

30. PRO, PREM 11/3311, Tel. No. 1159, Sir Harold Caccia (Washington) to the Foreign Office, Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram Serial No. T.259/61, priority, deyou, top secret.

At the beginning of June, in Paris, de Gaulle seized the opportunity provided by the meeting with Kennedy to say that the British should “come all the way in or not come at all” into the Common Market and to declare his opposition to an exclusively economic agreement. Furthermore, in a very straightforward manner, the General expressed serious doubts about Britain’s readiness “for the necessary political commitment”.³² Thus, the progressive approach of the British island to the Continent initiated a period of unheeded French warnings. Actually, the negative outcome of the Paris meeting led some members of Her Majesty’s Government to conclude that the French would hardly accept Britain’s accession to the Treaty of Rome – “since de Gaulle would not agree to a weakening of his leadership of Europe” – and to suggest a change of the course.

“Does it not mean that we might more easily associate the Seven with USA and Canada than with the Six?” – wrote the Minister of Education David Eccles to Macmillan – “Would not this be a better way to mobilise the strength of the West, to bring indirect pressure on France not to insist on a 17th century leadership, and to hold the Commonwealth together? I fear the consequences of finding the French terms for joining the Six too high for many of us to swallow.”³³

Nonetheless, such a ‘revisionist’ wave, originating from de Gaulle’s intransigence, was destined to be overcome by increasing pressure from Washington, where the British accession to the Common Market came to be considered “the biggest change in world politics since the Chinese revolution” and a fundamental factor of stability for the Old Continent. In particular, the extension of the European Community to the United Kingdom appeared as the best guarantee against a possible and still very much feared uncontrolled German rebirth. As the Special Assistant for National Security wrote to Chester Bowles, in handling European problems the US “should never forget that the major premise, and indeed the whole object of the European exercise is to embrace Germany in a Franco-German-British marriage – a marriage of convenience, if not of love, but a marriage nonetheless”.³⁴

31. For this important correspondence see the following files: PRO, PREM 11/3311 and PREM 11/3319. While the nuclear issue was a cause of disagreement between Kennedy and Macmillan, the purely economic matters connected with the British accession to the EEC seemed to recreate an idyllic atmosphere. On the 10th of May Ball answered Macmillan showing the deepest concern and comprehension for the difficulties Britain would encounter on its way towards Europe. (See: JFKL, NSF, Box 170, “Great Britain and the Common Market”, Summary of Mr. Ball’s Memorandum of May 10, 1961, Replying to Prime Minister Macmillan, unclassified). Two days later, the outcome of a meeting between Sir Harold Caccia, George Ball, Robert Schaezel, the Economic Minister David Pitblado and the expert on European affairs Richard Vine on the possible British accession to the Treaty of Rome was a very positive one. (See: JFKL, NSF, Box 170, Memorandum of Conversation “Possible UK Accession to the Treaty of Rome”, Participants: Sir Harold Caccia, Mr. David Pitblado, Mr. George Ball, Mr. Robert Schaezel, Mr. Richard Vine, 12.5.61, unclassified).
32. JFKL, POF, Folder 3 of Box 127a, “Note of Points made during the Private Discussion between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Admiralty House, June 5, 1961”, 8.6.61, sanitized copy, top secret.
33. PRO, PREM 11/3328, Minute, David Eccles (Minister of Education) to the Prime Minister, 8.6.61, secret.

Because of the wide favour with which Washington considered the British decision to join the EEC, London's hesitations and perplexities aroused a strong irritation in the American Administration. If in the summer of 1961 the British reputation in the United States was "at very low ebb", one of the main reasons was Her Majesty's Government's sketched reappraisal to which the Americans, in a rather straightforward manner, threatened to answer with a far more damaging reappraisal. As Sir Patrick Dean, chief of the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations warned, London's hesitations were "simply not understood" and even the friendliest of his banker and other professional New York friends were convinced that by hesitating the British were doing themselves "untold damage". Moreover, Sir Patrick reported that unless Britain could "go in quickly" its financial position was "going to get much worse".³⁵ The message coming from the other side of the Atlantic was therefore a very clear one: if London wanted to preserve its privileged relationship with Washington – with all the ensuing advantages – Her Majesty's Government had to proceed in the already begun construction of a bridge towards Europe.

The British Application: its Implications for the United States

British policy-makers could but draw the logical conclusions from the American warnings. On August 9, 1961 the Prime Minister sent the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the European Economic Community the formal British application to the Common Market. Though very short, the text of the letter was extremely significant: besides asking for the opening of negotiations on the basis of art. 237 of the Treaty of Rome, the Prime Minister acknowledged the great difficulties that negotiators would soon face because of the British need to bear in mind "the special Commonwealth relationship", "the essential interests of British agriculture" and "the other members of EFTA".³⁶

Such remarks made the Europeanist wing of the Kennedy Administration more aware of the possible negative consequences of an enlarged Common Market for the US. That very same day, George Ball drew up a memorandum for the President in which he pointed out what he called the "enormous implications of Britain's adherence to the Rome Treaty". There were, according to the Under-Secretary of State, two elements that touched the "vital American commercial

34. JFKL, NSF, Box 81, W. W. Rostow (Special Assistant to the President for National Security) to Chester Bowles, 16.6.61, unclassified. As for the Kennedy Administration's attitude towards Germany, see also: F. COSTIGLIOLA, "The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle and the Struggle for Europe", *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1984, pp. 229–233.

35. PRO, FO 371/156453, Letter from Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, New York) to Sir Frank Hoyer Millar (Foreign Office), 17.7.61, strictly personal and confidential.

36. JFKL, NSF, Folder 6 of Box 170, "Text of the Prime Minister's letter to the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the European Economic Community", 9.8.61, personal and confidential.

interests – the Common Market’s relations with the Commonwealth, on the one hand, and the neutral members of EFTA, on the other“.³⁷ The United States could not accept any form of association between the Commonwealth and the Community that even remotely followed the patterns of association between the former French colonies and the Community, because such association would be “highly prejudicial“ for American agriculture. Moreover, Ball was persuaded that the British should complete their arrangements for full membership before any negotiation was undertaken by the neutrals, because any such attempt would hinder UK-EEC talks. Despite such negative implications, the success of the Brussels negotiations was in the interest of the United States; all Washington had to do was to control them.

“(…) we are at the stage where our most constructive contribution to the imminent negotiation is to make precise and explicit what we consider to be the salient principles. In doing so we must never lose sight of the primary consideration that for political reasons the forthcoming negotiations between the UK and the Common Market must succeed. Our efforts must be directed at assuring their success while at the same time assuring that our economic interests – which are consistent with those of the Free World as a whole – are protected.“³⁸

The trade-off between the political advantages and the economic disadvantages of Britain’s accession to the Common Market explains – at least partially – the ambiguous attitude adopted by the Kennedy Administration. On the one hand, in order to ease the creation of an Atlantic partnership, the President was to ask Congress for greater power to reduce commercial tariffs, on the other, Kennedy was going to exert pressure upon the British Government for a loosening of the Commonwealth and EFTA ties, thus hindering the already difficult negotiations.

The basic ambiguity of the American position did not go unnoticed by the newly appointed British Ambassador to Washington Sir David Ormsby-Gore, who, in his *Annual Review for 1961* observed that American pleasure at British decision was not “accompanied by any enthusiasm for smoothing Britain’s path in the Common Market by bringing pressure on the Six in regard to the interests of the Commonwealth and EFTA countries“. On the contrary the British decision was “sometimes interpreted as meaning that the days of the Commonwealth, which the Americans always find hard to understand, are numbered“.³⁹

As the negotiations proceeded,⁴⁰ the implications for the United States of the British decision became more and more embarrassing for the White House, who deeply felt the responsibility of having triggered a process potentially very damag-

37. JFKL, NSF, Box 170, Memorandum for the President, “Certain Implications for American Policy of the Prime Minister Macmillan’s Statement on the EEC“, 9.8.61, confidential. The United States as well as Latin American countries were particularly worried by the extension of the Common Market system of preferences to their African rivals, that is to the African producers of coffee, sugar and bananas. (See: JFKL, A. Schlesinger’s Papers, White House Files, Box WH-11, “Problems of British entry into the European Community“).

38. JFKL, NSF, Box 170, *ibidem*.

39. PRO, FO 371/162578, “Annual Review for 1961“, Sir David Ormsby-Gore to the Foreign Office, 2.1.1962, confidential.

ing for the American producers. Hence, it was necessary to act to protect the United States interests and, in order to obtain the best and fastest effect, the Kennedy Administration chose to act at the highest level. At the beginning of April 1962, when Macmillan came to Washington to ask for a more moderate attitude on the part of the American representatives in Brussels who kept on opposing a preferential position for the Commonwealth and EFTA products, the Administration was ready to reject such requests. According to Ball, the President should not only deny any concession, but also avoid being faced with a *fait accompli*:

“I would strongly recommend that you do not give a favorable response to the Prime Minister’s importunings. (...) You should make clear to him that our expressed opposition to proposals for a permanent preference for Commonwealth products is not based on doctrinal considerations: it is based on the obligation of the United States government to protect the trading interests of the American producers.”⁴¹

From Birch Grove to Nassau: an inextricable Intertwinement of economic and military Matters

From 24 to 26 November, 1961, the de Gaulles were Macmillan’s guests in his private residence at Birch Grove. This place had been chosen by the General. Macmillan, in spite of the inadequacy of the lodgings for an official summit, immediately complied with de Gaulle’s wish, hoping that the informal atmosphere of the house could in some way appease the main obstacle on his road towards Europe. The extreme importance of the meeting was also felt in Washington. On November 9, during a telephone conversation with Macmillan, President Kennedy offered to come and help his British ally should the need arise. The Prime Minister did not

40. On September 26, 1961, the Council of Ministers had formally accepted the British request and proposed that the United Kingdom make an introductory statement at a ministerial conference to be held in Paris on October 10. In such statement Edward Heath tackled three major problems: Commonwealth ties, British agriculture, EFTA arrangements. Most of Heath’s speech was consecrated to the relationship between the Commonwealth and Britain, about which the Lord Privy Seal declared: “I am sure that you can understand that Britain could not join the EEC under conditions in which this trade connection was with grave loss and even ruin for some of the Commonwealth countries”. (White Paper, “*The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community*”, Cmnd. 1565, HMSO, November 1961, para. 29). Heath’s statement was discussed in the following ministerial meeting (8–9 November 1961), but by then it was already clear that the negotiations would not really get under way until early 1962, because the Six did not want to discuss agricultural matters until they had reached a common agricultural policy (CAP). On January 14, 1962, the Council finally reached an agreement (see: *Journal des Communautés Européennes*, 20.4.1962). Hence, it was possible to start negotiating with Britain. As negotiations proceeded, two problems emerged: the question of imports of temperate-zone foodstuffs from the Commonwealth and the timing and procedure of the change-over from the British system of deficiency payments to the Community support system. The first problem was to prove the most difficult to be dealt with and to cause a stalemate in winter 1962. (For a more detailed account of negotiations see: Camps, “Britain”, pp. 267–280).

41. JFKL, NSF, Box 175, Memorandum for the President, “The Macmillan Visit – The Problem of Commonwealth Preferences in the UK-EEC Negotiations”, by George Ball, 24.4.62, confidential.

accept the generous offer, aware – it is indeed surprising that Kennedy was not – that the Anglo-American privileged relationship, the aim and means of the British decision to join the EEC, had to be carefully hidden from de Gaulle's eyes.

Despite the great expectations aroused, the meeting did not lead to any progress, but provided for a further clarification of the Gaullist conception of European rebirth around the French-German nucleus. The General also seized the occasion to highlight all the difficulties that, in his opinion, divided Britain from the Common Market. "It is the timing that seems to worry him most" – would resume a few days later the British Ambassador to Paris Sir Pierson Dixon – "He would rather that we had come in earlier or left it till later. (...) our inclusion will dilute the purely European conception which de Gaulle would prefer. King Alfred does not easily fit in with de Gaulle and Charlemagne". According to the Ambassador, these considerations would push de Gaulle to "play for time". Sir Pierson, therefore, seemed to foresee the French veto to Britain's entry in the EEC more than one year in advance. Yet, self-deception prevailed. After having grasped the gist of the General's thought correctly, the ambassador arbitrarily departed from it adding: "These, perhaps, are de Gaulle's inmost thoughts, partially revealed, or at least to be inferred, at Birch Grove. It does not necessarily mean that he will translate them into action, or policy. He is a realist as well as a thinker". The Ambassador meant that in translating his thought into action, the General should have taken into consideration that the failure of negotiations would probably imply the end of the European Community and a deterioration of Anglo-French relations ("which he genuinely treasures"). These remarks led Sir Pierson to the rather unrealistic conclusion that "in spite of the General's obduracy", the British should plod away the negotiations in Brussels, because "De Gaulle has never conceded a point in argument. He has often given away in the face of the force of overwhelming facts and made the best deal he could in the actual circumstances".⁴²

President Kennedy, immediately informed of the outcome of the Anglo-French summit by the Prime Minister, was very irritated by de Gaulle's attitude and deeply worried because of what seemed to him a "clear indication of a deep-seated hostility to the Americans".⁴³ Yet, the negotiations for Britain's accession to the Common Market continued, becoming more and more complex because of the increasing pressures exerted by Washington, where a new shape for Euro-American relations – the so-called '*Grand Design*' – was then being moulded. At the beginning of January 1962, Ball met Sewyn Lloyd, then Lord Privy Seal, to stress the American support for the British approach to Europe. The Under-Secretary of State seized the occasion to highlight the Kennedy Administration's desire to reach an

42. PRO, PREM 11/3338, Memorandum, 'Visions and Illusions of General de Gaulle', Sir Pierson Dixon (Paris) to Lord Home, 27.11.61, secret.

43. PRO, PREM 3338, Tel. No. 3210, Sir David Ormsby-Gore (Washington) to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Personal Telegram Serial No. T.660/61, 28.11.61, immediate, . The same worries were expressed by the President a few days later in a letter to the Prime Minister. (See: PRO, PREM 11/3338, Tel. No. 3121, from Foreign Office to Bonn, containing message from J.F.Kennedy to H. Macmillan of December, 2, 4.12.61, immediate, top secret).

‘Atlantic Partnership’ in which “responsibility would be more equally shared than it is now possible”⁴⁴. Furthermore, Selwyn Lloyd was told in an extremely confidential manner (given that the Congress itself had not yet been informed) some important news concerning the presidential proposals on trade: Kennedy was going to ask Congress for greater power to reduce tariffs on Common Market commodities with a view toward the creation of an Atlantic free trade area. Such an initiative, later concretised in the Trade Expansion Act, was but one of the numerous aspects of the economic, political and military Euro-American integration project under the generic name of ‘*Grand Design*’, a project whose main difficulty would be American reluctance to build an alliance on other than American terms.⁴⁵

On January 30, 1961, in his first State of the Union message, Kennedy had depicted a bleak picture of the American economy: “The present state of the economy is disturbing” – the President remarked – “We take office in the wake of seven months of recession, three and a half years of slack, seven years of diminished economic growth, and nine years of falling farm income. (...) In short, the American economy is in trouble“. If the most urgent economic problem facing President Kennedy was internal recession, the economic problem that weighed most heavily on him was the balance of payments deficit: “Since 1958“ – Kennedy pointed out in another key-passage of his speech – “the gap between the dollars we spend or invest abroad and the dollars returned to us here has substantially widened. This overall deficit in our balance of payments increased by nearly eleven billion dollars in these three years – add holders of dollars abroad converted them to gold in such quantity as to cause a total outflow of nearly five billion dollars from our gold reserve“.⁴⁶

Among the solutions envisaged by the new Administration, the most important was a shift of American commercial policy towards free trade. In 1961, the principal trade issue was the impact of the Common Market. Introducing free trade meant reducing the existing tariffs on the flow of goods crossing the Atlantic. When Kennedy came into office a tariff negotiation round in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) had been going on for almost a year, but the talks on tariff reductions were in the doldrums. The Kennedy Administration immediately increased the pressure on the EEC and, by the end of April 1961, an agreement on industrial goods seemed within reach. The EEC negotiators were therefore very surprised when they received an American memorandum asking for European concessions on agricultural products. A stalemate in the negotiations ensued. It is conceivable that a deadlock was exactly what the Americans were looking for. As has already been pointed out, in the middle of April President Kennedy had a meeting with Harold Macmillan, who informed him of Britain’s decision to join the Common Market. Hence, the United States memorandum might be interpreted as

44. PRO, FO 371/164687, Tel. No. 66, Sir D. Ormsby-Gore (Washington) to the Foreign Office, 7.1.61, priority, confidential.

45. See: Costigliola, “The Failed Design“.

46. PRO, FO 371/156436, Text of Kennedy State of the Union Message, Washington, 30.1.61, (advance for release).

an attempt to improve its bargaining position before the negotiations between the EEC and Great Britain began⁴⁷. As Arthur Schlesinger has remarked, Washington “could hardly accept a system which would give Commonwealth farm products a permanent position in the Common Market more favorable than that enjoyed by competing products from the United States”⁴⁸.

In early May 1961, recognising that the GATT negotiations could not go further, the Council of Ministers of the European Community announced their conclusion. The following round – the so-called Dillon Round – could then be started on 15 May 1961. Its stated purpose was a multilateral reduction of tariffs by all participants. The Common Market representatives initially offered a twenty percent cut in common external tariffs, subject to reciprocity, but the United States’ power to reduce tariffs was severely limited by the peril point procedure (according to which the US Tariff Commission could limit duty reductions damaging for domestic producers). Only Kennedy’s authorisation to go beyond the peril point saved the negotiations. Yet, the average reduction was only about ten percent and it concerned industrial products exclusively.

Later on that year, an important new concept was introduced in the tariff reduction procedures. The participants in the GATT ministerial meeting held in Geneva on the last days of November 1961 reached the conclusion that the item-by-item reductions used “both in the past and in the present (Dillon Round) tariff conference (...) were no longer adequate to meet the changing conditions of world trade.” Therefore, the Ministers agreed that consideration should be given “to the adoption of new techniques, in particular some form of linear tariff reductions”⁴⁹. Strong endorsement to linear tariff cuts was given both by the U. S. delegation headed by George Ball and by the EEC representatives.

At the same time, that is towards the end of 1961, the Kennedy Administration was faced with a major decision on trade policy. As the existing trade agreements would expire the following June, the Administration had to decide whether to base its trade policy on an amended extension of the existing legislation or on a new trade act. While the veterans of the GATT negotiations pressed for the first solution, George Ball and the Europeanists supported the introduction of a new trade legislation, as a first, necessary step towards the creation of an Atlantic partnership. Though not a free trader, Kennedy was interested in a trade program which would strengthen trans-Atlantic ties. Furthermore, he perceived the importance of offering

47. This is the rather convincing explanation suggested by Ynze Alkema in *European-American Trade Relations in the GATT, 1961–1963*, paper presented at the Conference on “Kennedy and Europe”, 8–10 October 1992, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

48. Schlesinger, “A Thousand Days”, p.846.

49. E. H. PREEG, *Traders and Diplomats. An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, Washington 1970, p. 42. For an analysis of the origins of the Trade Expansion Act, of its provisions and, more in general, of the United States trade policy after World War II, see also: S. METGER, *Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Round*, Fairfax, Virginia 1964; S. L. LANDE & C. VANGRASSTEK, *The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984*, Lexington 1986; W. DIEBOLD, *The Trade Expansion Act*, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Kennedy and Europe’, 8–10 October 1992, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

Congress a trade bill which was not narrow in scope, but, on the contrary, implied a broad foreign policy program.

The decision to introduce a new trade law was made in mid-December. In January 1962, the President stressed in his State of the Union message that the United States needed “a new law – a wholly new approach – a bold new instrument of American foreign policy” and announced that he would shortly send to the Congress “a new five-year trade expansion action, far-reaching in scope but designed with great care to make certain that its benefits to our (American) people far outweigh any risk”.⁵⁰ The text of the Trade Expansion Bill was submitted to Congress on January 25, 1962 and introduced by an attentive analysis of the new political and economic world developments that made the traditional American trade policy obsolete: the growth of the European Common Market, the increasing pressures on the American balance-of-payments, the need to accelerate US economic growth, the Communist trade offensive and the need for new markets. As the President remarked, besides procuring strictly economic advantages to the United States, the new trade bill would promote the strength and unity of the West, as well as reinforce the American leadership of the Free World:

“This bill will make possible a fundamental, far-reaching and unique change in our relations with the other industrialised nations – particularly with the other members of the Atlantic Community. As NATO was unprecedented in military history, this measure is unprecedented in economic history. But its passage will be long remembered and its benefits widely distributed among those who work for freedom.”

The provisions of the Bill were, in the President’s words, basically three. First, the Act would entrust the President the authority to reduce existing tariffs by 50 percent in reciprocal negotiations and “a special authority, to be used in negotiating with the EEC, to reduce or eliminate all tariffs on those groups of products where the United States and the EEC together account for 80 percent or more of world trade”.⁵¹ Second, the bill provided for special safeguards for the domestic industry. Finally, American producers damaged by the increased foreign competition would receive prompt governmental assistance. The most controversial among the provisions of the Bill was the special authority to eliminate tariffs when the United States and the Common Market accounted for 80 percent of world exports. Unless the United Kingdom joined the EEC, only aircraft and margarine would have fallen under this category! The provision thus became a means to exert pressure on the Brussels negotiations and, obviously enough, did not favour them.

After the presentation of the Bill to the Congress, a widespread campaign to support it was organised by the Department of State. The Trade Expansion Bill was promoted as a key instrument for both internal and external purposes. As George Ball was to stress on March 13 before the House Ways and Means Committee: “Not only should it prove an effective tool for advancing and protecting the inter-

50. *Department of State Bulletin*, January 29, 1962, p. 162–163, President Kennedy’s State of the Union Message, 20.1.1962.

51. *Department of State Bulletin*, February 12, 1962, p. 238, Message of the President to the Congress, White House Press release dated January 24, 1962.

ests of the United States trade – and thus of providing new business opportunities and job opportunities for Americans – but it should also constitute a necessary instrument for strengthening the bonds between the two sides of the Atlantic⁵². In the end, the campaign to pass the Bill was to prove more successful than expected: the Act received broad bipartisan support and was signed into law by the President on October 11, 1962.

The British Reappraisal

As already mentioned, in April 1962 Macmillan went on a trip to Washington, his second since Kennedy's election. As in the previous year, the Prime Minister tackled the issue of France's accession to the *nuclear power club*, but his approach was now completely different. Whereas the first time he had tried to convince the President to give France nuclear power *status*, this time his attitude was much more cautious.⁵³ "The idea of an Anglo-French nuclear contribution to NATO might one day be a good thing, and I would not be precluded from dangling this carrot before de Gaulle's eyes;" – said Macmillan to Kennedy during a private conversation – "but it would be a mistake to come to an agreement now. He would merely take, and pay nothing for it".⁵⁴ Such proof of self-restraint (and, above all, of allegiance to Washington's will) could but greatly please the President, who immediately expressed his approval. Besides agreeing to exclude France from the *nuclear power club*, at least for the time being, the two statesmen negotiated an extension of the September 27, 1960 agreement on Skybolt missiles. Under the new conditions, the Department of Aviation committed itself to supply the Air Ministry Skybolt and related equipment "in the quantities requested"⁵⁵ and to guarantee adequate services and technical assistance on the United States territory.

The increasing intimacy between Washington and London – especially in a delicate sector like the military – did not go unnoticed in Paris, where it fed the General's hostility towards the Anglo-Saxons. A hostility that de Gaulle did not try to hide, as the journalist Walter Lippmann reported after a short conversation with him:

52. *Department of State Bulletin*, April 9, 1962, p. 604, Statement by Acting Secretary Ball before the House Ways and Means Committee in support of H.R. 9900 on March 13, 1962 (Press release 164).

53. Macmillan's changed attitude can be explained in the light of a description made by the American Ambassador to London, David Bruce, in December 1961: "Unable to succeed as middle man between the US and USSR, no longer on a basis of old friendship with the President of the United States, realizing that a revival of the classical balance of power in Europe with Britain weighing the scale is no more possible, my guess is that he will go far to suit otherwise discordant notes to the US President harmony". (JFKL, NSF, Box 170, Tel. No.2295, Amb. David Bruce (London) to the Secretary of State, 13.12.61, priority, secret).

54. PRO, PREM 11/3783, 'Note by the Prime Minister of his Conversation with President Kennedy on the morning of Saturday, April 28, 1962, at the White House', top secret.

55. PRO, FO 371/162624, 'Draft Agreement on Skybolt', F.J. Doggett (Ministry of Aviation) to R.C. Kent (Air Ministry), 26.4.62, confidential.

“The main reason which he gave for thinking that there would be difficulty over UK entry to the Community was that the UK had a special relation with the United States, above all in questions of atomic energy.⁵⁶ He made clear that he would not agree to the UK becoming a member of the Community if this special relationship was to continue unchanged.”⁵⁷

The warning launched by the French President was the last of a long series, but, like the previous ones, it was doomed to remain completely unheeded. The same fate was met by the warnings launched in *Le Figaro* by the eminent French political scientist Raymond Aron, who highlighted the inner contradiction of Washington’s attitude towards Europe

“(…) l’administration Kennedy s’est refusée à reconnaître le fait majeur: ni le Général de Gaulle ni tout autre gouvernement français n’admettra la thèse officielle de Washington selon laquelle la dissémination des armes atomiques devient dangereuse lorsque celles-ci passent la Manche mais non lorsqu’elles franchissent l’Atlantique“,

reaching the conclusion that

“aussi longtemps qu’aucune concession ne lui (Général de Gaulle) sera faite sur les sujets qui lui tiennent à coeur, mieux vaut qu’on ne se fasse pas trop d’illusions à Washington, et, plus encore, dans l’immédiat, à Londres“.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, there were more illusions in London than ever. At the beginning of June, in the wake of his meeting with de Gaulle at Chateau de Champs, Macmillan wrote Kennedy a rather optimistic letter. From the talks, described as “fairly satis-

56. The ‘*nuclear special relationship*’ originated from the fact that the invention by the Americans of the atomic bomb was mainly based on the brilliant researches conducted by British scientists. As the Americans were endowed with much higher capitals, their results were soon better than the Europeans’ and only after a long fight was Churchill able to convince Roosevelt to sign the Quebec Agreement, which provided for a joint Anglo-American control over uranium reserves. The United Kingdom could do nothing but accept the role of junior partner and, actually, when the United States launched the atomic bomb on Japan, London’s consensus was a purely formal one. From 1947 on, the creation of an independent nuclear capacity became the main objective of Her Majesty’s Government’s foreign policy for at least three reasons. First, the lack of any formal American commitment to defend Europe against the Communist threat. Second, the atomic bomb was the symbol of great power status – a status which the British were not ready to abandon. Third, the approval by Congress of the McMahon Act, which forbade the communication of nuclear information to any foreign Government, including the British. At the beginning of 1948, anyway, London and Washington reached an agreement – the so-called *modus vivendi* – providing for a future collaboration in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Later on, Britain accepted the deployment on its territory of atomic bombers in exchange for the right to be consulted prior to their use. Hence, at the end of the Forties the intimate Anglo-American co-operation in the military sector was matched by a very unsatisfactory ‘collaboration’ in the nuclear sector. Only the success of Britain’s first atomic tests made a privileged relationship in this matter feasible. In 1954 the McMahon Act was amended to enable exchange of nuclear information with the United Kingdom. It was the birth of the *nuclear special relationship*. The interdependence between the two nuclear capacities progressively extended to include the delivery systems: in 1960 Macmillan offered Eisenhower the Holy Loch base in Scotland obtaining in exchange the supply of Skybolt missiles (thus guaranteeing the employment of the otherwise obsolete RAF bombers). For a more detailed history of the *nuclear special relationship* see: J. BAYLIS, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939–1984. The Special Relationship*, London 1984 and M. GOWING, “Nuclear Weapons and the Special Relationship“, in Louis & Bull (Eds.), “The Special Relationship“.

57. PRO, PREM 11/3775, ‘Europe’, Mr. France to Sir Frank Lee (Foreign Office) 15.5.62, secret.

factory“, the Prime Minister drew the conclusion that when the General would come “to grips with the practical details of all these political and defence questions, we might well be able to engage in sensible and practical discussions“.⁵⁹ Because of the “very frank and intimate“ nature of the conversations with de Gaulle, Macmillan closed his letter with an invitation to “treat it as a very personal one“ and to keep its content secret. But other, unacknowledgeable reasons underlay the Prime Minister’s invitation to a greater reserve: London started to realize that going to Paris via Washington was not the shortest and easiest way, especially when Washington refused concessions that the British might bring as a ‘dowry’ to the French.

Such a realization seemed to occur towards the end of May, when R. W. Jackling of the Foreign Office wrote to the British Chargé d’Affaires in Washington Lord Hood, expressing London’s growing concern for the United States’ position towards the negotiations in Brussels. Though he was convinced that the Americans sincerely wished to favour them, Jackling had the impression that Washington’s interventions had the opposite effect: “The trouble“ – he observed – “is that almost everything they (the Americans) do about it tends to damage the prospects for success“. The problem was, therefore, that of ‘excluding’ the Americans by telling them that “there have been signs of sensitivity on the part of the Six to any appearance of external intervention in the negotiations and there might be a risk that any direct advocacy of our entry would (...) have the wrong effect“.⁶⁰ Macmillan’s invitation to Kennedy to show greater reserve was, therefore, the first sign of the British realization that the *Special Relationship*, though original aim and tool of London’s European choice, should, at least for the time being, take a back seat in order to smooth Britain’s approach to Europe. Once again, Her Majesty’s Government’s policy assumed the existence of real room for manoeuvre between French requests and American refusals.

Yet, there was not such room at the time, nor was it in any American plan for the future. In response to the British invitations to decrease the external pressure on the already difficult negotiations, George Ball elaborated a new document setting forth

58. R. ARON, “Le Centre du Débat“, *Le Figaro*, 12.5.62.

59. PRO, PREM 11/3775, Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram Serial No. T.284/62, Letter from H. Macmillan to J.F. Kennedy, 5.6.62, top secret. To what extent this conclusion was far-fetched can be deduced from the following report of de Gaulle’s remarks: “Britain could join the Community but it would then become a different sort of organisation. Of course Britain would bring considerable economic, political and military strength and would make of the Community a larger reality, but it would also change everything. That was why France had to look at this matter carefully. (...) Was it possible for Britain to adopt a genuinely European approach?“ (PRO, PREM 11/3775, ‘Visit of the Prime Minister to the Château de Champs. Extract from a Conversation between the Prime Minister and President de Gaulle, June 3, 1962’,) top secret.

60. PRO, FO 371/164692, Minute, R. W. Jackling (Foreign Office) to Lord Hood (Washington), 30.5.62. The growing nervousness in the Foreign Office was perceived also by the American Ambassador David Bruce, who reported that “as crucial May-July phase of UK-EEC negotiations gets under way, political officers in Foreign Office who have been closely connected in planning negotiating strategy tend to show signs of nervousness over ambiguity of de Gaulle’s attitude and its possible influence on course of negotiations“. (JFKL, NSF, Box 170, Tel. No. 4230, from London to Secretary of State, 17.5.62, sanitized copy).

the “basic requirements of US policy in connection with the outcome of the UK-EEC negotiations”.⁶¹ While the stated purpose of the document was that of highlighting American exigence to avoid being confronted with a *fait-accomplis*, the real aim of the State Department memorandum seems that of sending a clear, strong message to London: Washington did not agree to be put aside. On the contrary, the White House increased its pressures on the negotiations for an enlarged Common Market by proposing an Atlantic Partnership through the famous speech held by the President in Philadelphia on the Day of Independence:

“The United States looks on this vast and new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. (...) We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defence, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others to lowering their trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic and political areas. (...)

But I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a “Declaration of Interdependence”, that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the way and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago. (...)

In urging the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton told his fellow New Yorkers to “think continentally”. Today Americans must learn to think intercontinentally(...).⁶²

The Skybolt Story

On June 16, 1962, during commencement at the University of Michigan, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara delivered a speech designed to make public the Kennedy Administration military and nuclear policy and “to cut short the confused debate about control of nuclear forces that had flashed around the alliance for years”⁶³ by reaffirming American support for the Multilateral Force (MLF).⁶⁴ The outcome of McNamara’s support for a centralized defence strategy⁶⁵ and of the ‘theologians’ opposition to helping independent nuclear capabilities, the speech focused on two concepts: ‘conventional options’ and ‘controlled response’. Stressing the importance of ‘conventional options’, the Secretary of Defence called for a military build-up by Europeans and, in particular, for an increase of the troops deployed on the Old Continent. ‘Controlled response’, on

61. JFKL, NSF, Folder 24 of Box 170, Memorandum from George Ball to American Embassies in London, Brussels and Paris, 25.7.62, secret.

62. *Department of State Bulletin*, July 23, 1962, pp. 132–133, Address by President Kennedy made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on July 4, 1962.

63. D. SHAPLEY, *Promise and power. The Life and Times of Robert McNamara*, Boston-Toronto-London 1993, p. 142.

the other hand, implied the integration and the centralised direction of all NATO nuclear deterrents. According to McNamara:

“(...) relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. (...) Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of its being used independently, this force would be inviting a preemptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. (...) In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operated independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in capability as a deterrent.”⁶⁶

Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent seemed to shake under the weight of those words. Her Majesty’s Government seemed to shake as well.⁶⁷ Even though they tried to convince themselves that the speech was addressed to Paris instead of London,⁶⁸ the Prime Minister and his Cabinet feared that McNamara’s words might become an excellent weapon in the hands of the Opposition. And their fears were soon confirmed: the following days the Minister of Defence Watkinson became the target of a strong attack from the Shadow Cabinet.

Moreover, McNamara’s speech further reduced Britain’s room for manoeuvre in the international field. As A. P. Hockaday of the Ministry of Defence wrote to Macmillan, it was “not going to be very easy to steer between the two conflicting policies of trying to be in agreement with the Americans and the French, particu-

64. The idea of a multilateral nuclear force originated in the late 50s within the SHAPE. Subsequently, a plan for the organisation of a submarine force armed with Polaris missiles to be operated by multinational NATO troops – while Washington would retain control over nuclear warheads – was elaborated under the Eisenhower Administration and inherited by Kennedy. At the beginning, the debate on and the final adoption of the strategy of flexible response relegated the MLF to the back seat. As the struggle against independent nuclear deterrents within the Atlantic Alliance gained ground in the State Department and in the Pentagon, new life was put into the MLF, which came to be considered as the key to winning that struggle. For a general background, see in particular: J. D. STEINBRUNER, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis*, Princeton 1974).
65. The need for a centralized defence strategy derived from McNamara’s endorsement of the doctrine of ‘flexible response’. In contrast with Eisenhower’s massive retaliation, this doctrine provided for the Western Alliance to build up its conventional forces to have the option of a large scale non-nuclear war in case of a Communist attack. Obviously enough, flexibility implied a centralized control.
66. McNamara’s speech at Ann Arbor, quoted in *The Times*, “U. S. Objections to the Minor Deterrent Forces”, 18.6.62.
67. Actually, McNamara’s speech was just the public version of a declaration he had made one month earlier in Athens during a closed-door NATO meeting. (See: JFKL, “Remarks by Secretary McNamara”, Athens, 5.5.62, sanitized copy). Hence, it was not its content that really embarrassed the British, but the publicity given to it.
68. In this respect, it is rather interesting what Macmillan wrote to Dean Rusk on the 19th clearly seeking a confirmation of his interpretation: “What Mr. McNamara said at Ann Arbor was that limited nuclear capabilities operating independently were dangerous. But Britain’s Bomber Command aircraft with their nuclear weapons have long been organized as an integral part of a combined Anglo-American striking force and are targetted with them (...)” (PRO, PREM 11/3709, Tel. No. 1637, from Foreign Office to Paris, containing message from H. Macmillan to D. Rusk, 19.6.62,) top secret.

larly as I can see how much it is in our interests that we should not offend the French at this stage".⁶⁹

Only McNamara's public statement that the United Kingdom did not belong to the nuclear independent deterrents he had attacked was able to calm down the storm.⁷⁰ In spite of the Secretary of Defence's clarification, the British irritation towards the American Administration remained strong, as witnessed by the tone of Macmillan's letter to Lord Home on the eve of Rusk's visit to London :

"If we cannot persuade the Americans to keep quiet about the Common Market, I would hope that we could at least impress on Rusk the importance of leaving the nuclear question, and indeed the re-organisation of NATO, over until our negotiations with the Six have come to a head. In the nuclear field we have an independent deterrent and the French are going to get one; these are facts that the Americans cannot alter."⁷¹

Nonetheless, despite London's irritation and Washington's *mea culpa*, the whole question seemed to have blown over. The nuclear special relationship was, once again, safe.

But Summer 1962 was to prove fatal for one of the pillars on which that relationship was built – the Skybolt agreement of 1960. While in Britain Watkinson discussed with the Secretary of State for Aviation whether to order 100 or 128 Skybolts,⁷² on the other side of the Atlantic the conclusion was reached that the production of those missiles was far too expensive. Towards the end of August, McNamara's technical and military advisers suggested the cancellation of the Skybolt project and its substitution by the Minuteman, the production of which was in advance of schedule. But of such conclusions only a very weak echo⁷³ reached London (and it is legitimate to wonder whether the responsibility of this lack of communication is to be ascribed to a voluntary American omission or to the British refusal to listen to the bad news).

In September, the newly appointed Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft went to Washington, where he had some long talks with the President and the Secretary of Defence. Though McNamara hinted at the excessive costs and the uncer-

69. PRO, PREM 11/3709, Minute by A. P. Hockaday (Ministry of Defence) to the Prime Minister, 18.6.62, secret.

70. The background of McNamara's clarification statement was a meeting between the Secretary of Defence and Sir David Ormsby-Gore on June 22. On that occasion, the British Ambassador had highlighted the delicacy of the British position in Brussels. Though recognising the importance of the creation of a multilateral force and of a reform of the NATO structure, Ormsby-Gore had identified the British accession to the Common Market as 'the highest priority' of the Western world. McNamara, emphasizing the necessity of remoulding Western defence strategy according to the doctrine of 'flexible response', had concluded the meeting apologizing for the negative consequences of his words and declaring himself ready to clarify the whole misunderstanding publicly. (PRO, PREM 11/3709, Tel. No. 1656, Sir D. Ormsby-Gore to the Foreign Office, 22.6.62, immediate, top secret).

71. PRO, PREM 11/3715, H. Macmillan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24.6.62.

72. Cfr. PRO, PREM 11/3716, Minute from the Minister of Defence to the Prime Minister, 13.7.62, top secret.

73. See: PRO, FO 371/162624, Doggett to H. L. Lawrence Wilson (Ministry of Defence) 22.8.62, secret.

tainties connected with the Skybolt project, Thorneycroft recalls that, when he went back to London, he had no doubts about the United States' real capability of fulfilling its obligations. After all, he thought, in every project final expenses exceed the estimated costs.⁷⁴ It was only towards the middle of October that McNamara decided to put aside his last uncertainties and abandon the Skybolt project definitively. The news was immediately received in London, but the discovery of Soviet launching pads in Cuba and the ensuing crisis postponed the opening of the question.

On November 7, during a meeting with President Kennedy, Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy on the Cuban success, McNamara tackled the problem of Skybolt missiles, pointing out all the economic and technical disadvantages of their production. In the end, the unanimous conclusion was that the project had to be abandoned and the British should be immediately informed. This was the Secretary of Defence's task. The following day, Ormsby-Gore was invited at the Defence Department to discuss the future of Skybolt. McNamara opened the meeting by recalling the history of the project and remarking that costs had risen so much as to be twice the estimate. On the other side, he "fully recognized the American obligations to the United Kingdom" and emphasized that no official decision had been made, nor would it be made, without consulting London. The Ambassador thanked him for the briefing and seized the occasion to warn the Americans that "a decision to abandon the Skybolt programme would have been political dynamite so far as the United Kingdom was concerned" because the whole British policy in the strategic nuclear field in the second half of the decade was founded upon the availability of Skybolt. McNamara replied suggesting some alternative solutions (like the supply of Minuteman or Polaris missiles) in the case of a definitive cancellation of the production of Skybolt and closed the meeting by inviting the British to elaborate and put forward "alternative solutions which might be satisfactory for the United Kingdom".⁷⁵ Later on that day, McNamara had a telephone conversation with his English colleague on the same subject. The misunderstandings ensuing from that phone call were to occasion one of the most serious crises in Anglo-American relations since Suez. In fact, once the British had been informed of the probable cancellation of the Skybolt program, they were expected by McNamara to assume the initiative and put forward some new proposals. But, since he had the opposite expectation, the Minister of Defence did not seek alternatives. Instead, he waited for a new American proposal.

From there on, events precipitated. At the end of November, the President gathered all his assistants to analyse the defence budget for 1964. By the end of the meeting, the cancellation of Skybolt production had become definite. McNamara was supposed to go to London immediately, to inform the Minister of Defence personally, but other commitments kept him at home. And it was in Washington that Ormsby-Gore saw him on the evening of the 28th.⁷⁶ The British Ambassador

74. See: JFKL, Oral History Project, Peter Thorneycroft interviewed by David Nunnerly, 18.6.69.

75. PRO, PREM 11/3716, Tel. No. 2832, Sir David Ormsby-Gore (Washington) to the Foreign Office, 8.11.62, emergency, dedip, top secret.

immediately took up the Skybolt question, but McNamara answered evasively, that he was planning to go to London to discuss the whole question with Thorneycroft. The Secretary of Defence's careful avoidance of any reference to the recently adopted decision fed the misunderstanding even more. In the meantime, London did not seek an alternative, but rather cultivated the illusion that, against all evidence, the Americans would in the end supply the Skybolts.⁷⁷ It is thus very easy to imagine the devastating effect of the news of the Skybolt cancellation published by the American press on December 7.

Four days later, McNamara arrived in London. During rather complex consultations with the Minister of Defence, the latent misunderstanding finally came to the fore: on the one hand, McNamara expected a formal request for Polaris from the British, on the other Thorneycroft expected the Americans to draw back and fulfil their original commitment. Yet, none of them explicitly declared his own country's expectation, and the atmosphere became heavier with tension and suspicion. The British could but recall McNamara's speech in Ann Arbor a few months earlier, while the Americans found that Britain's political accent was becoming less American and more French.⁷⁸ Simultaneously, the British press gave voice to the sensation of betrayal felt by Her Majesty's Government. London's indignation soon occupied the front pages of newspapers all over the world. Only at the top level could the crisis be solved, only Kennedy and Macmillan could put back together what their Secretaries of Defence had torn apart.

In the meantime, negotiations in Brussels had reached a stalemate. Since their *de facto* beginning on October 10, 1961, UK-EEC negotiations had concentrated on problems related to temperate zone agriculture and, as the chief of the United States mission to the European Communities, Ambassador John Tuthill, reported, there was "still no sign of an early breakthrough".⁷⁹ A confirmation of the Amba-

76. For a report of this meeting, see: PRO, PREM 11/3816, Tel. No. 2987, Sir D. Ormsby-Gore (Washington) to the Foreign Office, 29.11.62, immediate, top secret.

77. In this respect, the Prime Minister's comment to one of the questions asked by Ormsby-Gore to McNamara seems rather enlightening: "I think Ambassador Gore made a mistake in talking to McNamara about the so-called failure of Skybolt. It seems odd that if this failure was so dramatic, the Secretary of Defence had not heard of it. Could it not be that just one of the tests have gone wrong? After all, nearly all American rockets have gone wrong at times. Ought they to take it so tragically?" (PRO, PREM 11/3816, Prime Minister Personal Minute Serial No. M.326/62, H. Macmillan to the Minister of Defence, 3.12.62, unclassified).

78. This feeling that the British were getting closer to the French and further from the Americans had been grasped by in *The Christian Science Monitor* since the beginning of December, when the Special Correspondent from London remarked that a "degree of asperity unknown in Anglo-American relations since the reconciliation over Suez" had broken out in the post-Cuban crisis atmosphere. Observing that "the European mood that Washington has been for decades recommending to the British actually could be adopted by the British", the correspondent concluded that the British "might some day start talking English with a French accent and could be welcomed from across the Channel as being true Europeans". (J. C. HARSCH, "Aftermath of Crisis. Britain's Political Accent Becomes Less American and More French", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1.12.62).

79. JFKL, NSF, Folder 33 of Box 170, Ambassador John W. Tuthill (US Mission to the European Communities, Brussels) to the Department of State, Tel. No. ECBUS A-329, 29.11.62, limited official use, priority.

sador's pessimistic outlook was the extreme difficulty of the debate during the ministerial meeting of the Six on December 3–5. Especially on the issue of British domestic agriculture, the French position was isolated on the tactical question of "when and under what circumstances (the) Six should indicate flexibility".⁸⁰ As for the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the Six were not ready to reach any compromise: their plan was to tell Heath officially that the Community could not give any assurance that negotiations with all the other EFTA countries including the neutrals would be completed prior to UK accession. What the Six wanted to make clear to Heath was that, once the UK joined the EEC, any EFTA country not a member or associate must be treated as an outside country. Obviously enough, asking London to raise tariffs by 50–60 percent overnight on imports from Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal did not ease negotiations. Moreover, Belgium and Italy's attempts to get things moving by moderating the position of the Six on agriculture and by introducing some additional meetings in January were doomed to failure because of France's opposition.⁸¹

To a certain extent, the stalemate in the Brussels negotiations was connected with the Skybolt crisis. On December 10, George Ball wrote to the President that "with the failing domestic strength of the Macmillan Government, the negotiations in Brussels with the European Economic Community have seriously slowed down and are nearly on dead-center". The Department of State's main preoccupation was then to breathe "some new life into negotiations and insure against their failure". To this end, the Americans were ready to offer themselves as "channel of communication between the Commission and the British".⁸²

The best place to solve the Skybolt crisis and to inform Macmillan that Washington was ready to "strike a blow on his side" to ease Britain's accession to the Common Market was the Nassau Anglo-American summit. Conceived originally as a relaxing exchange of ideas between good friends, the Nassau appointment of December 18 became, given the circumstances, determinant. Inevitably, the atmosphere was unbearably heavy, dominated, as Henry Brandon later recalled, by "nagging exasperation and bitter indignation (...) such as I have never experienced in all the Anglo-American conferences I have covered over the past twenty years".⁸³

Macmillan had just been through a very difficult meeting with de Gaulle at Rambouillet, a meeting during which the General had listed all the reasons why the United Kingdom was not ready to join the EEC. The Prime Minister was thus in the unenviable position of having to heal the wound inflicted to British pride by the Skybolt cancellation without offending the American counterpart, whose support

80. JFKL, NSF, Folder 33 of Box 170, Ambassador J. Tuthill (Brussels) to the Secretary of State, ECBUS 536, (Section I of II) 5.12.62, confidential.

81. See: JFKL, NSF, Folder 33 of Box 170, Ambassador John Tuthill (Brussels) to the Secretary of State, ECBUS 536, section II of II, 5.12.62, confidential.

82. JFKL, NSF, Folder 35 of Box 170, Memorandum for the President, "United Kingdom-Common Market Negotiations, George Ball to the President, 10.12.62, secret.

83. JFKL, Oral History Project, Henry Brandon (correspondent from Washington of *The Sunday Times*).

became essential for the success of the Brussels negotiations. In this respect, the Foreign Office brief on the talks with President Kennedy was revealing of the British tactics:

“If the negotiations are to succeed, the French will have to be brought to realise the importance of the political issues at stake and be prepared to make concessions as we have done. (...) Direct American intervention in Paris would be counter-productive. The key to the situation really lies in Bonn. (...) Given the American influence in Bonn, it will be of vital importance when the time comes for the Americans to do anything possible to persuade the Germans to get the French to move.”⁸⁴

On December 19, Kennedy opened the talks at the Bahamas by proposing to the Prime Minister the compromise formula elaborated with Ormsby-Gore on the flight from Washington: the Skybolt program might be saved by sharing the expenses and producing the missiles just for Britain. Yet, it was too late. Macmillan could not accept as a personal favour what had been publicly denied him a few days earlier. To use Richard Neustadt’s words, “the lady had been violated in public”.⁸⁵ The President then drew back to the old idea – already proposed by McNamara, but refused by Thorneycroft – of supplying Britain with Polaris, provided they were placed under NATO control. In this way, after two days of negotiations, the so-called Nassau Agreement was reached. Under its provisions, the Polaris missiles received by the British Government were to become part of a multinational force under NATO control. From that force, London might withdraw them in case of emergency. An offer in the same terms was addressed also to Paris. In this way, Macmillan’s idea of “independence within interdependence” seemed to find realization. Britain’s satisfaction could hardly be hidden. “I feel sure” – wrote Macmillan to Kennedy on Christmas Eve – “that our agreement will become a historic example of the nice balance between interdependence and independence which is necessary if Sovereign states are to work in partnership together for the defence of freedom.”⁸⁶

The General says no

The Nassau agreement had been conceived to save and strengthen the *Special Relationship*, while hiding it from the French sight under the NATO umbrella. This was, evidently, another of the numerous illusions which seem to constitute the unifying thread of the whole story of the British attempt to join the EEC at the beginning of the Sixties.

On January 7, answering the Prime Minister’s letter, Kennedy observed: “We have had our first exchanges with General de Gaulle, and they are not discourag-

84. PRO, FO 371/164697, “Talks with President Kennedy”, Foreign Office brief, 16.12.62, secret.

85. R. NEUSTADT, *Alliance Politics*, New York 1970, p. 50.

86. JFKL, Folder 8 of Box 127, Letter from H. Macmillan to J. F. Kennedy, 24.12.62. Copy of the same document can be found in PRO, PREM 11/4052, Prime Minister Personal Telegram Serial No. T.635/62.

ing. (...) It is far from clear that he really wants anything that can fit within the basic framework of the Nassau Agreement, but he seems not to object to a dialogue“.⁸⁷ This was the last of a long series of illusions: on January 14, de Gaulle pronounced his veto to Britain’s accession to the Common Market, accusing London of representing the ‘Trojan horse’ of American interests in Europe.⁸⁸ Why did the General say no? In a way, as the story narrated so far seems to suggest, Paris’ veto might be interpreted as the outcome of an explosive mixture of economic and military issues. Too wide a gap existed between economic – especially agricultural – French interests and Britain’s attempts to preserve its Commonwealth ties. Too strong a contrast existed between Anglo-American defence strategy and the French aspiration to obtain an independent nuclear deterrent. Hence, the Nassau Agreement can be read as ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’.

In the end, the Gaullist veto brought back to reality those who, more or less arbitrarily, had departed from it. It brought back down to earth the New Frontiersmen, who had tried to transform their privileged relationship with Britain into a bridge towards a Europe bowing to American will.⁸⁹ But, above all, it brought down to earth Her Majesty’s Government, which had flattered itself that it could hide such a privileged relationship from the French, although it was the means and aim of its approach to Europe. Macmillan had sincerely believed in the existence of room for manoeuvre between Kennedy and de Gaulle, without realizing that Britain had become their battlefield.

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87. JFKL, POF, Folder 9 of Box 127, Letter for J. F. Kennedy to H. Macmillan, 7.1.63.

88. See: JFKL, NSF, Box 72, Tel. No. 2779, C. Bohlen (Paris) to the Secretary of State, 14.1.63, limited official use.

89. The Kennedy Administration’s attitude is thus summarized by Dean Rusk in his recently published memoirs: “(...) we hoped that if Britain joined the Common Market, it would take into Europe that special relationship with the United States. Perhaps our special relationship could be expanded into Europe itself. We were rather miffed, therefore, when President de Gaulle used that special relationship as an excuse for vetoing British membership“ (D. RUSK, *As I saw it*, New York 1990, p. 267).

The Participation of Free Trade Unions in the Process of European Integration

A preliminary Review of Archive Sources

Andrea Ciampani

The purpose of this paper¹ is to draw the attention of researchers to the records of some archives which could be useful in assessing the role of social forces, and trade unions in particular, in the process of European integration during its early stages (1949–62).

This article focuses on those bodies and persons, within the Italian trade union Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Nazionali dei Lavatori (CISL), who have made a special contribution to the development of this process. We mention records which may help to understand the action of CISL, in that they deal with the part played by the union in supranational and international bodies, in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Italian trade union CISL.

At the same time, however, some records (Historical Archive of the European Communities, ICFTU Archives, G. Pastore Archive) also reveal the vital network of relations between people and the various national organizations in all its complexities. For example, Paul Finet (President of ICFTU) and Walter Schevenels (in charge of various International and European bodies) emerge as particularly important figures.

I

The European Community's Historical Record Office holds documents which concern important political personalities as well as supranational and community bodies.²

Among the documents which highlight existing relations between politics and the representation of social forces, the material concerning the ECSC Council of Ministers (a typed inventory is available) is the most difficult to use because it is not collected in one file, but divided up.³

1. This paper was presented at the historical Forum 'Italian Social Catholicism and the European Horizon in the Post-Second-World-War-Period (1943–63)' held in Castiglione Fiorentino (Arezzo) from 1st to 3rd October 1992. The conference was promoted by the Fondazione Giulio Pastore in Rome and by the Archives of the History of the Catholic Social Movement in Italy at the Università Cattolica in Milan.

2. See for the European Community's Historical Record Office's (hereinafter called ECHRO) Istituto Universitario Europeo, *Guida agli archivi storici delle Comunità europee*, ed. by J.M. PALAYRET Firenze 1991).

3. The papers concerning the trade union representatives in the consultative committee, during the 1950s, are collected in the records of ECHRO, Cm1 .

There are some interesting papers in the ECSC records concerning the High Authority, the Advisory Committee⁴, and the social forces (entrepreneurial associations and intermediate cadres as well as trade unions) represented in the two community bodies. The minutes of the Committee's work and the documentation concerning the Department for Work and Social Affairs and the Department for Foreign Relations are also particularly interesting.

The contribution made by the social forces represented within the advisory body can be seen in their common action (as in the case of the amendment of article 56 of the Treaty)⁵ or in the initiative of single persons such as Enzo Giacchero.⁶

However, the Florence records suggest better ways of understanding the action of the European movement.⁷ In fact the EEC's Economic and Social Committee's papers, available up to 1961⁸, and the Pierre Uri Fund papers⁹ (concerning amongst others the Schuman Plan and the Pfimlin Plan for agriculture)¹⁰ and the European Movement Fund¹¹ are a great help in understanding the role of social forces in the broader process of European integration.

II

A closer study of international trade unionism and of the various national European trade unions could be carried out at the International Institute of Social History of Amsterdam (IISH).¹²

In addition to WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions), the Institute also holds records of the ICFTU, from the period 1949–84 up to 1984. These records contain the correspondence and the printed material related to conferences, as well

4. The three volumes *Commission des Communautés Européennes. Dossiers de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier* (Luxembourg 1989) are available, in addition to typed inventories. A new classification plan is being made in order to consult this record (record Ceab 15).
5. ECHRO, records Ceab1, 245 (1953–55).
6. ECHRO, record Ceab2, 767; the Giacchero documents are in the Fondation Archives Européennes, record Ap3. See Fondation Archives Européennes, *Etat sommaire des Fonds d'Archives*, Genève 1991.
7. ECHRO, Ceab3. 445.
8. A printed inventory in three volumes is available: *Guides des Archives Historiques du Comité économique et social des Communautés Européennes*, Bruxelles 1990). A typed inventory is also available for the last two records.
9. Paper inventory, microfiches record.
10. See ECHRO, Dep 5.45 and Dep 9.18.
11. Typed inventory, marking Dep 13.
12. On the history of the Institute and its activity see J. LUCASSEN, *Tracing the past. Collections and research in social and economic history: The international Institute of social History, the Netherlands Economic History Archive and related institutions*, Amsterdam 1989; a general introduction to the records is A. VAN DER HORST, E. KOEN editors, *Guide to the International Archives and Collections at the IISH*, Amsterdam 1989.

as circulars and documents concerning meetings of the General Council, the Advisory Council and the Executive Committee of ICFTU.

The meetings of the Emergency Committee (1950–74) are particularly interesting: at the first two meetings (held in Brussels from 1st to 3rd March and from 13th to 15th September 1950) the agenda included a Draft of Statement on the integration of Western Europe and a Committee Report on the Schuman Plan.¹³

The meetings of the Schuman Plan Committee, starting from the International Ruhr Conference (Düsseldorf, 22nd–23rd May 1950) bear witness of the intensive ICFTU participation in the formulation of the Schuman Plan itself: the constant presence of Giuseppe Glisenti representing CISL, the action of Vincent Tewson, Léon Jouhaux, Léon Chevalme; the close collaboration between Gust de Muynck (assistant secretary of ICFTU) and Uri and Monnet; the role of Irwing Brown; the preparation of Finet's candidature in Community organizations; relations between ICFTU and the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.¹⁴

Together with these papers there are also the European Regional Organisation (ERO) records¹⁵ concerning the Committee for European Social Integration (1954–58) where we find, *inter alia*, the discussion of subjects such as the Council of Europe and the Draft Social Charter (17th–18th January 1956), the European Economic and Social Council (5th–6th April 1956), the European minimum social standard and the Draft European Social Charter (13th–14th September 1956) and the development of European integration (22nd October 1957).

But, as regards the ERO – secretary Walther Schevenels – there are a series of special records. Of particular interest are the documents relating to the regional European conferences held between 1950 and 1967. Various topics were discussed: in 1950 European integration, in 1956 the Messina conference, in 1958 harmony between the European Common Market and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA); in the 6th regional conference (Kuporsord, Amersfoort, 27th–29th April 1961), in which CISL was represented by Giovanni Canini, Dionigi Coppo, Cacace ('rapporteur' on the theme problems of energy in Europe) and Rocchi, the Report on European Unity and the OECD was delegated to E. Douglass, the TUC representative.¹⁶

On the other hand, the 'regional council meeting' papers include the documents containing the CISL proposal of the 1st meeting from 29th to 31st January 1951, concerning point 14 of the agenda 'Urgent European Economic Questions', which ended by an urgent appeal: 'In view of the close connection between national measures of economic policy and those measures to be adopted on the international level, ICFTU should claim participation by the international trade union organisation in those bodies set up to maintain economic and social equilibrium in the world'.¹⁷

13. See Archive IISH (thereafter AIISH), ICFTU, Emergency Committee, D1 e D2.

14. See AIISH, ICFTU, Schuman Plan Committee, K1.

15. See AIISH, ICFTU, ERO Committee on European Social Integration, J1 and J2.

16. See AIISH, ERO, Sixth European Regional Conference, 5.

17. See AIISH, ERO, European Regional Council, 6.

Papers of the ERO Office Committee (1951–54) and the ERO Executive Committee (1955–56) can also be consulted. The latter, which included amongst its members C. I. Geddes (Great Britain), Konrad Nordahl (Scandinavia), Ludwig Rosenberg (Germany), André Lafond (France and Spain), Anton Proksch (Austria, Switzerland and Saar), and Hendrik Oosterhuis (Benelux), had a very important operational role in the process of European integration. In addition to relations between the various national organizations, records of debates also describe the important talks between Schevebeks and Paul-Henri Spaak, leader of the European Socialist Movement (5th October 1955); the decision to join the Jean Monnet Committee (3rd November 1955); the proposals by the Italians Giulio Pastore and Cannini on unification (27th February 1956); ways of setting up the European Economic and Social Consultative Council (31st July 1956) and unions organisation within the European Community (19th July 1957).¹⁸

Less ‘political’, but nonetheless interesting, are the proceedings of the ERO Economic Committee which met for the first time in Brussels from 24th to 26th May 1951 (CISL was represented by Bruno Storti and Glisenti). For example there is a substantial document containing the outline of a programme for European integration. The committee worked on this issue for the whole of 1954; whereas in 1957, the Committee’s work was mainly taken up by a discussion of the Common Market Treaty and EFTA.¹⁹

European unions – members of ICFTU – became particularly active in the mid 1950s. On 25th–27th August 1955 a conference prepared by the ERO Economic Committee (18th July 1955) was held in Brussels. The result was put into practice by the European Regional Council the following November. Documentation of the work of the conference reveals the enthusiasm with which western trade unions embraced the issue of European integration in general, and the question of energy and transport in particular.²⁰ The national trade unions had representatives at the highest levels (these were for the CISL: Pastore, Coppo, Canini, and Mari).²¹ The presence of the guests Finet, Potthof and Massaccesi, on behalf of ECSC seemed to be particularly significant. On this occasion, Pastore emphasized the importance of European integration and of the establishment of the Common Market for the free flow of trade including the movement of capital and workforce; the Secretary General of CISL pointed out that ICFTU should act in favour of the European Community ‘not only making claims’, as Renard noted, but to establish precise objectives and action to sustain the process of unifying Europe, without waiting for initiatives from governments or other groups.

18. See AIISH, ERO, Executive Committee, 8.

19. See AIISH, ERO, Economic Committee, 12 and 13.

20. See AIISH, ERO, Conference for the revival of the European idea, 23.

21. Coppo followed the work of the XXI Trade Union Committee (ECSC) and took part in the work of the Drafting Committee; Canini was present at the II Commission (transport); Pastore took part in the General committee together with Dalla Chiesa (head of the Uil Delegation).

It is obvious that a considerable amount of material is available for researchers (ERO records concerning correspondence of Schevenels, the Council of Europe, and the conference on the Common Market and the Free Trade Area on 16th–17th May 1957 are also of considerable interest), but ICFTU records, briefly mentioned above, are not the only research material available in the Amsterdam archives.

There are in fact at least three other different types of documentation which is worth recording in this brief survey on the representation of workers and European integration.

First of all the collection of material of the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) (1948–55) at the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This contains information on the beginning of the links between non-communist European trade unions which J.B. Carey, in a letter to Schevenels on 17th February 1949, called 'reformist trade unions'²², and on the International Conference of ERP (European Recovery Programme) trade unions (1948–50): minutes and circulars, correspondence with the Secretary Schevenels and in particular with Tewson, Robert Bothereau, and Will Lawther of the Miners' International Federation, for the OEEC Coal Committee.

It is in the archives of the International Federation of Trade Unions that we can find a second approach to research into the operational participation by trade unions in the development of European integration and in international bodies such as ECSC. For example in IISH of Amsterdam, there are the records of the Miners' International Federation (MIF) (and in particular correspondence concerning the ECSC) and of the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF): and here we draw attention to the conference on European Economic Integration and on the Iron and Steel Workforce, which was held in Geneva from 29th to 30th November 1962 (report on the Common Market by Buitter, Secretary, European Trade Union Office).

Lastly, with a provisional inventory, one can consult the collection of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Jean Monnet Committee, 1955–75) which includes important documents put together from various records (although most documents were given to the Institute by the Committee itself). All the following provides us with an interesting insight into the relationship between Monnet's actions and those of the European trade union forces: correspondence concerning the setting up of the Committee and the dossier relating to the Committee's sessions, the address (reported in a newspaper cutting) by Monnet to the general assembly of trade union organizations from six European Community Member States in Luxembourg on 5th November 1959; and the one made to the president of the committee at the meeting of the free trade unions of Community Member States in Dortmund on 6th July 1963.²³

22. See AIISH, TUAC, W. Schevenels (Secretary 1949–57), 40. A Preliminary list of the collection of the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) 1948–82 is available.

23. There may be more material on relations between trade unions and the Committee in the archives of Lausanne (Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe) and of Geneva (Fondation Archives Européennes), which shall be researched in the course of a project sponsored by the Fondazione G. Pastore.

III

On the basis of the records of the single social and trade union forces of the Community countries, we can see the significance attributed by the social forces to the process of European integration and the way in which it was developing. It would certainly be worthwhile ascertaining the pro-European attitude adopted by national unions such as TUC (Trade Unions Congress), DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), or the French trade unions.²⁴

As regards Italy, and CISL in particular, documents of the Office for Foreign Relations and Emigration (previously the International Relations Office) concerning the European Union Secretariat are available in the CISL library. On the other hand, the records in the historical archives of CISL are not yet available for consultation by experts.²⁵

At the Giulio Pastore Foundation in Rome, however, other interesting records are available: the collection of Lamberto Giannitelli, a Catholic trade unionist of CIL in the 1920s and of the CISL in the 1950s; the archives of Giulio Pastore (founder of CISL and subsequently Minister for the Mezzogiorno and depressed areas from 1958), the records of the CISL General Secretariat 1950–58.²⁶

From all this it emerges that there was continual contact between the CISL Secretariat, Monnet, OEEC and ERO. It also appears that Mario Romani was certainly behind the most important stands made by Pastore in favour of European integration both at a national (see the ratification of the Common Market Treaty in the Italian Parliament) and at an international level.

However the above mentioned records also reveal that important initiatives were taken by single unionists and union delegations, and that their role in the integration process was significant.²⁷ The definition of their role, which did not always have a positive effect, certainly calls for a more in-depth study of the life and the decisional processes within the Italian unions of the 1950s.

24. Besides the cited VAN DER HORST, KOEN eds., *Guide to Archives IISH*, the following volumes may be of use to single out the European trade unions and social and political forces which have dealt with the problems of workforce on a European scale: EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, *Directory of Trade Union Libraries, Documentation Centres, and Archives in Europe*, Bruxelles 1991; J. FOSTER, J. SHEPPARD, *British Archives, A guide to Archives Resources in United Kingdom*, New York 1989, United Kingdom 1989; J. SAVILLE, *The Labour Archive at the University of Hull*, Hull 1989; P. C. HARTMANN, *Archives, bibliothèques et centres de documentation à Paris pour l'histoire des XIX et XX siècles*, München 1978.

25. In the course of the Forum, Dr. Giampiero Bianchi presented a paper on the condition and contents of these two collections of archival sources.

26. A provisional inventory is available for the Giulio Pastore papers, whereas a final inventory is available for the CISL General Secretariat's Archive.

27. The author had interesting interviews with Luigi Zanzi of FIM CISL, who took part in the ECSC Commission.

IV

On concluding this first and certainly short survey, two brief considerations, regarding historiographical issues inherent in the dynamics of the problem concerning the contribution made by the social forces (and for Italy by CISL) to the development of a united Europe (a problem which cannot be avoided by anyone wishing to really understand the history of European bodies over the last forty years), can be put forward.

The first consideration concerns the importance of relations between European and American trade union forces. Some differences emerge in their respective positions, and the whole relationship should be considered within a particularly complex framework, due to the presence of the Mediterranean trade unions on one side and the Anglo-Scandinavian ones on the other side. It would certainly be advisable to try to reach a better understanding of the non-communist European trade unionists' 'western choice', which is not necessarily linked to some governments' 'Atlantic' choices.

Secondly it is important, from a cultural and operational point of view, to emphasise the central position occupied by the European socialist reformist movement and its need to establish a dialectic relationship with Catholic oriented organizations and culture, bearers of a European vision of solidarity.

The development of this confrontation, which found expression within the national union organizations, the internal and external relations of ICFTU (cf. the tormented relationship with the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions), was a decisive element in carrying out certain objectives in the pro-European programme. Within this context an important part in CISL was played by both Pastore and Romani, who were present from its beginnings.

Andrea Ciampani

Publications of the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians

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Eric BUSSIERE. – *La France, la Belgique et l'organisation économique de l'Europe, 1918–1935.* Paris, Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1992, 521 p. ISBN 2-11-081217-6. 250 FF.

L'ouvrage d'Eric Bussière – issu d'une thèse de doctorat dirigée par le Professeur François Caron – a le mérite de "combler une lacune de l'historiographie française". En effet, en quelques cinq cent pages, il nous livre une synthèse fondamentale des relations économiques franco-belges de l'entre-deux-guerres.

Chacune des quatre grandes parties de son travail restitue une phase de l'histoire de ces relations. Le début des années vingt est marqué par la volonté française de créer une union douanière qui inclut la Belgique et par le souci belge de rechercher la constitution d'une zone de libre-échange (avec le Royaume-Uni et la France). Les voies empruntées de part et d'autre donnent peu de résultats concrets. C'est cette difficile coopération qu'Eric Bussière met en valeur dans sa première partie. La crainte d'une concurrence allemande rapproche les deux pays. Paris et Bruxelles marchent d'un même pas dans l'affaire de la Ruhr et signent entre eux un accord commercial en mai 1923. Ce rapprochement franco-belge constitue le coeur de la seconde partie de l'ouvrage.

Si le Reich allemand a renforcé la collaboration entre la France et la Belgique, la fin de la résistance passive éloigne à nouveau les deux partenaires. Dès lors Eric Bussière s'intéresse dans sa troisième partie aux tentatives d'organisation originales (ententes internationales, coopération commerciale et industrielle, convergence dans le secteur pétrolier ...) qui s'élaborent dans le contexte de la "détente internationale" à partir de 1924. "La perspective franco-belge passe au second plan" et Bruxelles se rapproche de Londres pour contrecarrer la volonté hégémonique du couple franco-allemand en Europe continentale. Seuls d'importants liens subsistent entre firmes belges et françaises.

La crise de 1929 modifie ces données. Cette crise – avec ses implications – fait l'objet de la quatrième partie de l'étude. L'échec de la conférence de Londres (1933), la décomposition des ententes poussent les pays dans la voie du bilatéralisme. La tentative franco-belge de donner vie à un "bloc-or" – à un moment où les politiques autarciques triomphent – se solde par un échec en 1935. La France avait-elle les moyens (et la volonté) de prendre la tête d'un tel projet? La crise démontre en fin de compte que – selon les termes même de l'auteur – la solution régionale, voire "européenne" "n'est pas mûre".

L'ouvrage d'Eric Bussière présente en définitive deux logiques diplomatiques. L'une, française, se fixe comme objectif de placer Paris à la tête d'une entité économique capable de dominer le voisin germanique et tenir tête aux Anglo-Saxons. Elle suppose une "absorption" de la Belgique dans une union économique aux contours géographiques (avec le Luxembourg?) et juridiques variables. L'autre voie, belge celle-là, cherche à préserver une zone de libre-échange "occidentale". Elle permettrait à Bruxelles de regarder tout autant vers le Royaume-Uni et l'Allemagne que vers la France. La position française, issue de la Grande guerre, domine les années 1919–1924. Elle s'efface – après son échec en 1924 – au profit de la logique belge. Mais la solution d'un bloc régional réapparaît à nouveau avec la crise – sous une nouvelle variante – lorsque les deux pays ébauchent le "bloc-or".

On aura compris – et l'auteur le montre fort bien – que Berlin et Londres pèsent de toute leur influence sur les relations économiques entre Paris et Bruxelles. C'est tout l'intérêt de l'ouvrage que d'élargir le cadre bilatéral au contexte européen de l'époque. La richesse des sources documentaires exploitées – archives publiques, comme archives privées – apporte son lot d'informations inédites. Elle permet à Eric Bussière de démêler les fils d'interminables et complexes négociations (celles de 1919, de 1927, comme celles censées amener la

constitution du “bloc-or”). S’appuyant sur les travaux de Jacques Bariéty, de Georges Henri Soutou et de Denise Artaud, l’auteur apporte une contribution importante à la connaissance des stratégies industrielles et financières, celles qui ont été à la base des tentatives d’organisation d’espaces économiques régionaux. On affine ainsi mieux notre approche de cette phase d’expérimentation originale qu’a aussi été l’entre-deux-guerres.

Mais pourquoi Eric Bussière a-t-il voulu, par le choix de son titre, nous laisser espérer que le contenu de l’ouvrage allait, au-delà des relations franco-belges, nous livrer “une pré-histoire économique” de la CEE? Nous savons que les puissances européennes – pendant la période traitée par l’auteur – conçoivent leurs relations économiques avec des partenaires de moindre rang dans une perspective davantage hégémonique (même s’il s’agit de “l’impérialisme du pauvre”) que réellement coopérative. C’est vrai pour le début des années vingt, comme pour les années trente. Est-ce cette logique là qui prévaut dans la construction européenne depuis 1945? Cette entorse n’enlève cependant rien à l’intérêt historiographique de l’ouvrage d’Eric Bussière, exemplaire à bien des égards.

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Henri BRUGMANS. – *A travers le siècle*. Bruxelles, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, “Mémoires d’Europe”, 1993, 416 p. ISBN 90-5201-315-2. 1117,- Fb.

Henri Brugmans aime se raconter et tous les lecteurs de ses précédents (et nombreux) ouvrages sur “l’idée européenne” et le “fédéralisme” le savent bien. La nouvelle collection “Mémoires d’Europe”, “collection de textes qui racontent chacun une vie d’engagements personnels mais aussi la relation passionnée d’un homme avec l’Europe vécue comme un ensemble vivant, à la fois diversifié et cohérent”, était donc faite sur mesure pour l’ancien recteur du Collège d’Europe. Dans cet ouvrage très personnel, “le plus personnel que j’aie jamais écrit” note-t-il dès l’avant-propos, de plus de quatre cents pages denses et serrées, l’auteur met en scène le récit de sa propre vie, depuis sa naissance à Amsterdam en 1906 dans une famille libérale protestante jusqu’à son remariage catholique à Bruges en 1981, sans oublier pour autant d’inscrire sa destinée dans la trame des événements du siècle et d’essayer de faire comprendre au lecteur comment l’on devient le grand militant de la cause fédéraliste européenne qu’il dit être resté au soir de sa vie. En cela, son témoignage intéressera non seulement l’historien de l’intégration européenne, mais également l’historien tout court de l’Europe contemporaine. A trop vouloir rechercher cependant des “révélation” sur les hommes, les mouvements ou les milieux européens fréquentés par Brugmans dans l’après-guerre, le spécialiste risquerait d’être déçu. L’homme a déjà beaucoup écrit sur ces questions, les historiens eux-mêmes ont progressé dans la connaissance des débuts de la construction européenne. Les trois chapitres (sur un total de quinze) qu’il consacre à son action militante à la tête de l’Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF) ne nous apprennent rien qu’on ne savait déjà, que ce soit sur les origines du mouvement et ses antécédents personalistes (Mounier, Rougemont), sur ses démêlés avec Duncan Sandys au moment du congrès de La Haye (1948), ou encore sur la scission avec Altiero Spinelli (1956) vers laquelle, dit-il, “j’ai poussé de toutes mes forces” (p. 286). De même, le très long chapitre dédié à ce qu’il appelle “l’oeuvre de sa vie” (le Collège d’Europe de Bruges) fait une large place à cet événement central, mais en fin de compte très personnel, de la vie de Brugmans, qu’a été sa conversion au catholicisme en 1957. Tout au plus, à propos de son départ du Collège en 1972, donne-t-il à comprendre que les engagements fédéralistes du recteur étaient devenus incompatibles avec la vocation “technocratique” du Collège: “J’ai toujours refusé de voir dans le Collège une “Ecole Européenne” d’Administration” note-t-il (p. 346).

Comment devient-on un militant fédéraliste européen? Tel est bien, semble-t-il, le “fil rouge” de toute la première partie de l’ouvrage, la plus neuve et la plus intéressante selon nous. Tout ce qu’il nous dit par exemple de son engagement dans le mouvement flamand des années vingt, ou encore de sa rencontre “amoureuse” avec la France vue, à l’image de De Gaulle, comme “une personne”, aide à mieux comprendre certains traits de sa vision européenne d’après-guerre. Pour lui comme pour tant d’autres intellectuels de cette génération “non-conformiste” des années trente, bien décrite par Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle dans un livre pionnier¹, la résistance a bel et bien été une expérience “fondatrice” sur le chemin de son engagement fédéraliste européen. A l’heure où les historiens s’interrogent sur le contenu “européen” des projets de la résistance et remettent en cause la continuité entre ceux-ci et le grand dessein d’union européenne d’après 1945, il est bon d’entendre le témoignage lucide du résistant Henri Brugmans sur cette période tourmentée et contradictoire. Premier point: la résistance contre Hitler, parce qu’elle ne pouvait être qu’à l’échelle de l’Europe tout entière, a de fait favorisé l’émergence d’un sentiment de solidarité européenne inconnu auparavant entre individus ou groupes d’individus appartenant aux diverses nations en conflit. Comme l’écrit Brugmans, “peu importaient le lieu où ils se trouvaient et la langue parlée par les uns et par les autres, nous nous trouvions engagés dans une bataille transnationale. Une certaine vision européenne y était confrontée avec une autre, contrastante” (p. 154). Deuxième point: il serait faux d’en déduire pour autant que l’Europe ait été au centre de toutes les discussions en vue de l’après-guerre et qu’elle ait inspiré de grands projets d’union économique ou politique. Comme l’écrit, là encore, Brugmans à propos de la Hollande (mais l’observation vaut, me semble-t-il, pour tous les pays occupés), “les “affaires extérieures” restèrent à peu près étrangères à nos discussions. Oui, il ne fallait plus croire à la fiction de notre “neutralité”. Oui, l’idée du Benelux, élaborée à Londres, était un progrès. Oui, les pays européens devaient collaborer étroitement. Mais c’était tout” (p. 182). Sur ce point précis (et très discuté actuellement) de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne, comme sur bien d’autres d’ailleurs qu’il eût été trop long de vouloir recenser méthodiquement ici, le livre d’Henri Brugmans restera, à n’en pas douter, une source de première valeur.

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Dorette CORBEY. – *Stilstand is vooruitgang. De dialectiek van het Europese integratieproces.* Assen/Maastricht, Van Gorcum, 1993, 274 p. ISBN 90-232-2820-0, 49,50 Fl.

The author wants to know, how formal and actual control over national, social and economic policy is actually distributed between the national and the European level. Subsequently she examines to what extent the actual distribution of power between the two levels can be explained by convergent national policy preferences (intergovernmentalists), by the influence of non-state actors on both the state and the supranational institutions (domesticists), by the decision-making system (supranationalists) or by functional logic (neo-functionalists). If the intergovernmentalists are right, larger or richer countries should have more control on the integration process than smaller and poorer ones. If the supranationalists are right, one has to prove that the nature of the decision-making procedure is responsible for the actual distribution of power. If the neo-functionalists have a point, one has to find some kind of functional spill-over logic in the transfer of power from the national to the supranational level. If the ‘domesticists’ have a point, one has to prove that the activities of non-state actors are highly responsible for the distribution of power between the national and the European level.

1. *Les Non-conformistes des années trente. Une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française.* Paris 1969.

The author's analysis of the formal control over social and economic policy seems to vindicate the intergovernmentalist position. Firstly, the formal control of the EEC is of a predominantly negative character. Secondly, majority-voting affects more often than not only one stage in the decision-making process. Thirdly, member states can always ask for exceptional treatment on the basis of something as vague as the public morale (art. 100 A,4). Finally, in contrast with the subsidiarity principle, which prescribes a clear division of competences, there are overlapping national and EEC competences in the areas of the formulation of standards as well as additional policy, there is a double regulation structure that is so complicated that nobody seems to bear political responsibility except uncontrolled national bureaucracies constantly beleaguered by lobbyists. This observation makes an analysis of actual control of the member states instead of purely formal control even more urgent.

One of the reasons why the member states preferred negative integration was the fact, that the loss of formal control was actually compensated by an increase of actual control in other policy areas. The abolished intra-trade tariffs for instance were, if the need for it was felt, replaced by non-tariff trade barriers. Negative integration was also attractive, because it satisfied the neo-liberal elements in the society, it only required consensus on policies which should not be endorsed and it did not involve large transfer of financial resources. Supranationalism was never an attractive option, because it presupposes a common interest between governments with different ideological traditions and even more important divergent economic strength. Intergovernmental policy coordination was only attractive insofar it enabled national governments to rescue their national policies which otherwise would become counterproductive due to the increasing policy competition. Monetary policies inside the Exchange rate mechanism (ERM) – before it exploded – for instance, took the form of intergovernmental coordination between countries, who shared the idea, that devaluation was not a suitable instrument to improve the national position.

According to the author, the decision to stick to negative integration was taken by the governments themselves and was not the result of pressure group lobbying. Increased negative integration on its turn changed the internal national power relations. The implementation of the customs union at the end of the sixties for instance, made wage moderation crucial, and this improved the national leverage of the unions. The increased national leverage of the unions in the seventies on its turn explains, why unions lost their interest in the European level. This evidence seems to suggest, that every attempt to revive negative integration is automatically followed up by an intensified national orientation.

According to the author, this stop and go rhythm of the integration process cannot be explained by the existing integration theories. Intergovernmentalism can explain to some extent the integration process by pointing to the convergence of policy preferences of deregulation and a strong currency between the three larger powers, the Federal Republic, France and the United Kingdom, but it cannot explain, why those preferences converged. Supranationalism cannot explain, why, as a consequence of negative integration, the actual control capacity of the member states increased. The neo-functional idea of spill-over cannot explain stagnation, cannot explain why both workers' and employers' organization lost their interest in European social laws and therefore cannot explain, why there was no transfer of loyalty to a higher level. Finally, domesticists can explain, why the member states preferred negative integration and can also explain why the member states lost interest in European social laws because they restored the old national tripartite consultation mechanisms. Domesticists, however, cannot explain why labour relations in the member states developed in a similar way and why the policy preferences of the governments converged.

The author claims, that the stop and go character of the integration process and the divergence or convergence of policy preferences is much better explained by her theory, which she calls dialectic functionalism. This theory embodies a dialectic interpretation of the spill-over effect in the sense, that negative integration in one area generates increased national

intervention in other policy areas. The fact, that member states choose different other policy areas explains the divergent national policies. The fact, that those other policy areas are protected from EEC influences explains the stagnation of the integration process. After a while, however, increased national intervention in the other areas can easily become counterproductive due to policy competition leading to a senseless begging my neighbour policies. Counterproductiveness of national intervention in those areas can therefore lead to attempts to include them too in the integration process.

As the author admits, the empirical evidence for dialectic functionalism is extremely shallow. It remains to be seen, when the archives are open, whether this theory is actually capable of understanding the facts. Secondly, the author cannot satisfactorily explain, why the activities of the interest groups in the alternative policy areas leading to counterproductive policy competition do not always result in a new integration round. The author admits, that the spill-over process is not automatic, but does not specify the conditions under which integration actually does take place. It is for instance not at all clear, that counterproductive policy competition in the area of exchange rate policy would inevitably lead to an intergovernmental exchange rate mechanism. Dialectic functionalism can to a certain extent explain the genesis of the ERM in 1978, but it cannot explain without the use of external factors, why this mechanism exploded in the nineties. It seems, that the author is still a neo-functional, albeit wearing new clothes, who admits that the spill-over process is not an automatic one, but who has a blind spot for the theoretical possibility, that an integration process cannot only intensify or stagnate, but also disintegrate.

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Ary BURGER. – *Voor boerenfolk en vaderland. De vorming van het EEG-landbouwbeleid 1959–1966.* Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993, VI-161 p. ISBN 90-73052-67-X. 27,50 Dfl.

Le titre du livre du jeune historien néerlandais Ary Burger *Pour les paysans et la patrie* ne couvre pas son contenu réel. Le sous-titre *La formation de la politique agricole de la CEE 1959–1966* est en effet plus éclairant. Cet ouvrage, version adaptée d'un mémoire doté du prix Jan Romein 1991–92, retrace le processus de la prise de décision concernant la politique agricole commune (PAC) de la CEE et explique le succès de cette prise de décision. Le livre de Burger mérite d'être lu. Son point fort est une bonne analyse des négociations et des compromis au sein du Conseil des ministres et forme un point de départ pour des études plus détaillées au niveau national. Vu les intérêts opposés, on peut s'étonner de prime abord que les institutions nationales et communautaires se soient retrouvées au cours des dix premières années de la CEE pour concevoir et exécuter la PAC, avec l'organisation d'un marché commun, l'instauration de prix communs, une préférence mutuelle et une solidarité financière.

Burger analyse l'origine et la nature de l'intervention gouvernementale dans les politiques agricoles des pays membres de la CEE. Déjà dans les années cinquante, l'agriculture fut caractérisée par une production supérieure à l'augmentation de la demande et la politique agricole par le souci des autorités à ne pas agrandir la disparité entre les revenus des agriculteurs et ceux des autres classes sociales. Le degré d'autarcie était déjà dépassé ou presque atteint pour de nombreux produits. En dépit des échecs antérieurs d'intégration agricole, le Traité de Rome prévoyait l'instauration d'un marché commun agricole. Il n'imposait cependant pas de moyens précis pour atteindre ce but; le Traité énumérait seulement des possibilités.

Le corps du livre se situe dans le troisième chapitre traitant de la libération des échanges au sein de la CEE et de l'instauration et des enjeux de la PAC. En oubliant la conférence de Stresa – importante car les organisations professionnelles y ont adhéré à la formulation d'une

politique commune – Burger discerne trois phases vers ce marché intégré. La première couvre la période des premières propositions de la Commission jusqu’au marathon agricole aboutissant le 14 janvier 1962 à un accord de principe pour les premières organisations de marché (céréales, viande porcine, oeufs et volaille) et à l’instauration d’un fonds commun pour financer cette politique. La France et les Pays-Bas, pays exportateurs qui avaient le plus à gagner d’une ouverture des frontières internes, plaidaient pour la libération des échanges, tandis que l’Allemagne et la Belgique s’accrochaient à leur protectionnisme agricole. Les premiers atteignaient leur but en liant l’abolition accélérée des tarifs industriels et la transition vers la seconde phase de la CEE à un progrès décisif et à des décisions fermes en matière agricole.

La deuxième phase fut l’élaboration concrète de cette PAC jusqu’en 1964. Une fois de plus, les pays se laissaient guider par leurs intérêts nationaux. Quand la Commission fut mandatée de négocier dans le cadre du Kennedy-Round (GATT), de nouvelles difficultés surgirent en matière agricole et opposèrent une fois de plus la France à l’Allemagne. On a néanmoins instauré de nouvelles organisations de marché (produits laitiers, viande bovine et riz). En décembre 1964, l’Allemagne consentit finalement à un prix unitaire pour les céréales, mais obtenait en revanche des montants compensatoires pour la diminution de ses prix nationaux jusqu’en 1970.

Le couronnement de la PAC fait l’objet de la troisième phase, en 1965 et 1966. La CEE connut entretemps la crise du siège vide, provoquée en juin 1965 par de Gaulle à l’occasion de l’expiration du financement provisoire de la PAC, mais dont la raison réelle fut plutôt la possibilité de prendre des décisions à vote majoritaire dans la CEE à partir de 1966. Avec le retour de la France à la table de négociation, la CEE adoptait une extension des organisations de marché et des prix communs, un règlement de longue durée pour le financement de la PAC et une date pour l’entrée en vigueur du marché commun agricole.

Cette évolution et le contenu réel des enjeux et des propositions sont décrits en détail et peuvent facilement être consultés grâce à la bonne division du livre. Burger attribue le succès de l’élaboration de la PAC au fait que le secteur agricole a été impliqué et mêlé à des sujets non-agricoles, ce qui n’avait pas été le cas avant 1957. Il y avait donc un double équilibre à sauvegarder dans l’élaboration de la PAC: compromis entre les intérêts agricoles nationaux des différents Etats membres et compromis entre les intérêts agricoles et non-agricoles. La France et l’Allemagne furent les pays les plus opposés, mais la réalisation de la PAC ne peut pas être paraphrasée comme un accord franco-allemand: cette présentation est trop simplifiée et sous-estime le rôle des autres pays.

Burger a utilisé des archives néerlandaises comme base de recherche, en particulier les procès-verbaux des réunions du Conseil des ministres et du Comité spécial pour l’agriculture. En se limitant à ce niveau supérieur, Burger n’a incorporé dans sa recherche ni la prise de décision interne aux Pays-Bas ni les opinions des milieux concernés. Ceci constitue peut-être une faiblesse, car la consultation de ces archives à La Haye aurait sans doute permis de pousser plus loin la connaissance historique et scientifique de la PAC. Quant à la bibliographie, elle est certes abondante mais nous ne comprenons pas pourquoi les mémoires du premier président Walter Hallstein n’ont pas été consultés, ni pourquoi la littérature en langue française n’y soit pas incluse.

La critique la plus sévère peut être formulée envers le dernier chapitre dans lequel Burger trace les grandes lignes de la PAC après 1966. Bien que sa description témoigne d’une bonne connaissance de l’évolution de la PAC, il s’engage dans un débat d’hypothèses sans soutien scientifique de ses arguments et affirmations. Le point crucial de ce débat consiste à savoir si oui ou non les prix communs élevés sont à la base et à l’origine des excédents agricoles dans les années septante. Burger rejette trop facilement et sans fondements précis cette hypothèse et affirme de la même manière que les améliorations techniques dans les méthodes de production ont causé les excédents. La vérité se trouve probablement entre les deux hypothèses.

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L'Europe du Patronat. De la guerre froide aux années soixante. Textes réunis par Michel DUMOULIN, René GIRAULT, Gilbert TRAUSCH. Euroclio, Série “Etudes et documents”, Berne, Peter Lang, 1993, 244 p. ISBN 3-261-04598-1. 48,- sFr.

Naissance et développement de l'information européenne. Textes réunis par Felice DASSETTO et Michel DUMOULIN, Euroclio, Série “Etudes et documents”, Berne, Peter Lang, 1993, 144 p. ISBN 3-261-04599-X. 38,- sFr.

Michel DUMOULIN, Anne-Myriam DUTRIEU. – *La Ligue européenne de coopération économique (1946–1981). Un groupe d'étude et de pression dans la construction européenne, Euroclio, Série “Etudes et documents”,* Berne, Peter Lang, 1993, 274 p. ISBN 3-906750-74-4. 59,- sFr.

Avant de rendre compte des trois ouvrages en référence, saluons l'initiative de notre collègue Michel Dumoulin, promoteur d'*Euroclio*, projet scientifique et éditorial: celui-ci a pour objectif, d'une part, d'offrir des instruments de travail et de référence à la recherche et, d'autre part, de rendre rapidement accessibles les résultats de la recherche en matière d'histoire de l'unification européenne. Dans la mesure où il est important que la dimension historique de l'intégration européenne soit prise en compte dans les débats en cours sur l'Union européenne, les historiens doivent être à même de faire connaître les résultats de leurs recherches et d'ouvrir en continu de nouvelles interrogations à propos des expériences du passé, aussi bien en ce qui concerne les conditions de succès de certaines propositions que les projets qui ont avorté.

Aux historiens et surtout aux jeunes chercheurs ainsi qu'aux organisateurs de nouveaux chantiers de recherche soucieux de diffuser rapidement leurs travaux, *Euroclio* offre sans doute un instrument efficace et prometteur; en effet, les Editions Peter Lang qui ont accueilli la nouvelle collection sont bien représentées au niveau européen et international, ouvertes aux travaux scientifiques issus des principales aires culturelles et linguistiques européennes.

Les ouvrages susmentionnés inaugurent la série *Etudes et documents*, destinée à publier des monographies, des recueils d'articles, des actes de colloque et des recueils de textes commentés. La série *Références* est réservée à la publication de bibliographies, guides et autres instruments de travail; cette série a été inaugurée par Gérard Bossuat, auteur d'une *Bibliographie thématique commentée des travaux français relative à l'Histoire des constructions européennes au XXe siècle*.



Le premier titre de la collection, *L'Europe du Patronat: de la guerre froide aux années soixante*, réunit les contributions présentées lors d'un colloque organisé par Michel Dumoulin, à Louvain-la-Neuve, les 10 et 11 mai 1990. Quatorze historiens traitent de l'attitude des patrons de plusieurs pays européens par rapport à l'intégration européenne, de la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale jusqu'à la fin des années soixante.

Présentant une grille de questions auxquelles l'historien est invité à répondre, au-delà de la formule controversée d'une “Europe du Patronat”, René Girault propose de s'interroger en priorité sur trois questions principales, à savoir:

1. Quel rôle ont joué les patrons européens dans l'élaboration des constructions européennes?
2. Quelle a été leur participation à la gestion de ces constructions une fois établies: CECA, CEE, ...?
3. Quelle a été l'adhésion des patrons européens aux principes et aux effets de l'intégration européenne?

Il est évident que les différentes contributions présentées dans ce recueil ne pouvaient répondre entièrement à cette interrogation; en effet la réponse ne peut être que partielle, du

fait des situations objectivement différentes selon les pays et surtout de l'absence d'études équivalentes sur les divers patronats nationaux. Une partie des contributions analyse l'attitude de certains chefs d'entreprise: Christophe Chanier pour la multinationale *Philips* et Jean Rivoire pour le *Crédit Lyonnais*, d'autres contributions s'intéressent à des groupes sectoriels: Philippe Mioche pour le patronat de la sidérurgie française, Ruggero Ranieri pour les milieux sidérurgiques italiens et Charles Barthel pour les maîtres de forges luxembourgeois. D'autres auteurs explorent les organisations faitières des patronats nationaux, ainsi Werner Bühner pour le *Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie*, Thierry Grosbois pour les groupements patronaux du Benelux, Antoine Fleury pour le patronat suisse et Gérard Chastagnet pour le patronat espagnol; enfin deux études abordent des organisations transnationales de patrons européens telles que la *Ligue européenne de coopération économique* par Michel Dumoulin et le *Comité européen pour le Progrès économique et social* par Anne-Myriam Dutrieue.

Les résultats des recherches publiées ici montrent à quel point le chantier ouvert par le colloque de Louvain est encore à peine entamé, tant les pistes que les diverses contributions ont dégagées sont à la fois nombreuses et novatrices, en ce sens que les travaux sont encore rares; les historiens réunis autour de ce chantier sont bien conscients qu'il leur est difficile de déterminer l'apport spécifique des patrons, des chefs d'entreprises (grandes, moyennes et petites), des organisations patronales faitières et sectorielles, nationales et transnationales, à la construction européenne.

Sur la base des observations établies par Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, à partir de ces diverses contributions, certes ponctuelles, mais souvent nouvelles, les conclusions suivantes peuvent être retenues:

- l'idée d'intégration européenne n'est pas étrangère aux patrons européens, bien que seules les organisations patronales allemandes aient joué un rôle actif en faveur de l'intégration européenne et encore plutôt de façon sélective selon les institutions européennes proposées;
- si l'idée d'intégration est acceptée dans les milieux patronaux, encore faut-il s'entendre sur la portée de ce concept; les patrons sont presque massivement hostiles à la supranationalité;
- l'attitude à l'égard de l'intégration ne fait pratiquement jamais l'unanimité à l'intérieur d'un même secteur, y compris au sein des associations européennes où s'expriment des avis divergents quant aux finalités et aux modalités de l'intégration;
- le changement d'attitude des patrons dans le temps, l'évolution parfois rapide, parfois lente, d'une position hostile, par exemple au Plan Schuman, à leur ralliement aux Traités de Rome.

Il a été constaté aussi – et cela n'est pas sans importance – que la mise en place progressive du Marché commun, dont certains objectifs allaient pourtant à l'encontre de principes dominants dans les milieux patronaux, a rallié ceux-ci aux institutions créées par les gouvernements européens. Enfin, dans cette évolution en direction d'une construction européenne, le rôle des hommes, de certains patrons, de certaines associations au sein desquelles ils militent, apparaît comme décisif.

Sur le plan méthodologique et c'est une dernière remarque, si la seule histoire économique ne saurait satisfaire à la question fondamentale sur les ressorts de cette grande entreprise de la seconde partie du XXe siècle qu'est la Construction européenne, elle n'en démontre pas moins que l'étude des milieux économiques, des entreprises, des patrons, esquissée dans le présent recueil, illustre opportunément que l'histoire politique et idéologique qui domine encore largement les études portant sur l'Union européenne doit être confrontée aux résultats de ces nouvelles recherches portant sur des milieux qui ont contribué et contribuent à façonner l'Europe.

Dans *Naissance et développement de l'information européenne*, il s'agit de textes qui résultent d'exposés et de transcription de débats, lors de deux journées d'études, à Louvain-la-Neuve, en mai et en novembre 1990, où se sont réunis des praticiens des services d'information du Conseil de l'Europe et d'institutions communautaires ainsi que des témoins qui ont été à un moment donné des experts, des acteurs, des utilisateurs de l'information en matière européenne.

Quel est finalement le sens de l'information en provenance des institutions européennes et quels en sont les objectifs? Quel en est l'impact dans les divers pays européens? Des interventions et des exposés reproduits dans ce recueil, on peut conclure que l'information sur les "affaires communautaires" n'atteint pas son objectif; il faudrait concevoir des guides pratiques à la portée du citoyen qui doit être à même d'apprécier les enjeux européens aussi bien dans ses activités qu'en tant que citoyen européen. Dans cette perspective, ce petit volume dont le contenu fait appel à des compétences pluridisciplinaires apporte une contribution éclairante au dossier essentiel de l'Europe du citoyen, finalité suprême d'une union européenne fondée sur la démocratie au service de tous ses citoyens.

Pour sa part, l'historien y trouvera de solides points de repère sur la laborieuse mise en place d'une politique d'information au sein des institutions européennes, esquissée par Jacques-René Rabier et Paul Collowald, sur l'organisation du service de presse et d'information des Communautés européennes (CE) et des bureaux de presse à l'extérieur, sur le service de l'information syndicale auprès des CE par Gianfranco Giro et Franco Chittolina, sur la création des presque trois cent centres de documentation et de près de deux cent cinquante Euro-Info centres au service des citoyens et des entreprises, des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, par Manuel Santarelli ainsi que sur les agences de presse, relais indispensables de l'information européenne par Yves Conrad. Deux contributions de caractère analytique et critique présentent, – l'une la création d'une échance mythifiée: "1993: généalogie d'un mythe" par Jean-Luc Chabot, conçue comme vecteur de popularisation de la question européenne, – l'autre, par Thierry E. Mommens étudiant le processus de l'information communautaire dans le domaine social, le discours européen des services communautaires et sa réception et restitution par la presse écrite belge, française, allemande et italienne.

Dans leurs conclusions, les organisateurs de ces journées et éditeurs, Felice Dassetto et Michel Dumoulin, constatent la fragmentation de l'information européenne, du fait de la multiplicité des producteurs institutionnels de discours européen. Cela ne facilite pas sa perception par le citoyen qui a de la peine à s'y retrouver, entre les idées générales et souvent généreuses qu'il fait volontiers siennes et les finalités et les enjeux de la politique européenne. Enfin, s'interrogent les éditeurs, que va-t-il sortir de tout ce matériel informatif, de toutes ces campagnes de sensibilisation à l'Europe, notamment par l'usage souvent abusif d'une nouvelle symbolique européenne? Ils font remarquer qu'une mobilisation trop manipulée sur des images et des thèmes artificiels peut très bien produire un effet pervers.

Ce questionnement qui traverse tous les débats indique à quel point la thématique nouvelle abordée dans cette publication mérite encore bien des études qui soient à même de nourrir les réflexions de ceux qui doivent mener une politique européenne d'information au service des citoyens, et non à l'usage des seuls appareils bureaucratiques et gouvernementaux.

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Le troisième volume, *La Ligue européenne de coopération économique, 1946–1981*, ouvre un champ de recherche inexploré jusqu'ici. A défaut d'archives des groupements d'intérêts, la plupart des analystes avaient en effet cherché à circonscrire la genèse et l'évolution des projets fédéralistes au travers d'associations militantes et de groupes de promotion. Toute une plage restait inoccupée: il y avait sans conteste une sorte de vide entre d'une part le souci de ponctualité, caractéristique d'un Walter Lipgens qui s'était attaché à mettre en lumière la permanence des traditions fédéralistes dans une optique largement soustraite aux

rapports de force, et de l'autre les raisonnements de l'historien économiste qui, à l'image d'un Alan Milward maniant avec ironie le contrepoint, cherche à mesurer le poids des conjonctures commerciales et monétaires, quitte au passage à tourner en dérision l'écho modeste que les milieux communautaires réservèrent aux mythes fondateurs du fédéralisme européen.

Sous cet angle, les trente premières années de la Ligue, celles en somme de la présidence de René Boël, industriel gérant le groupe *Solvay & Cie*, fournissent à Anne-Myriam Dutrieue et Michel Dumoulin la matière première d'une richesse exceptionnelle. Devant la variété des enjeux dont les archives rendent compte, les auteurs font un choix double: ils mettent d'une part en avant les débats de fond qui animèrent les protagonistes de la Ligue proches du secrétariat général à Bruxelles, et laissent à d'autres la tâche d'analyser le rôle des comités nationaux de celle-ci; ils choisissent d'autre part de traiter en un chapitre distinct, le dernier, la dimension monétaire des défis auxquels la Ligue a été confrontée sans discontinuer depuis sa création.

Le second point prête à discussion, dans la mesure où les objectifs de la Ligue traduisent la permanence d'un faisceau d'intérêts financiers et monétaires que celle-ci défend avec persévérance. En dépit de divergences internes, les dirigeants de la Ligue appuient en effet tous les efforts entrepris par les Communautés en vue de stabiliser les conditions du crédit et des échanges en Europe. Certes, ils cherchent à exercer une influence sur les grands enjeux économiques et sociaux dans le contexte d'après-guerre; cependant, l'objectif principal de la Ligue demeure la mise en place d'un régime de liberté optimale des transferts financiers, ceci dans le cadre d'un grand marché unique s'appuyant sur un mécanisme de stabilisation durable des principales monnaies d'Europe occidentale. Il ne fait pas de doute que la priorité de cette visée complexe ne manque pas de peser sur toutes les préoccupations qui se font jour au sein de la Ligue depuis la guerre.

Créée en 1946–1947, souvent amalgamée de ce fait aux premières associations fédéralistes militantes, la Ligue remonte par ses origines à plusieurs projets nés en 1941–1942 parmi les Belges installés à New York et à Londres. De ces réflexions d'exilés, elle tire une triple ambition: groupe d'études, elle cherche d'abord à associer à son effort d'analyse industriels et banquiers, universitaires et syndicalistes, voire hauts fonctionnaires de gouvernements et de banques centrales. Forte de ces facultés d'observation, elle appelle au rétablissement progressif d'une entière liberté de mouvement des biens et des capitaux. Elle aspire ainsi à peser comme un lobby d'impulsion dans la perspective d'un grand marché: opposée aux solutions dirigistes, elle estime que tout régime de convertibilité doit s'accompagner de clauses de coordination monétaire, commerciale et budgétaire, sinon de mesures d'harmonisation fiscale.

Dans cette optique, l'histoire de la Ligue tend à apparaître comme celle des conditions d'élaboration d'une cinquantaine de brochures qui, sans être confidentielles, ont été distribuées entre 1949 et 1981 dans les milieux dont la Ligue cherche à infléchir les choix. L'examen de cet important corpus de textes s'appuie ici sur le dépouillement des archives du secrétariat général de la Ligue (correspondance, rapports, notes internes), des Archives du ministère belge des Affaires étrangères, ainsi que de quelques fonds privés, en particulier des papiers van Zeeland (chap. Ier). Cette ample documentation gagnerait cependant à être enrichie d'éclairages latéraux: ils seraient fort bienvenus, ceux notamment des milieux bancaires dont les intérêts, on le devine, ne s'arrêtent pas à l'objectif des changes définitivement amarrés à un pôle monétaire fixe.

La libéralisation des conditions de transfert et la mise en place des premières Communautés sont pour beaucoup dans l'institutionnalisation progressive de la Ligue, promise à devenir une instance d'appui mais aussi de freinage des politiques financières et monétaires adoptées au sein des Communautés. Les instances de délibération qui concourent alors à la confection des brochures – depuis les panels restreints d'experts jusqu'au grand forum de la

conférence monétaire – apparaissent par conséquent bien rodés au moment où, à partir de 1967, le dérèglement général des changes, puis les chocs énergétiques offrent aux experts de la Ligue une nouvelle occasion de tester leurs méthodes d'analyse et de prévision. Cette fois cependant, le credo de la Ligue ne s'arrête plus aux articles de foi libre-échangistes: si elle plaide, comme aux temps de Daniel Serruys et d'Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, en faveur d'un rôle européen pour la livre et d'une négociation avec les Etats-Unis, elle rappelle les engagements pris lors du Plan Werner et préconise avec force, jusqu'en 1981 et au-delà, la poursuite de l'intégration monétaire. Il est vrai que, dans la bouche de ses dirigeants, le terme d'"Union économique et monétaire" (UEM) remonte au début des années cinquante.

Au total, cette première histoire d'un groupe d'études et de pression transnational balise avec brio tout un nouveau champ de recherche. De par le rôle cardinal du fait monétaire dans la construction européenne comme dans les relations internationales, elle incite à élargir l'examen des logiques d'influence dans une optique intégrant les objectifs des groupes multinationaux, tôt ou tard confrontés à ceux des trésoreries nationales, des banques centrales et des institutions financières internationales. C'est dire la multiplicité et les divergences entre les stratégies en jeu des grandes entreprises dont la Ligue, première instance de son espèce dans l'Europe communautaire, a cherché à renforcer l'écho, la cohérence et l'efficacité.

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Par la nouveauté des thèmes abordés, par la variété des approches qu'implique toute étude large et dynamique du processus d'union européenne, les trois premiers volumes de la collection *Euroclio* devraient inciter – et nous le souhaitons vivement – la communauté historique à apporter son soutien à ce projet, en proposant en premier lieu des thèmes novateurs et des textes de qualité et en deuxième lieu en faisant connaître autour d'elle, dans les milieux concernés par la construction européenne, les études en question au fur et à mesure de leur parution.

Antoine Fleury, Lubor Jilek
Fondation Archives Européennes, Genève

Martin GRESCHAT und Wilfried LOTH (Hrsg.). – *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* "Konfession und Gesellschaft" Bd. 5, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1994, 245 S. ISBN 3-17-013120-6. 49,80 DM.

Die den Herausgebern der Reihe "Konfession und Gesellschaft" gemeinsame Überzeugung von der auch in der säkularisierten Gesellschaft der Gegenwart fortwirkenden Kraft der Konfessionen zur Mitgestaltung der politischen und sozialen Ordnung läßt sich wohl an keinem historischen Gegenstand besser erhärten als an der Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Daß ihre founding fathers zu einem erheblichen Teil sich dem abendländlichen Christentum verpflichtet wußten, hat in den frühen Jahren der europäischen Integration manchen ihrer Gegner den bequemen Vorwurf geliefert, sie strebten nichts anderes an als ein katholisches und klerikales, darum anderen unzugängliches Europa. Daß diese Kritik an Europa verstimmt, weil durch Tatsachen widerlegt ist, macht es dem Historiker möglich, von tagespolitischen Rücksichten unbeschwert der Frage nachzugehen, welchen Anteil Christen an diesem Vorgang hatten und inwiefern ihre Politik mit ihrer religiösen Überzeugung korrespondierte.

Der hier anzuzeigende Band verfolgt diese Fragestellung durch zehn verschiedene Beiträge eines weitgespannten, internationalen Historikerkreises. Sie sind um zwei Themenkreise gruppiert. Der erste untersucht Gruppen und Institutionen in ihrer Haltung zum Projekt der europäischen Integration, der zweite den Anteil herausragender Persönlichkeiten. Diese Arbeiten sind im einzelnen von unterschiedlichem Umfang und differieren auch in

Ansatz und Anspruch. In ihrer Gesamtheit ergeben sie trotz solcher Disparitäten ein Bild von beachtlicher Dichte und Geschlossenheit. Einleitend ist erstmals eine knappe Skizze über die "Zukunftsplanungen christlicher Kirchen und Gruppen während des Zweiten Weltkriegs" gedruckt, die der verstorbene Saarbrücker Historiker Walter Lippgens in der Vorbereitung seiner Dokumentensammlung zur Geschichte der europäischen Integration verfaßt hat. Die beiden folgenden Aufsätze (Martin Greschat, "Der Protestantismus und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft" sowie Philippe Chenaux, "Der Vatikan und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft") dürften die wichtigsten in ihrem Themenkreis bilden. Denn Greschat schildert in seinem sehr umfangreichen Aufsatz mit großer Detailkenntnis die Diskussionen in den vielfältigen und von unterschiedlichen theologischen Ansätzen ausgehenden Gruppierungen im deutschen Protestantismus, die zu einem großen Teil der Politik die Gefolgschaft versagten, die unter den gegebenen Bedingungen den Weg zur Integration Europas einschlug. Die Arbeit von Chenaux bringt demgegenüber neue Aufschlüsse über die Auffassung des Vatikans, weil es ihm gelungen ist, hierfür die neuen Quellen aus der Berichterstattung der französischen und der italienischen Vertretung beim Heiligen Stuhl zu erschließen. (Ein überraschendes Detail: Jacques Maritain, der Verfasser von *Humanisme intégral* und anderen Arbeiten zur Fundierung einer christlichen Demokratie, damals Botschafter seines Landes am Vatikan, mißbilligte die Ablehnung der These von der Kollektivschuld der Deutschen durch Pius XII. S. 100). Im zweiten Hauptteil, der den gestaltenden Persönlichkeiten gewidmet ist, könnten es die Arbeiten von Manfred Görtemaker über John Foster Dulles und von Wilfried Loth über André Philip sein, welche die größte Aufmerksamkeit auf sich lenken werden. Denn einem breiteren Publikum in Deutschland ist bislang die wichtige Rolle unbekannt geblieben, die Dulles durch seine Förderung der europäischen Integration wahrgenommen hat. Dies dürfte freilich auch gelten für seine lebendige Verwurzelung in der presbyterianischen Tradition seines Elternhauses. Mit André Philip, dem evangelischen Sozialisten, kommt in diesem Bande aufs neue der Anteil zur Darstellung, den der Protestantismus in der Konzeption und Durchsetzung der europäischen Integration gehabt hat. Ihn in der Zukunft stärker zu beachten, dürfte eine der Konsequenzen sein, die der Historiker aus diesem Bande zu ziehen hat, der es allerdings ebensowenig unterläßt, neben der Bedeutung des Vatikans den Beitrag von Alcide de Gasperi (L. Pastorelli), Robert Schuman (R. Poidevin) und des "rheinischen Katholiken" Adenauer (A. Doering-Manteuffel) herauszustellen. Während Pastorelli vornehmlich bemüht ist, in der Europapolitik des hingebungsvollen Christen de Gasperi Phasen und Strategien zu erkennen, tritt in den Arbeiten über Schuman und Adenauer die katholische (im Falle Adenauers auch protestantische Abwehrreaktionen auslösende) Motivation wiederum als ein leitendes Prinzip hervor.

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Notices – Informations – Mitteilungen

Neutral States in Europe and European Integration 1945–1994 (Die europäischen Neutralen und die Integration 1945–1994)

International Symposium of the Working Group for European Integration at the
Institute of Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck (Austria)
held April, 6th to 9th, 1995

Can neutrality of European states like Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland or Austria be defined as a problem of security policy, or is neutrality a problem of national identity and sovereignty which must be regarded in the context of European integration? This question dominated the symposium, organized at the instigation of Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger of the Institute of Contemporary History at Innsbruck. Since the recent accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union, the questions of their future position within the European framework, of the neutrality of Ireland and of the future attitude of Switzerland have once again been put on the European agenda. Furthermore, each of the five neutral countries of Europe contributes its own historical and conceptual perspective to the discussion about how to continue the process of European integration.

The great powers – the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain – each had an idea of their own about how the neutrality of the five countries would affect their security interests. As long as the problem of Germany remained unresolved, that is until 1955, the United States regarded neutralism, in Dulles' words, as "immoral". Neutrality could be tolerated only where a strong anti-communist bias and economic and ideological cooperation with the Western world existed (Michael Ruddy, St Louis). To close the security gap, however, President Eisenhower as early as 1953 pleaded for Austrian neutrality to follow the Swiss example. Dulles gave this policy his reluctant support, but there was no room for neutral countries in George Ball's view of European integration policy in the early sixties (Oliver Rathkolb, Vienna).

After the crisis involving the attitude of the neutral countries towards the EEC and their failure to establish a wider EFTA at the beginning of the sixties, the neutral states only rediscovered a constructive role in world politics in the seventies, with the beginning of detente and disarmament talks, and more especially in the context of the CSCE. Their exact position in European-American relations, however, remained to be defined (Oliver Rathkolb, Vienna). From the early sixties onwards, the British sought a pragmatic role for the neutral states within the framework of their European policy (Wolfram Kaiser, Essen/Vienna). Marshall Plan Aid and the division of Germany led the Soviets to abandon their concept of a belt of neutral states from Norway and Denmark through Germany and Austria to Italy. Accordingly, the Stalin offer of March 10 of 1952 must be viewed in terms of propaganda (Vladislav Zubok, Moscow/Washington). After the phase of "peaceful coexistence", inaugurated in 1955 by Khrushchev, who showed great personal confidence in Austrian politicians like Raab, the colours of neutrality reappeared with Gorbachev's formula of a common "European home".

Ireland's interest in neutrality was almost exclusively determined by the problem of defining its political independence from Britain and by the question of the Ulster provinces (Brian Girvin, Cork). At the same time, the economic dependence of Ireland on Great Britain was continuously increasing. In 1947, after violent internal debates, the positive British attitude enabled Ireland to accept Marshall Aid (Ulfert Zöllner, Hamburg). By 1961, it was obvious that European integration had become a critical economic consideration for Ireland

and that the political significance of neutrality had diminished in the process. This was reflected in the referendum result of 1972 which saw eighty-three per cent of the Irish electorate voting in favour of EEC membership (Maurice FitzGerald, Florence). Irish interest in European integration up till now has been focused on economic as opposed to political or social considerations (Rona Fitzgerald, Dublin). The Irish interpretation of neutrality as “non-alliance“ and “non-participation in international military organisation“ is a special case of how national sovereignty and identity are defined (Jürgen Elvert, Kiel). A change of position could occur once the question of the Ulster provinces is resolved.

Among the states whose neutrality is “self-imposed“, Switzerland possesses a particularly clear and orthodox definition. Neutrality, as a political symbol, has for nearly hundred and fifty years been closely related to national identity and sovereignty. As the Federal Council depends on a referendum for approval of any major decisions on foreign policies, and as its actions are by necessity based on a high degree of consensus on internal affairs, a number of restrictive elements are bound to appear in the integration discourse (Laurent Goetschel, Chavannes près Renens). The very fact that Switzerland is characterized by a high degree of economic interdependence with the international community creates a prejudice against any kind of interference with the rules and customs of the national economy. Thus, the inability of the EFTA to survive had very serious consequences for Switzerland. Negotiations for association with the EEC at the beginning of the sixties were hesitantly conducted (Martin Zbinden, Chavannes près Renens). The first report on integration by the Swiss federal council in 1988 deeply affected the traditional self-perception of the Swiss (Peter Moser, Zurich). It meant a change of direction which, however, did not translate automatically into the courage necessary for a discussion of foreign policy problems in front of a national audience. The report led to a deeper feeling of disorientation and of fears about the preservation of national sovereignty, especially as far as monetary and agricultural matters were concerned.

Swedish neutrality features a model welfare-state apparently bridging the gap between the two superpower-systems, but linked to NATO by a “secret partnership“. Sweden’s democratic stability became a myth legitimizing the country’s demand for leadership among the Nordic countries. At the same time, economic dependence on the West and on military cooperation with the USA was growing fast (Karl Molin, Stockholm; Charles Silva, Stockholm; Mikael af Malmborg, Lund). Full membership of the EEC was demanded by the Conservatives all through the sixties, while the Socialist Party did not redefine its aims until 1967 when Labour members began to participate in governments in EEC states. During the eighties, an intellectual reorientation took place, mainly within the Socialist Party, which used Delors’ masterplan for a common European policy on social affairs as one of its points of departure. At the same time, economic decline put a severe strain on the socialist welfare system, which was meant to provide a “people’s home“ and closely related, as a factor of identity, to the concept of neutrality. Public opinion was divided over this static idea of the state and a “fuzzy concept“ of neutrality which was used as a vehicle for new political ideas. This division occurred within the ranks of the Socialist Party as well and was reflected in the discussion about the referendum of 1994 (Bo Strath, Gothenburg).

Finnish neutrality was determined by the geopolitical and military condition of the country which made a policy of appeasement towards the Soviet Union inevitable. Exclusion from the Marshall aid program later led to considerable economic difficulties (Tapani Paavonen, Turku). When Sweden became an EFTA member, there remained no alternative for Finland but to become associated as well, in 1960, and to conclude corresponding trade agreements with the Eastern European countries. EFTA was regarded as the forecourt of the EEC, Sweden being the decisive factor (Pekka Visuri, Helsinki). President Kekkonen’s good relations with De Gaulle were of paramount importance for giving a European orientation to political ideas in Finland (Martti Häikiö, Helsinki).

Austria's approach to neutrality was as flexible as the Swedish. In 1955, when Soviet pressure forced Austria to become a neutral and a sovereign state at the same time, an ambiguous comparison was drawn with the Swiss example; in fact, neutrality was in the first place used as a means to distance Austria from both West and East Germany and to enable it to conduct an active foreign policy through international institutions, especially during the era of Chancellor Kreisky (Heinrich Schneider, Vienna). For Austria as for others, the Marshall Aid Program was of vital importance. Since the fifties, Austria's close economic cooperation with West Germany has made Bonn – but also Rome – the champion of its interests within the EEC. In 1956, Austria became a member of the Council of Europe. Political leaders of both the Socialist and People's parties declared themselves in favour of adherence to the European Coal and Steel Community. After an interruption caused by severe Russian pressure following the rebellion in Hungary, a possible Austrian membership of the EEC was discussed controversially in 1959/60 (Michael Gehler, Innsbruck). In terms of international law (Maximilian Oswald, Graz) and historiography (Thomas Angerer, Vienna), the evaluation of neutrality underwent a change from 1955 to 1995 as Austria developed closer links with the European and the world economy. Interpretations of neutrality range from the view that it is a permanent protection for Austrian independence, a discussion of problems implied by membership in international institutions to the concept of "secret alliance" with the West (Paul Luif, Laxenburg).

Although the end of the cold war has obliterated the security argument in favour of neutrality, it is still important for the establishment of a national identity and the protection of smaller states during the process of European integration. A collective security structure must be created in Europe to which the formerly neutral states are able and prepared to adhere. The fear of losing national identity and sovereignty, however, remains and will only be overcome if an attractive alternative is shown. This presents a double challenge to the European Union and the five countries under discussion at Innsbruck.

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Regards croisés et coopération en Europe au XX^e siècle sous la direction d'Elisabeth du Réau.

L'ouvrage est constitué par les Actes d'un colloque international organisé en décembre 1992 au Mans (France) par Elisabeth du Réau, professeur à la Sorbonne (Paris III).

Le colloque a étudié les **relations intereuropéennes au XX^e siècle, du Traité de Versailles (1919) aux récentes mutations à l'Est de l'Europe (de la chute du Mur à la dislocation de l'URSS en 1991)**.

La première partie de l'ouvrage est consacrée à l'évocation des relations diplomatiques, politiques et culturelles, de 1919 à la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

La seconde partie évoque les espoirs de l'immédiat après-guerre et la troisième l'évolution des relations entre les deux Europe après l'instauration de la Guerre froide.

Enfin la dernière partie, qui constitue un épilogue, présente les perspectives récentes de coopération économique entre l'Est et l'Ouest de l'Europe.

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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Patrick Pasture

The Fist of the Dwarf. Formation, Organization, and Representation of the Christian Trade Unions as a European Pressure Group

The article analyzes the way in which the Christian trade unions attempted to act as a pressure group during the formation years of the European Community. It emphasizes the organization of their action, mainly through the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), rather than the content of their arguments. Although Christian Democracy played a vanguard role in the creation of the European Community, this was much less the case for the Christian trade unions. After World War II, in only a few West-European countries Christian trade unions still were in existence. Since the IFCTU had lost some of its most prominent affiliates, in particular from Germany and Italy, its survival was far from granted. Moreover, it had to deal with fierce opposition, in particular from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and its affiliates, which proclaimed to be the only real representatives of the free workers. Nevertheless, the IFCTU managed to carve out a niche for itself in the European institutions. How difficult this was, is demonstrated by its experiences in the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OEEC. But finally the Christian trade unions, who gave their full support to the European idea, could let their voice be heard, among others in the OEEC, the ECSC, the Council of Europe, the EEC and Euratom. They owed their relative success mainly to their contacts with the Christian democracy and the diplomatic skill of their leaders.

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Cet article analyse les syndicats chrétiens comme groupe de pression pendant les années de formation de la Communauté européenne. Il se concentre sur l'organisation de leur action, essentiellement par le biais de la Confédération internationale des syndicats chrétiens (CISC), plutôt que sur le contenu de leurs arguments. Bien que la démocratie chrétienne ait joué un rôle de premier plan dans la création de la Communauté, ceci était bien moins le cas pour les syndicats chrétiens. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, ceux-ci survivaient seulement dans quelques pays ouest-européens. Puisque la CISC avait perdu quelques uns de ses membres les plus importants (d'Italie et d'Allemagne), sa survie était loin d'être garantie. En plus, elle devait affronter une opposition farouche, en particulier de la part de la Confédération internationale des syndicats libres (CISL) et de ses affiliés. Toutefois les syndicats chrétiens ont réussi à se faire une place dans les institutions européennes. Entreprise difficile comme le montrent les avatars subis au Comité syndical consultatif de l'OECE. Mais finalement les syndicats chrétiens pouvaient faire entendre leur voix à l'OECE, à la CECA, au Conseil de l'Europe ainsi qu'à la CEE et à l'EURATOM. Ils doivent ce succès relatif surtout à leurs contacts avec la démocratie chrétienne et aux talents diplomatiques de leurs dirigeants.

Francesca Fauri

Italy in International Economic Cooperation: The Franco-Italian Customs Union and the Fritalux-Finibel Negotiations

The first part of the essay focuses on the origins of the customs union, the role of the industrial sector in the ensuing negotiations and the actual feasibility of the union in economic terms. The main obstacles to the union were economic: problems lay in the similar economic structure of Italy and France and therefore in their low degree of complementary. The industrialists' solution to check competition resulting from the removal of tariffs and quotas consisted in the use of cartels under government aegis. While the Italian government had decided that the Treaty was politically important for the country, the French government was itself uncertain on the political-economic advantages of an agreement with Italy and did not hide its preference for a treaty including Benelux. Moreover French economic forces were not willing to face increased competition from Italy nor an invasion of Italy's excess manpower. In May 1949 France rejected the customs union treaty with Italy, but tried to breathe new life into Franco-Italian relations through the Petsche Plan and the following Fritalux-Finibel negotiations

involving the Benelux countries as well. Also this effort was doomed to fail, as analyzed in the second part of the work. Yet, fruitless though they may seem, these efforts were not vain, they succeeded in reinserting Italy in international forums and provided a useful negotiating exercise on economic cooperation issues that will lay the foundations for future agreements.

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La première partie de cet article analyse les origines du projet d'union douanière franco-italienne, le rôle du secteur industriel dans les négociations et sa faisabilité en termes économiques. Les principaux obstacles à l'union étaient d'ordre économique: les structures des économies française et italienne étaient à bien des égards similaires, donc peu complémentaires. Afin d'endiguer la concurrence, que l'ouverture des frontières n'aurait pas manqué d'induire, des industriels français et italiens envisageaient la création de cartels. Le gouvernement italien souhaitait vivement la conclusion d'un traité d'union douanière pour des raisons politiques. Le gouvernement français par contre ne voyait guère d'avantage à un tel accord avec l'Italie. Les milieux d'affaires français craignaient et la concurrence italienne et une vague migratoire en provenance d'Italie. En mai 1949, la France refusa l'union douanière, mais cherchait un nouvel accord avec l'Italie à travers le Plan Petsche et les négociations Fritalux-Finibel qui incluaient aussi le Benelux. Mais cette voie était également vouée à l'échec comme le montre la deuxième partie de cet article.

Même si toutes ces initiatives finirent par échouer, elles ont néanmoins permis d'insérer à nouveau l'Italie dans des négociations de coopération économique internationale qui ont posé les fondements de futurs accords.

Jean-Marie Palayret

Educating young People to Europe: the European Youth Campaign, 1951-1958

The European Youth Campaign springs from an initiative taken late in 1950 by the European Movement. Although initially conceived as an alternative to communist-organized youth festivals, being financially supported by the "American Committee for a United Europe", (ACUE), the EYC's first steps consisted in starting an education and information campaign with the objective of interesting young people in the construction of Europe.

The European Movement thus relied essentially on the national and international youth movements of the fifteen member countries of the Council of Europe, which both staffed the EYC and organized European events for their members. During the year 1952/53, EYC evolved towards a clearly political campaign, in order to meet observations by the ACUE, as well as criticism from the European Movement. The movement's cooperation with the youth organizations then based itself on specific programs involving a "political threshold" as a condition for awarding funds. From 1954 on, the EYC supported efforts at relaunching the Community by preparing the "Youth States-General". In 1957 and 1958, the EYC concentrated its actions on the success and application of the Treaties of Rome by imparting essentially economic information to specialized circles (farmers, teachers). The creation of the EEC and EURATOM having led the ACUE to reduce its contribution and even to cut it off abruptly in 1958, the EYC had to be dissolved in 1959.

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La Campagne européenne de la Jeunesse (CEJ) est née d'une initiative prise à la fin de 1950 par le Mouvement européen. Conçue initialement comme une alternative aux festivals de la jeunesse organisés par les communistes, elle obtient le soutien financier de l'"American Committee for a United Europe" (ACUE). La CEJ apparaît au cours de sa première année d'activité comme une campagne d'éducation et d'information dont l'objectif consiste à intéresser la jeunesse à la construction de l'Europe.

Le Mouvement européen s'appuie alors essentiellement sur les mouvements de jeunesse nationaux et internationaux des Quinze pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe qui fournissent le personnel pour la CEJ et organisent les manifestations européennes pour leurs membres. Au cours de l'année 1952-1953, la CEJ connaît un infléchissement: elle évolue vers une campagne nettement politique afin de répondre à la fois aux remarques de l'ACUE, qui désire concentrer les moyens financiers sur l'action à entreprendre au sein des Six, et aux critiques du Mouvement européen soucieux d'amplifier l'action militante en faveur de la CED et de la CPE. La coopération du Mouvement avec les organisations de jeunesse est désormais fondée sur des programmes précis comportant un "seuil politique" qui condi-

tionne l'attribution des fonds. A partir de 1954, la CEJ seconde les efforts de relance communautaire. En 1957 et 1958, la CEJ concentre son action sur le succès et la mise en application des traités de Rome. Son travail s'infléchit alors dans le sens d'une information de caractère essentiellement économique et destinée à des milieux spécialisés (agricultures, enseignants). La création de la CEE et de l'EURATOM ayant conduit l'ACUE à réduire sa contribution puis à l'interrompre brutalement en 1958, les responsables de la CEJ se voient contraints de procéder à sa liquidation en 1959.

Beatrice Heuser
European Strategists and European Identity:
The Quest for a European Nuclear Force (1954–1967)

The monopoly of the use of force in defence of a system or in the furtherance of its interests is regarded as a touchstone of power. The ability to use armed force independently from reliance on, or interference from, other powers has come to be seen as the essence of a state's power or sovereignty. Imbued with these ideas, but also for hard defence-strategic reasons, Europeanists have pondered the need for a European defence entity as part of the creation of a European supra-national state. This article analyses the quest for a European nuclear force in the 1950s and 1960s, which foundered on general preferences for the continued existence of the sovereign nation-state.

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Le monopole de l'emploi de la force, pour assurer sa défense ou pour la poursuite de ses intérêts, est généralement considéré comme un élément-clé de la puissance d'un Etat et de sa souveraineté. Inspirés par de telles idées, mais aussi pour des raisons d'ordre stratégique, des européens ont réfléchi sur la nécessité d'une entité de défense européenne comme partie intégrante d'un Etat européen supranational. Cet article étudie la quête d'une force nucléaire européenne dans les années 50 et 60, quête qui a échoué face à la volonté générale de maintenir les Etats-nations comme entités souveraines.

Simona Toschi
Washington – London – Paris, an Untenable Triangle (1960–1963)

This article is a study of the first British decision to join the European Economic Community – its origins, its implementation, its failure. The unifying thread of the analysis is Harold Macmillan's attempt to spin a political, economic and military cobweb between Britain, the United States and France: a London-Washington-Paris triangle. The author not only describes Macmillan's tactics and the development of the Prime Minister's strategy, but also analyses the underlying assumptions on which the British tactics and strategy relied. Such examination brings to the fore the inner contradictions of the British attitude, supporting the author's thesis that the London-Washington-Paris triangle devised by Macmillan at the beginning of the Sixties was intrinsically untenable.

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Cet article porte sur les origines, la mise en place et l'échec de la première demande d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à la Communauté économique européenne. Le fil conducteur de l'analyse est constitué par les efforts de Harold Macmillan de tisser un réseau de relations politiques, économiques et militaires entre le Royaume-Uni, les Etats-Unis et la France, de créer, en quelque sorte, un triangle Londres-Washington-Paris. Mais l'auteur ne se limite pas à décrire la tactique et la stratégie du Premier Ministre anglais, il s'attache aussi à étudier les hypothèses qui sous-tendent cette tactique et cette stratégie. Cette analyse met en évidence les contradictions internes de la politique britannique et étaye la thèse de l'auteur en prouvant que le triangle Londre-Washington-Paris, imaginé par Macmillan au début des années soixante, était intrinsèquement non viable.

Andrea Ciampani

**The Participation of Free Trade Unions in the Process of European Integration.
A preliminary Review of Archive Sources**

This article presents some preliminary indications of research on the state of archive documentation which is at the disposal of historians who wish to study further in depth the role played by social forces and free trade unions in the process of European integration process during the period 1949-1962. The possibilities and the limits of participation of social forces in the context of European supranational organizations emerge from archive documentation which can back recent studies in this field. In particular this article mentions the importance of some documents in the archives of ECSC, of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and of the Italian Trade Union CISL.

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Cet article présente un aperçu sur l'état de la documentation à la disposition des historiens qui veulent étudier le rôle des forces sociales et des syndicats libres dans le processus d'intégration européenne pendant la période 1949-1962. Les possibilités et les limites d'action des forces sociales dans le cadre des organisations supranationales européennes ressortent de cette documentation susceptible d'alimenter de nouvelles études dans ce domaine de recherche. En particulier, l'article souligne l'intérêt de certains documents conservés dans les archives de la CECA, de la Confédération internationale des syndicats libres et du syndicat italien CISL.

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